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Foreword to the 2009 Edition 
Steffen Böhm and Campbell Jones 
With this publication of Herbert Marcuse’s Negations we also announce 
the establishment of MayFlyBooks, and with this a programme for the 
determinate negation of contemporary corporate capitalism. Marcuse’s 
book, which we are reprinting here, bears the mark of a particular 
historical moment, characterized by economic and cultural over-
industrialization, war and totalitarianism. This is the specific moment 
against which Marcuse set himself. In the current historical situation one 
senses the equally pressing need for options against the impositions of 
the increasingly grotesque forms of global capitalism. As Marcuse 
responded to the particular historical moment in which he lived, we 
sense today the demand to perform similar negations, which will be at 
once determinate, specific and singular at the same time that they keep 
an eye on the universal.  
This is not to say that the world we live in, like that of Marcuse, is 
one that is simply in crisis, but rather that, across the various spaces in 
which it is grasped in thought, it is not in crisis enough. This is the 
result of the impositions and extensions not only of the capitalist mode 
of production and the commodification of life, but of the incorporation 
of the very spaces in which these social processes might have been 
understood and transformed. Here we think with Marcuse of the place 
of culture and the diversion or incorporation of the critical impulse, but 
also the almost complete abdication of responsibility by those working 
in what are still nobly called universities. 
Struggling against these totalisations, Marcuse’s book is caught at the 
borderline between utopianism and despair. On the one hand, it 
outlines concrete theoretical and practical proposals for overcoming the 
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present, while, on the other hand, it is keenly aware that the present is 
marked by an almost complete subsumption in ‘total administration’. 
This dialectic therefore eschews two of the most dominant trends in 
thought today: first, naive utopianism that imagines the easy escape 
from the present, as if the collapse of the capitalist empire is already at 
hand, and, second, the varieties of empiricism and fatalism that merely 
document the state of affairs and our failures to date. 
The essays in this book fall in two parts. The first five chapters were 
written and published before the start of the Second World War at a 
time when Marcuse was a member of the Frankfurt Institute for Social 
Research. These essays were originally published in the Zeitschrift für 
Sozialforschung (Journal for Social Research), the ‘house journal’ and main 
literary organ of the Frankfurt School, which was edited and led by Max 
Horkheimer during the 1930s. Marcuse joined the Institute in 1933, the 
same year he emigrated from Germany, first to Switzerland and then to 
the United States, where he lived until his death in 1979. These essays 
therefore precede, and can be read as preparations for, Reason and 
Revolution (1941), Marcuse’s elaboration of the negative philosophy 
which he takes from Hegel. The final three chapters in Negations 
appeared later, in the mid through late 1960s, in the years following the 
publication of One-Dimensional Man in 1964, in those years in which 
Marcuse was elevated into a public intellectual figure in the days of 
1968. 
Forty years after their original publication, these essays are not, 
however, of merely historical interest, nor as part of a documentary 
testimony to Marcuse or the ‘Frankfurt School’. For Marcuse, published 
works are profoundly historical, both in their location in relation to the 
moment against which they are opposed, but, at the same time, texts 
cannot deny their relation to that which exceeds that moment. From 
our current situation of suffocating affluence we can again sense 
Marcuse’s dismay at the failure or unwillingness to seize the productive 
capacities unleashed by capitalism and put them towards more humane 
purposes than those to which they were and currently are being put. 
The conditions for transformation were for Marcuse, as they are for us 
now, present in the very same conditions that also give us so much 
reason for despair. 
Negations is therefore not a negative book but a call to action, a 
thinking that involves an affirmation of thinking and of life and a 
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hopefulness that knows also that hopefulness without negation –  an 
awareness of what must be negated and the risks of that task –  is naive. 
In this way, it is continuous with the project that, as Adorno stressed in 
Negative Dialectics, to stay positive, to affirm life, one must engage in a 
process of negating what is. Because only through this negating of what 
is can one find determinate possibilities of development, progress, 
freedom. Positive possibilities of a new life that escape the stultifying 
repetition of the present can only come through negation. Being simply 
‘positive’ involves the danger of putting forward utopian futures which 
have no relation to the present, to the ‘what is’, to contemporary social 
relations. This is why Marx so vehemently criticised the utopian 
socialists of his time, as their utopian ideas for new towns and 
communities were not founded in an understanding of the realities of 
‘actually existing’ capitalist relations. 
In the world of academic fashion, every dog will have its day. There 
is little point in taking issue with those who have set themselves to 
sidestep the work of Marcuse, and others, in their interest to create ever 
more radical thought. Rather, we offer this book as something of an 
invitation, an invitation for a learning – or a relearning – of what 
dialectical thinking, in a materialist register, can offer. Because our 
suspicion is that Marcuse continues to inform, and indeed should 
continue to inform, the diverse and often self-servingly isolated critical 
vocabularies currently circulating. This we hold to be the case from 
those concerned with the incorporation of critique in the production of 
a ‘new spirit of capitalism’ to those who sense the immanent 
possibilities that arise from the socialisation of work and the tendencies 
that are apparently rendering productive relations today linguistic and 
immaterial. 
This book is, as we all are, part of these productive relations. We are 
all part of a capitalist culture that continuously tries to individualize us, 
to set us apart, to establish hierarchies that are able to judge, measure 
and categorize us. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that academic 
critique is today so individualised and is more intent on distinguishing 
itself from other criticism than on changing anything. But to overcome 
this state of affairs is also the point. Marcuse’s Negations shows how this 
individualisation functions, how it is directly related to the 
commodification of life, and how it produces, what he calls with a 
directness rare today, a ‘sick society’. Negation means to, first, realize 
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that we are sick, and, second, that there is a need to develop strategies 
beyond that sickness. 
To escape sickness is not to return to the previous state of good 
health, but is a joy in the possibility of living again. Joy of negation then, 
and not for the purpose of frivolity or posturing, but because of the 
enclosure and of the forestalled real possibilities for freedom, that is, for 
meaningful and genuinely democratic social relations. Joy in knowing 
that another world is possible and that the immanent possibilities of the 
present both contain and constrain that very world. Joy in a negation 
that stands together with those who have struggled for the possibility of 
a future and who continue to do so today, in their various practical and 
intellectual experiments. 
MayFlyBooks is part of this history and tradition of practical and 
intellectual experimentation and the struggle toward a different future. 
Publishing under Creative Commons is today an explicit negation of the 
the political and economic structures of the publishing industry, which 
continues to put profit over thought, enclosure over freedom. In 
contrast to the publishing corporations, we offer this book to the 
intellectual commons, for everyone to learn, to learn from history, to 
learn to negate, to learn to interrogate the present and ourselves. We 
thus hope this book will inspire a new generation of commoners, of 
intellectuals and activists struggling for a better world, beyond the 
current enclosures of thought and life. 
To be sure, this book will not provide all the answers. Far from it. 
We have not made any effort to cover up the defects in this book, and 
indeed we offer it up for critical reading. We have corrected a few 
obvious typographical errors but have left slips of the pen and other 
lapses and inconsistencies in place. This means, and not merely at the 
level of typography, that this is a book for the critical reader, the reader 
who is not satisfied with readymade answers, who is not looking for a 
recipe book for how to change the world. Negations needs to be read 
affirmatively, to draw out connections to today, to other present 
struggles, and to the current crisis. Affirmatively, which is to say also, 
and at the same time, through a strategy of negation. 
  xvii 
 Foreword 
Herbert Marcuse 
Many of the essays collected here were written in the years from 1934 to 
1938. They developed out of my work at the Institute for Social 
Research in New York and were formulated in discussion with my 
friend Max Horkheimer, at that time director of the Institute, and his 
coworkers. I have let them be republished unchanged. No revision 
could bridge the chasm that separates the period in which they were 
written from the present one. At that time, it was not yet clear that the 
powers that had defeated fascism by virtue of their technical and 
economic superiority would strengthen and streamline the social 
structure which had produced fascism. The question remained open, 
whether this conquest would not be superseded by more progressive 
and general historical forces. Capitalist society had not yet revealed all 
its strength and all its rationality, and the fate of the labor movement 
was still ‘uncertain’. The first of these essays closes with that 
uncertainty, which is common to all of them, as is the hope, that fascism 
might perhaps be vanquished by forces (or rather, that its destruction 
would set free forces) that would make possible a more human and 
more rational society. For if there was one matter about which the 
author of these essays and his friends were not uncertain, it was the 
understanding that the fascist state was fascist society, and that 
totalitarian violence and totalitarian reason came from the structure of 
existing society, which was in the act of overcoming its liberal past and 
incorporating its historical negation. This presented the critical theory of 
society with the task of identifying the tendencies that linked the liberal 
past with its totalitarian abolition. This abolition was not restricted at all 
to the totalitarian states and since then has become reality in many 
democracies (and especially in the most developed ones). The present 
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did not appear to be in immediate opposition to the past: it was 
necessary to exhibit the mediation by means of which bourgeois 
freedom could become unfreedom. But it was also necessary to indicate 
the elements that opposed this transformation. Thus the theme of the 
first essay is common to all of them. 
The focal point is the interpretation of some of the leading ideas of 
intellectual culture – of ideology. In political economy, Marxian theory 
had traced to their origins the tendencies that linked the liberal past with 
its totalitarian liquidation. What I attempted was to detect and trace 
these tendencies in culture, more specifically in its representative 
philosophy. For it was mind, reason, consciousness, ‘pure’ thought that 
in the traditional culture was supposed to constitute the autonomy of 
the subject, the essential freedom of man. Here was the sphere of 
negation, of contradiction to the established order, of protest, of 
dissociation, of criticism. Protestantism and the bourgeois revolutions 
proclaimed the freedom of thought and of conscience. They were the 
sanctioned forms of contradiction – often the only ones – and the most 
precious refuge of hope. Only rarely and in exceptional cases did 
bourgeois society dare to infringe on this refuge. Soul and mind were (at 
least officially) considered holy and awesome. Spiritually and mentally, 
man was supposed to be as autonomous as possible. This was his inner 
freedom, which was his authentic and essential freedom; the other 
liberties were taken care of by the economy and the state. Normally it 
was not necessary for society to intervene in this sphere; a total 
coordination and subordination of individuals was not required. The 
productive forces had not yet reached that stage of development at 
which the sale of the products of social labor demanded the systematic 
organization of needs and wants,1 including intellectual ones. The 
market regulated for better or worse the operation and output of a labor 
apparatus not yet dependent upon uninterrupted mass consumption. At 
a low level of productive forces, bourgeois society did not yet have the 
means to administer soul and mind without discrediting this 
administration through terroristic violence. Today total administration is 
necessary, and the means are at hand; mass gratification, market 
research, industrial psychology, computer mathematics, and the so-
called science of human relations. These take care of the nonterroristic, 
democratic, spontaneous-automatic harmonization of individual and 
socially necessary needs and wants, of autonomy and heteronomy. They 
assure the free election of individuals and policies necessary for this 
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system to continue to exist and grow. The democratic abolition of 
thought, which the ‘common man’ undergoes automatically and which 
he himself carries out (in labor and in the use and enjoyment of the 
apparatus of production and consumption), is brought about in ‘higher 
learning’ by those positivistic and positive trends of philosophy, 
sociology, and psychology that make the established system into an 
insuperable framework for conceptual thought. 
But the rapidity with which it was possible to achieve the social 
organization and administration of the mind suggests the question 
whether the mind did not itself bear part of the responsibility for such a 
development. In other words, did intellectual culture prepare its own 
liquidation? Were its autonomy, inwardness, purity, and the happiness 
and fulfilment that it promised already permeated with unfreedom, 
adjustment, unhappiness, and renunciation? Did this culture have an 
affirmative character even where it was the negation of the status quo? 
In regard to these questions I investigated several concepts of idealism 
and materialism. Ideas such as essence, happiness, or theory bore 
evidence of inner disunity. In an authentic way they revealed the 
genuine potentialities of man and of nature as being in contradiction to 
the given reality of man and of nature; thus they were eminently critical 
concepts. At the same time, however, they invalidated this contradiction 
by giving it ontological stability. This was the specific situation of 
idealism that culminated in Hegelian philosophy; contradiction becomes 
the very form of truth and movement, only to be enclosed in a system 
and internalized. But by adhering to reason as the power of the negative, 
idealism made good the claim of thought to be a condition of freedom. 
The classical connection between German idealism and the Marxian 
labor movement was valid, and not merely as a fact of the history of 
ideas. 
It was in this perspective that the essays dealt with the legacy of 
idealism, with the element of truth in its repressive philosophy. But the 
legacy and truth of materialism, and not only historical materialism, 
were of equal import. In the insistence of thought upon the abolition of 
misery and of need, upon happiness and pleasure as contents of human 
freedom, the tabooed tasks of revolution were preserved: tasks which 
even in socialist theory and practice had already been long suppressed 
or postponed. The more ‘materialistic’ society became in the advanced 
industrial countries, i.e. the higher the standard of living rose for broad 
strata of the population, the clearer became the extent to which this 
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progress stabilized misery and unhappiness. Productivity bore 
destruction within it and turned technology from an instrument of 
liberation into one of new enslavement. Faced with a society in which 
affluence is accompanied by intensified exploitation, militant 
materialism remains negative and revolutionary (even where exploitation 
becomes more comfortable and does not penetrate into consciousness). 
Its idea of happiness and of gratification can be realized only through 
political practice that has qualitatively new modes of human existence as 
its goal. 
That most of this was written before Auschwitz deeply separates it 
from the present. What was correct in it has since become, perhaps not 
false, but a thing of the past. To be sure, the concern with philosophy 
expressed in these essays was already, in the thirties, a concern with the 
past: remembrance of something that at some point had lost its reality 
and had to be taken up again. Precisely at that time, beaten or betrayed, 
the social forces in which freedom and revolution were joined were 
delivered over to the existing powers. The last time that freedom, 
solidarity, and humanity were the goals of a revolutionary struggle was 
on the battlefields of the Spanish civil war.2 Even today the songs sung 
for and in that struggle are, for the younger generation, the only 
persisting reflection of a possible revolution. The end of a historical 
period and the horror of the one to come were announced in the 
simultaneity of the civil war in Spain and the trials in Moscow. 
The new period saw the suppression, crippling, and neutralization of 
the classes and forces that, due to their real interests, embodied hope 
for the end of inhumanity. In the advanced industrial countries, the 
subordination and coordination of the suppressed is effected through 
the total administration of the productive forces and the growing 
satisfaction of needs, which insulate society against its necessary 
transformation. Productivity and prosperity in league with a technology 
in the service of monopolistic politics seem to immunize advancing 
industrial society in its established structure. 
Is this concept of immunity still dialectical? To be sure, for critical 
theory it implies the sorrow of concern with something that has 
disappeared (this was the tenor of the essay ‘Philosophy and Critical 
Theory’). But does it also offer hope that the social tendencies 
comprehended through this concept promise something other than 
what they are? Perhaps the very break with the past exhibited in the 
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neutralization and liquidation of the opposition is an indication. In the 
essay just mentioned, I wrote: “Critical theory must concern itself to a 
hitherto unknown extent with the past – precisely insofar as it is 
concerned with the future”. Has social development perhaps attained a 
stage when the remembrance and constructive abolition of the past 
demands more radical concepts than those which were formed in the 
pretotalitarian period? Today critical theory is essentially more abstract 
than it was at that time: it can hardly think of ‘taking hold of the 
masses’. But may not the abstract, ‘unrealistic’ character of the theory at 
that time have lain in its having been attached too strongly to the society 
that it comprehended, so that in its concept of negation it did not go far 
enough in surpassing that society? In other words, did not its concept of 
a free and rational society promise, not too much, but rather too little? In 
view of the capacity and productivity of organized capitalism, should 
not the ‘first phase’ of socialism be more and qualitatively other than it 
was projected to be in Marxian theory? Is not this the context in which 
belongs socialism’s affinity for and successes in preindustrial and weakly 
industrialized societies? The Marxian concepts of capitalism and of 
socialism were decisively determined by the function of human labor, 
physical labor in social reproduction. Marx’s image of the realm of 
necessity does not correspond to today’s highly developed industrial 
nations. And in view of the frantic expansion of totalitarian mass 
democracy, the Marxian image of the realm of freedom beyond the 
realm of necessity must appear ‘romantic’. For it stipulates an individual 
subject of labor, an autonomy of creative activity and leisure, and a 
dimension of unspoiled nature that have long since been liquidated in 
the progress of domination3 and industrialization. 
Does this progress perhaps show that the contradiction and 
negation were not radical enough, that they rejected too little and held 
too little to be possible, that they underestimated the qualitative 
difference between the really possible and the status quo? Has not late 
industrial society already surpassed, in a bad form, the idea of socialism 
– as in bad planning, bad expansion of the productive forces, bad 
organization of the working class, and bad development of needs and of 
gratification? Of course, all the wealth, the technology, and the 
productivity of this society cannot match the ideas of real freedom and 
of real justice which are at the center of socialist theory. Nevertheless, 
these ideas appear in forms worked out substantially as the potentiality4 
and negation of a capitalism that was not yet fully developed. 
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Developed industrial society has already won for itself much of the 
ground on which the new freedom was to have flourished. This society 
has appropriated dimensions of consciousness and nature that formerly 
were relatively unspoiled. It has formed historical alternatives in its own 
image and flattened out contradiction, which it can thus tolerate. 
Through this totalitarian-democratic conquest of man and of nature, the 
subjective and objective space for the realm of freedom has also been 
conquered. 
In return, forces of total transformation are at work in the realm of 
necessity itself. The same mathematization and automation of labor and 
the same calculated, public administration of existence that tend to 
make society and the nature that it appropriates into one single 
apparatus, into an object of experimentation and control in the hands of 
the rulers, create an apparatus from which men can more easily 
withdraw, the more calculable and automatic it becomes. Here appears 
the chance of the transformation of quantity into quality, the leap into a 
qualitatively different stage. Marx described this transformation as an 
explosive tendency in the final transmutation of the capitalist labor 
process. Capital 
diminishes labor time … in the form of necessary labor in order to 
augment it in the form of surplus labor. It therewith in increasing 
measure sets the surplus as a condition – question de vie et de mort – of 
the necessary. On the one hand it calls to life all the forces of science 
and of nature as well as of social combination and of social intercourse, 
in order to make the creation of wealth (relatively) independent of the 
labor time expended on it. On the other hand it wants to measure 
against labor time the gigantic social forces that have been created, and 
to confine them within the limits required in order to preserve as value 
the value already created.5 
The growing automation of the labor process and the time that it sets 
free transform the subject himself, and man then enters as a different 
subject 
into the immediate process of production. Considered in relation to 
developing man, the process of production is discipline. At the same 
time, in relation to developed man, in whose head exists the 
accumulated knowledge of society, it is practice, experimental science, 
and materially creative, self-objectifying knowledge.6 
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It can be seen that precisely the most exaggerated, ‘eschatological’ 
conceptions of Marxian theory most adequately anticipate social 
tendencies: for instance, the idea of the abolition of labor, which Marx 
himself later rejected. Behind all the inhuman aspects of automation as 
it is organized under capitalism, its real possibilities appear: the genesis 
of a technological world in which man can finally withdraw from, 
evacuate, and oversee the apparatus of his labor – in order to 
experiment freely with it. Irresponsible as it may seem, in view of 
existing poverty and existing need, to summon up the image of such 
freedom, it is just as irresponsible to conceal the extent to which 
existing poverty and existing need are perpetuated only by the interests 
that rule the status quo. Despite all planning and organization, however, 
the fundamental tendencies of the system realize themselves against the 
will and the intentions of individuals – as blind forces even where they 
are scientifically mastered and calculated and obey the requirements of 
the apparatus. The apparatus becomes in a literal sense the subject; this 
is practically the definition of an automaton. And to the extent to which 
the apparatus itself becomes the subject, it casts off man as a serving 
and working being and sets him free as a thinking, knowing, 
experimenting, and playing being. Freedom from the need for the 
intervention of human service and servitude – that is the law of 
technological rationality. Today the latter is enmeshed in the apparatus 
of domination, which perpetuates the necessity whose abolition it makes 
possible. To experiment and play with the apparatus is at present the 
monopoly of those who work for the preservation and expansion of the 
status quo. Perhaps this monopoly can be broken only by catastrophe. 
Catastrophe, however, appears not only in the constant menace of 
atomic war, in play with annihilation, but also in the social logic of 
technology, in play with ever-growing productivity, which falls into 
ever-clearer contradiction to the system in which it is caught. Nothing 
justifies the assumption that the new form of the classic contradiction 
can be manipulated permanently. It is just as unjustifiable, nevertheless, 
to assume that it cannot lead once more to new forms of oppression. 
More than before, breaking through the administered consciousness is a 
precondition of liberation. Thought in contradiction must be capable of 
comprehending and expressing the new potentialities of a qualitatively 
different existence. It must be capable of surpassing the force of 
technological repression and of incorporating into its concepts the 
elements of gratification that are suppressed and perverted in this 
Negations 
xxiv 
repression. In other words, thought in contradiction must become more 
negative and more utopian in opposition to the status quo. This seems 
to me to be the imperative of the current situation in relation to my 
theoretical essays of the thirties. 
In totalitarian technological society, freedom remains thinkable only 
as autonomy over the entirety of the apparatus. This includes the 
freedom to reduce it or to reconstruct it in its entirety with regard to the 
pacification of the struggle for existence and to the rediscovery of quiet 
and of happiness. The abolition of material poverty is a possibility 
within the status quo; peace, joy, and the abolition of labor are not. And 
yet only in and through them can the established order be overcome. 
Totalitarian society brings the realm of freedom beyond the realm of 
necessity under its administration and fashions it after its own image. In 
complete contradiction to this future, autonomy over the technological 
apparatus is freedom in the realm of necessity. This means, however, 
that freedom is only possible as the realization of what today is called 
utopia. 
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The Struggle Against Liberalism in the 
Totalitarian View of the State 
The establishment of the total-authoritarian state was accompanied by 
the annunciation of a new political weltanschauung: ‘heroic-folkish1 
realism’ became the governing theory. 
Blood rises up against formal understanding, race against the rational 
pursuit of ends, honor against profit, bonds against the caprice that is 
called ‘freedom’, organic totality against individualistic dissolution, valor 
against bourgeois security, politics against the primacy of the economy, 
state against society, folk against the individual and the mass.2 
The new worldview3 is a great reservoir for all the currents that have 
been deluging ‘liberalist’ political and social theory since World War I. 
The struggle first began far from the political arena as a philosophical 
controversy with the rationalism, individualism, and materialism of the 
nineteenth century. A united front emerged which, with the 
intensification of economic and social conflict after the war, soon 
revealed its political and social function; compared with the latter, the 
struggle against liberalism (as we shall show in what follows) became no 
more than peripheral. Let us first briefly survey the most important 
sources of the current theory – 
The heroizing of Man 
Long before World War I, the celebration of a new type of man became 
prevalent, finding its adepts in almost all branches of the social sciences 
and humanities, from economics to philosophy. Right down the line, an 
attack was launched against the hypertrophic rationalization and 
technification of life, against the ‘bourgeois’ of the nineteenth century 
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with his petty joys and petty aims, against the shopkeeper and merchant 
spirit and the destructive ‘anemia’ of existence. A new image of man 
was held up to this paltry predecessor, composed of traits from the age 
of the Viking, German mysticism, the Renaissance, and the Prussian 
military: the heroic man, bound to the forces of blood and soil – the 
man who travels through heaven and hell, who does not reason why, 
but goes into action to do and die, sacrificing himself not for any 
purpose but in humble obedience to the dark forces that nourish him. 
This image expanded to the vision of the charismatic leader4 whose 
leadership does not need to be justified on the basis of his aims, but 
whose mere appearance is already his ‘proof’, to be accepted as an 
undeserved gift of grace. With many modifications, but always in the 
forefront of the fight against bourgeois and intellectualistic existence, 
this archetype of man can be found among the ideas of the Stefan 
George circle, of Moller van den Bruck, Sombart, Scheler, Hielscher, 
Jünger, and others. Its philosophical justification has been sought in a 
so-called –  
Philosophy of life 
‘Life’ as such is a ‘primal given’ beyond which the mind cannot 
penetrate, which is withdrawn from any rational foundation, 
justification, or evaluation. Life, when understood in this way, becomes 
an inexhaustible reservoir for all irrational powers. Through it the 
‘psychic underworld’ can be conjured up, which is “as little evil as [is] 
the cosmic … , but is rather the womb and refuge for all productive and 
generative forces, all forces that, though formless, serve every form as 
content, all fateful movements.”5 When this life ‘beyond good and evil’ 
is seen as the force that actually ‘makes history’, an antirational and 
antimaterialist view of history is created whose sociological fertility is 
demonstrated in political existentialism and its theory of the total state. 
This philosophy of life resembles Dilthey’s Lebensphilosophie in name 
only and took from Nietzsche only odds and ends and pathos. Its social 
functions come to light most clearly in the works of Spengler,6 where 
they become the substructure of an imperialist economic theory. 
The tendency common to both of these currents, namely ‘liberating’ 
life from the compulsion of a ‘universally’ obligatory reason that stands 
above specific ruling interests (and the mandate, derived from this 
reason, to create a rational human society) and delivering up existence 
to pregiven ‘inviolable’ powers, leads to – 
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Irrationalistic naturalism 
The interpretation of the historical and social process as a natural-
organic process goes behind the real (economic and social) motive 
forces of history into the sphere of eternal and immutable nature. 
Nature is interpreted as a dimension of mythical originality (well 
characterized in the phrase ‘blood and soil’), present in all things as a 
prehistorical dimension. Human history truly begins only when this 
dimension is overcome by being transformed. In the new 
weltanschauung, mythical, prehistorical nature has the function of 
serving as the real adversary of responsible, autonomous, rational 
practice. As something justified through its mere existence, this nature 
stands opposed to that which requires rational justification; as what 
must be absolutely acknowledged, against all that is first to be known 
critically; as the essentially dark, against all that derives its substance 
from the clarity of light; as the indestructible, against everything subject 
to historical change. Naturalism is based on an equation that is 
constitutive of the new worldview: nature, as original, is simultaneously 
the natural, genuine, healthy, valuable, and sacred. That which is 
beneath reason elevates itself, by means of its function ‘beyond good 
and evil’, to what is beyond reason. 
But the keystone of the entire edifice is still missing. The hymn to 
the natural-organic order contrasts too crassly with the factual, 
established order. There is a screaming contradiction between the 
relations of production on the one hand and the attained level of 
productive forces and the satisfaction of needs it makes possible on the 
other. Nature is confronted with an economy and society that are 
‘unnatural’, an order perpetuated by means of the violence of a gigantic 
apparatus that can represent the whole against the individual because it 
wholly oppresses him, a ‘totality’ that subsists only through the total 
domination of all. The theoretical transfiguration of this totality results 
in – 
Universalism 
We shall not discuss here those elements of a genuine contribution to 
philosophical and scientific knowledge (e.g. Gestalt theory) present in 
universalism. In the present context, what is significant is that in the 
area of social theory universalism quickly took over the function of a 
doctrine of political justification. Compared with individuals, the social 
totality as self-subsistent and primary reality becomes, by virtue of its 
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pure total character, a self-subsistent and primary value: the totality is, as 
totality, the true and the genuine. Universalism does not ask whether 
every totality does not first have to prove itself before the tribunal of 
individuals, to show that their potentialities and needs are realized in it. 
When the totality is no longer the conclusion but the axiom, the path of 
theoretical and practical social criticism leading to this totality is blocked 
off. Totality is programmatically mystified. It can “never be grasped by 
hands, nor seen with outer eyes. Composure and depth of spirit are 
necessary in order to behold it with the inner eye.”7 In political theory 
this totality is represented by the folk (Volk), as an essentially ‘natural-
organic’ unity and totality that is prior to all social differentiation into 
classes, interest groups, etc. With this thesis universalism rejoins 
naturalism. 
Here we interrupt our sketch of the currents that come together in 
heroic-folkish realism; later we shall deal both with their unification in a 
total political theory and their social function. Before interpreting their 
interconnection it is necessary to define the historical locus of their 
unification. It becomes visible from its antipode. Heroic-folkish realism 
indiscriminately brings together everything against which it fights under 
the title of liberalism. “Liberalism is the destruction of the nations”; these 
words stand at the head of that chapter of his book which Möller van 
den Bruck devoted to the mortal enemy.8 It was as a counter to 
liberalism that the theory of the total-authoritarian state became a 
‘weltanschauung’. Only in this Combat position did it attain its political 
sharpness (and even Marxism always appears to it in the train of 
liberalism9 as its heir or partner). We must initially ask, therefore: What 
does this theory mean by liberalism, which it damns with a virtually 
eschatological pathos, and what brought this damnation upon it? 
If we ask the spokesmen of the new weltanschauung what they are 
fighting in their attack on liberalism, we hear in reply of the ‘ideas of 
1789’, of wishy-washy humanism and pacifism, Western intellectualism, 
egotistical individualism, sacrifice of the nation and state to conflicts of 
interest between particular social groups, abstract, conformist 
egalitarianism, the party system, the hypertrophy of the economy, and 
destructive technicism and materialism. These are the most concrete 
utterances10 – for the concept ‘liberal’ often serves only for purposes of 
defamation, and political opponents are ‘liberal’ no matter where they 
stand, and are as such the simply ‘evil’.11 
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Most surprising in this catalogue of sins is their abstract generality 
and ahistorical quality. Scarcely one of them is characteristic of historical 
liberalism. The ideas of 1789 have by no means always been on the 
banner of liberalism and have even been sharply attacked by it. 
Liberalism has been one of the strongest supports of the demand for a 
powerful nation. Pacifism and internationalism were not always causes it 
adopted, and it has often enough accepted considerable intervention of 
the state in the economy. What remains is a vague ‘weltanschauung’ 
whose historical association with liberalism is not at all clear, although 
its qualification as an object for the attacks of the totalitarian theory of 
the state will, we hope, become clear later. But supplanting the real 
content of liberalism with a weltanschauung is in itself decisive in what 
it conceals and leaves unsaid. The concealment points to the true 
battlefront: it avoids the economic and social structure of liberalism. It 
is necessary to reconstruct (however summarily) this structure in order 
to know the historical and social terrain which makes the struggle of the 
‘weltanschauungen’ understandable. 
Liberalism was the social and economic theory of European 
industrial capitalism in the period when the actual economic bearer of 
capitalism was the ‘individual capitalist’, the private entrepreneur in the 
literal sense. Despite structural variations in liberalism and its bearers 
from one country or period to another, a uniform foundation remains: 
the individual economic subject’s free ownership and control of private 
property and the politically and legally guaranteed security of these 
rights. Around this one stable center, all specific economic and social 
demands of liberalism can be modified – modified to the point of self-
abolition. Thus, during the rule of liberalism, powerful intervention in 
economic life by state authority frequently occurred, whenever the 
threatened freedom and security of private property required it, 
especially if the threat came from the proletariat. The idea of 
dictatorship and of authoritarian direction of the state is (as we shall see 
shortly) not at all foreign to liberalism. And, often enough, national wars 
were fought in the period of pacifistic-humanitarian liberalism. Those 
basic political demands of liberalism, resulting from its economic views, 
that are so hated today (such as freedom of speech and of the press, 
complete publicity of political life, the representative system and 
parliamentarianism, the separation or balance of powers) were never, in 
fact, completely realized. Depending on the social situation, they were 
curbed or dropped.12 
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In order to get behind the usual camouflage and distortion and 
arrive at a true image of the liberalist economic and social system, it 
suffices to turn to Von Mises’ portrayal of liberalism: 
The program of liberalism …, summed up in a single word, should read 
‘Property’, that is, private property in the means of production. … All 
other demands of liberalism derive from this basic demand. 
In the free, private initiative of the entrepreneur he sees the surest 
guarantee of economic and social progress. That is why liberalism 
considers “capitalism the only possible order of social relations”, and 
why it has only one enemy: Marxian socialism. On the other hand, 
liberalism maintains that 
fascism and all similar attempts at dictatorship… have momentarily 
saved European culture. The merit that fascism has thereby acquired 
will live on eternally in history. 
We can already discern the reason why the total authoritarian state 
diverts its struggle against liberalism into a struggle of 
‘weltanschauungen’, why it bypasses the social structure basic to 
liberalism: it is itself largely in accord with this basic structure. The latter 
was characterized as the organization of society through private 
enterprise on the basis of the recognition of private property and the 
private initiative of the entrepreneur. And this very organization remains 
fundamental to the total-authoritarian state; it is explicitly sanctioned in 
a multitude of programmatic declarations.13 The considerable 
modifications and restrictions of this organization that are put into 
effect everywhere correspond to the monopoly capitalist requirements 
of economic development itself. They leave untouched the principle of 
the organization of production relations. 
There is a classic document illustrating the inner relationship 
between liberalist social theory and the (apparently so antiliberal) 
totalitarian theory of the state: a letter addressed to Mussolini by Gentile 
at the time when the latter joined the Fascist party. There he writes: 
As a liberal by deepest conviction, I could not help being convinced, in 
the months in which I had the honor to collaborate in the work of your 
government and to observe at close quarters the development of the 
principles that determine your policies, that liberalism as I understand it, 
the liberalism of freedom through law and therefore through a strong 
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state, through the state as ethical reality, is represented in Italy today not 
by the liberals, who are more or less openly your opponents, but to the 
contrary by you yourself. Hence I have satisfied myself that in the 
choice between the liberalism of today and the Fascists, who understand 
the faith of your Fascism, a genuine liberal, who despises equivocation 
and wants to stand to his post, must enroll in the legions of your 
followers.14 
No documents are needed to show that, quite apart from this positive 
connection, liberalism is entirely at one with the new worldview in its 
fight against Marxian socialism. To be sure, we often encounter in 
heroic-folkish realism vehement invective against the monstrosity of 
capitalism, against its bourgeois (Bürger) and his ‘greed for profit’ and so 
on. But since the foundations of the economic order, the sole source of 
the possibility of this bourgeois, remain intact, such invectives are 
always directed against only a specific type of bourgeois (that of the 
small and petty ‘merchant breed’ [Händlertum] and against a specific 
form of capitalism (represented by the model of the free competition of 
independent and individual capitalists). They never attack the economic 
functions of the bourgeois in the capitalist production process. The 
forms of the bourgeois and of capitalism that are attacked here are 
those which have already been displaced by the course of economic 
development; nevertheless the bourgeois capitalist remains as the 
subject of the capitalist economy. The new weltanschauung reviles the 
‘merchant’ and celebrates the ‘gifted economic leader’, thereby only 
hiding that it leaves the economic functions of the bourgeois 
untouched. The antibourgeois sentiment is merely a variation of that 
‘heroizing’ of man whose social meaning we shall come to later. 
Since the social order intended by liberalism is left largely intact, it is 
no wonder that the ideological interpretation of this social order 
exhibits a significant agreement between liberalism and antiliberalism. 
More precisely, important elements of liberalism are picked up and then 
reinterpreted and elaborated in the manner required by the altered 
economic and social conditions. In what follows we shall consider the 
two most important sources in the liberalism of the new political and 
social doctrine: the naturalistic interpretation of society and the liberalist 
rationalism that ends in irrationalism. 
Behind the economic forces and relations of capitalist society 
liberalism sees ‘natural’ laws which will demonstrate their entire salutary 
naturalness if they are only left to develop freely and without artificial 
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disturbance. Rousseau sums up this idea with the words, “That which is 
good and conformable to order is so by the nature of things and 
independently of human conventions.”15 There is a ‘nature of things’ 
that has its own primal law-like character independently of human 
activity or power and that persists and continually reproduces itself 
through and despite all disturbances. Here we find a new concept of 
nature that, in sharp antithesis to the mathematical-rational concept of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, refers back to the ancient 
concept of nature as physis. After a short revolutionary period, its social 
functions within bourgeois thought become retarding and reactionary 
(as we shall see below). The application of this concept of nature to 
political economy becomes decisive. 
The existence of natural laws was always the characteristic assertion of 
the classical school. These laws … are quite simply ‘natural’, just like 
physical laws, and are consequently amoral. They can be useful or 
harmful: it is up to man to adapt to them as well as he can.16 
Liberalism believes that through adaptation to these ‘natural laws’ the 
conflict between different wants, the strife between the general interest 
and private interests, as well as social inequality are ultimately overcome 
in the all-encompassing harmony of the whole, and that the whole thus 
becomes a blessing for the individual.17 Here, in the center of the 
liberalist system, society is interpreted through its reduction to ‘nature’ 
in its harmonizing function: as the evasive justification of a 
contradictory social order.18 
Looking ahead, we observe that the new antiliberalism, just like the 
crassest liberalism, believes in eternal natural laws of social life: “There 
is something eternal in our nature that continually reproduces itself and 
to which every development must return….” “Nature is conservative, 
because it is based on an unshakable constancy of appearances that 
always reproduces itself even if it is temporarily disturbed.” These are 
not the words of a liberal but of none other than Möller van den 
Bruck.19 And totalitarian political theory shares with liberalism the 
conviction that ultimately the “balance of economic interests and forces 
will be established”20 in the whole. Even natural law, one of the most 
typical liberalist conceptions, is restated today at a new stage of history. 
“We are entering a new epoch of natural law!” proclaims Hans J. Wolff 
in a treatise on “the new form of government of the German Reich.” In 
the crisis of legal thought today the dice “have fallen in favor of nature”. 
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Only it is “no longer the nature of man” out of which “the appropriate 
determination of norms is developed: it is nature, the specific character 
of the folk-nation (and nations) as a natural given and product of 
historical becoming.”21 
Granted, liberalist naturalism is part of an essentially rationalist 
system of thought, antiliberalist naturalism part of an irrationalist one. 
The distinction must be maintained in order not to obliterate artificially 
the boundaries of both theories and not to misunderstand the change in 
their social function. But liberalist rationalism already contains, 
preformed, those tendencies that later, with the change from industrial 
to monopoly capitalism, take on an irrationalist character. 
The position which critical analysis leads a scientific theory of 
society to take with regard to the antithesis rationalism-irrationalism has 
been presented elsewhere.22 In what follows we have only worked out 
the fundamental irrationalist tendency of the social theory that we have 
taken as our theme. ‘Irrationalism’ is a counterconcept; in order to 
understand an essentially irrationalist worldview, it is necessary to 
construct an ‘ideal-type’ of a rationalist view of society. 
A theory of society is rationalist when the practice it enjoins is subject 
to the idea of autonomous reason, i.e. to the human faculty of 
comprehending, through conceptual thought, the true, the good, and 
the right. Within society, every action and every determination of goals 
as well as the social organization as a whole has to legitimate itself 
before the decisive judgment of reason and everything, in order to 
subsist as a fact or goal, stands in need of rational justification. The 
principle of sufficient reason,23 the authentic and basic principle of 
rationalism, puts forward a claim to the connection of ‘things’ or ‘facts’ 
as a ‘rational’ connection: the reason, or cause, posits that which it 
causes as eo ipso also in accordance with reason.24 The necessity of 
acknowledging a fact or goal never follows from its pure existence; 
rather, acknowledgment occurs only when knowledge has freely 
determined that the fact or goal is in accordance with reason. The 
rationalist theory of society is therefore essentially critical; it subjects 
society to the idea of a theoretical and practical, positive and negative 
critique. This critique has two guidelines: first, the given situation of 
man as a rational organism, i.e. one that has the potentiality of freely 
determining and shaping his own existence, directed by the process of 
knowledge and with regard to his worldly happiness; second, the given 
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level of development of the productive forces and the (corresponding 
or conflicting) relations of production as the criterion for those 
potentialities that can be realized at any given time in men’s rational 
structuring of society.25 The rationalist theory is well aware of the limits 
of human knowledge and of rational social action, but it avoids fixing 
these limits too hurriedly and, above all, making capital out of them for 
the purpose of uncritically sanctioning established hierarchies. 
The irrationalist theory of society finds it unnecessary to deny 
radically the reality of critical reason: between binding reason to 
pregiven ‘natural-organic’ facts and enslaving it to the ‘beast of prey 
within man’, there is sufficiently wide latitude for all sorts of derivative 
reason. Decisive here is that irrational givens (‘nature’, ‘blood and soil’, 
‘folkhood’, ‘existential facts’, ‘totality’, and so forth) are placed prior to 
the autonomy of reason as its limit in principle (not merely in fact), and 
reason is and remains causally, functionally, or organically dependent on 
them. Against all attempts to fight shy of this conclusion, it cannot be 
emphasized often enough that such functionalization of reason or of 
man as a rational organism annihilates the force and effectiveness of 
reason at its roots, for it leads to a reinterpretation of the irrational 
pregivens as normative ones, which place reason under the heteronomy of 
the irrational. In the theory of contemporary society, playing up natural-
organic facts against ‘rootless’ reason means justifying by irrational 
powers a society that can no longer be rationally justified and 
submerging in the hidden darkness of ‘blood’ or the ‘soul’ 
contradictions recognized by the light of conceptual knowledge. This is 
intended to truncate comprehension and criticism. “Reality does not 
admit of knowledge, only of acknowledgement”:26 in this ‘classical’ 
formulation irrationalist theory arrives at the extreme antipode to all 
rational thought and at the same time reveals its deepest intentions. 
Today the irrationalist theory of society is as essentially uncritical as the 
rationalist theory is critical; it is essentially antimaterialist, for it must 
defame the worldly happiness of man that can be brought about only 
through a rational organization of society and replace it with other, less 
‘palpable’ values. What it offers as an alternative to materialism is a 
heroic pauperism: an ethical transfiguration of poverty, sacrifice, and 
service, and a ‘folkish realism’ whose social meaning we shall come to 
later. Compared with heroic-folkish realism, liberalism is a rationalist 
theory. Its vital element is optimistic faith in the ultimate victory of 
reason, which will realize itself above all conflicts of interest and 
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opinion in the harmony of the whole. In keeping with its economic 
views, liberalism links this victory of reason (and here begins the typical 
liberalist conception of rationalism) to the possibility of a free and open 
rivalry of divergent views and elements of knowledge, which is to result 
in rational truth and rightness.27 
As the economic organization of society is built upon the free 
competition of private economic subjects, in other words, on the unity 
of opposites and the unification of the dissimilar, so the search for truth 
is founded on open self-expression, free dialogue, and convincing and 
being convinced through argument – at root, that is, on contradicting 
and criticizing one’s opponent. All the tendencies from which the 
political demands of liberalism derive their theoretical validity (such as 
freedom of speech and of the press, publicity, tolerance, parliamentary 
government) are elements of a true rationalism. 
There is another source that furnishes liberalist society with a 
rationalist underpinning. The third fundamental right proclaimed in the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man is sûreté. This security means very 
definitely a guarantee of freedom in economic conduct – not only the 
state’s guarantee of disposal over private property, but also the private 
entrepreneur’s assurance of obtaining the greatest possible profitability 
and stability. This has two primary corollaries: a maximum of legal 
security for all private contracts and a maximum of exact calculability of 
profit and loss, supply and demand. In the liberalist epoch of capitalism, 
the rationalization of law and the rationalization of the enterprise (the 
elements demonstrated by Max Weber to be decisive for the spirit of 
Western capitalism) are realized to a previously unknown extent. But at 
this very point, liberalist rationalism comes up against barriers that it can 
no longer surmount of itself. Irrationalist elements seep into it and 
explode its basic theoretical conception. 
The liberalist rationalization of economic life (as of social 
organization in general) is essentially private. It is tied to the rational 
practice of the individual economic subject or of a multiplicity of 
individual economic subjects. In the end, of course, the rationality of 
liberalist practice is supposed to demonstrate itself in the whole and 
characterize the whole, but this whole itself is outside the sphere of 
rationalization.28 The harmony of general and private interests is 
supposed to result of itself from the undisturbed course of private 
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practice. On principle it is not subject to criticism, nor does it fall within 
the bounds of rational projects for practice. 
Through this privatization of reason, the construction of society in 
accordance with reason is deprived of the end which is supposed to 
provide its goal (just as in irrationalism it is deprived of its beginning 
through the functionalization of reason). Thus, precisely the rational 
determination and condition of that ‘generality’ in which the ‘happiness’ 
of the individual is supposed to be realized is missing. To this extent 
(and only to this extent) the reproach that liberalism’s talk of general 
interest or humanity remains caught in pure abstractions is correct. The 
structure and order of the whole are ultimately left to irrational forces: 
an accidental ‘harmony’, a ‘natural balance’. The plausibility of liberalist 
rationalism thus ceases immediately when, with the intensification of 
social conflict and economic crises, general ‘harmony’ becomes 
increasingly improbable. At this point liberalist theory must grasp at 
irrational justifications. Rational critique gives up; it is all too readily 
prepared to acknowledge ‘natural’ privileges and favors. The idea of the 
charismatic, authoritarian leader is already preformed in the liberalist 
celebration of the gifted economic leader, the ‘born’ executive. 
This rough sketch of liberalist social theory has shown how many 
elements of the totalitarian view of the state are already present in it. 
Taking the economic structure as a point of reference, we see an almost 
unbroken continuity in the development of the social theory. We shall 
here assume some prior knowledge of the economic foundations of this 
development from liberalist to totalitarian theory:29 they are all 
essentially part of the transformation of capitalist society from 
mercantile and industrial capitalism, based on the free competition of 
independent individual entrepreneurs, to monopoly capitalism, in which 
the changed relations of production (and especially the large ‘units’ such 
as cartels and trusts) require a strong state mobilizing all means of 
power. Economic theory declares openly and clearly the reason why 
liberalism now becomes the mortal enemy of social theory: 
Imperialism has ... put the expedient of a strong state at the disposal of 
capitalism…. The liberal ideas of free-floating competition between 
individual economic enterprises have proved themselves unsuited to 
capitalism….30 
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The turn from the liberalist to the total-authoritarian state occurs within 
the framework of a single social order. With regard to the unity of this 
economic base, we can say it is liberalism that ‘produces’ the total-
authoritarian state out of itself, as its own consummation at a more 
advanced stage of development. The total-authoritarian state brings with 
it the organization and theory of society that correspond to the 
monopolistic stage of capitalism. 
This organization and its theory, it is true, also contain ‘new’ 
elements that go beyond the old liberal social order and its mere 
negation: elements in which a clear dialectical reaction against liberalism 
is perceptible, but which presuppose for their realization the abolition 
of the economic and social foundations preserved by the total-
authoritarian state. The new political and social theory must not, 
therefore, be interpreted simply as a process of ideological adaptation. 
In order to contribute to comprehension of its real social function, we 
shall interpret its basic features by analyzing its three constitutive 
components: universalism, naturalism (organicism), and existentialism. 
Universalism 
The priority and primacy of the whole over its ‘members’ (parts) is a 
basic thesis of heroic-folkish realism. The whole is understood not only 
as a sum or abstract totality, but as the unity that unifies the parts, a 
unity which is the precondition for the fulfillment and completion of 
each part. The demand for the realization of such a totality occupies the 
first place in the programmatic proclamations of the total-authoritarian 
state. In the organic order of life 
the whole is primally given in its organic segmentation: the members 
serve the whole, which is superordinate to them, but they serve it 
according to the unique character that appertains to them as members 
…, and, at the same time, it is in this uniqueness that their personal 
destiny and the meaning of their personality are fulfilled to the extent 
that they participate in the whole.31 
As a historical entity this whole is supposed to encompass the entirety 
of historical occurrences and relationships: within it are “enclosed both 
the national and the social idea”.32 
We have seen that the exclusion of the whole from the process of 
rational action was a serious omission on the part of liberalist theory. 
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Those demands of liberalism that go beyond safeguarding and 
exploiting private property in really intending a rational plan for human 
practice require for their realization precisely the rational planning of the 
whole of the relations of production within which individuals have to 
live. The primacy of the whole over individuals is real, insofar as the 
forms of the production and reproduction of life, which are ‘general’, 
are pregiven to the individuals and insofar as the appropriate 
organization of these forms is the precondition of the individual 
happiness of men. But released from its economic and social content, 
the concept of the whole has absolutely no concrete meaning in social 
theory. We shall see that its organicist version, i.e. the interpretation of 
the relation of totality to members as an organic-natural relationship, is 
not able to provide this meaning. Even the ‘folk’ becomes a real totality 
only by virtue of its economic and social unity, not vice versa. 
The strong universalist tendency does not, indeed, arise as a 
philosophical speculation; economic development actually requires it. 
One of the most important characteristics of monopoly capitalism is 
that it brings about, in fact, a quite definite ‘unification’ within society. It 
creates a new “system of dependencies of the most diverse kinds”, such 
as that of small and middle-sized enterprises on cartels and trusts or of 
landed property and large-scale industry on finance capital.33 
Here, in the economic structure of monopoly capitalist society, are 
located the factual bases of universalism. But in the theory they are 
totally reinterpreted. The whole that it presents is not the unification 
achieved by the domination of one class within the framework of class 
society, but rather a unity that combines all classes, that is supposed to 
overcome the reality of class struggle and thus of classes themselves: the 
“establishment of a real folk community, which elevates itself above the 
interests and conflicts of status groups and classes”.34 A classless 
society, in other words, is the goal, but a classless society on the basis of 
and within the framework of – the existing class society. For in the 
totalitarian theory of the state the foundations of this society, i.e. the 
economic order based on private property in the means of production, 
are not attacked. Instead, they are only modified to the degree 
demanded by the monopolistic stage of this very economic order. In 
consequence, all contradictions that inhere in such an order and make a 
real totality impossible are carried over into the new stage and its theory. 
Realizing the desired unifying totality would be in truth primarily an 
economic task: elimination of the economic order that is the source of 
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classes and class struggles. But it is just this task that universalism 
cannot and will not take on; indeed, it cannot even recognize it as an 
economic one: “It is not economic conditions that determine social 
relations but, to the contrary, it is moral views that determine economic 
relations”.35 Universalism must divert both consciousness and action 
from the only possible way to realize the ‘whole’ and from the only 
possible form of that whole into another, less dangerous direction: it 
substitutes the ‘primal given’ of the folk, of folkhood. 
We shall not go into the various attempts that have been made to 
define the concept ‘folk’. What is decisive is that it aims at a ‘primal 
given’ that, as a ‘natural’ one, is prior to the ‘artificial’ system of society. 
It is the “social structure of the organic level of occurrence”36 and as 
such represents an ‘ultimate’, ‘germinated’ unity. “The folk is not a 
structure that has originated through any human power”;37 it is a 
‘divinely willed’ groundwork of human society. In this way the new 
social theory arrives at the equation through which it is led to the 
premises of irrationalist ‘organicism’: as a natural-organic whole, the 
first and last totality, the foundation and limit of all ties and obligations, 
is the genuine, divinely willed, eternal reality in contrast with the 
inorganic, ‘derived’ reality of society. As such, owing to its origins, it is 
largely withdrawn from the range of all human planning and decision. 
Hence all attempts are ‘a priori’ discredited that would overcome the 
present anarchically conflicting strivings and needs of individuals and 
raise them to a true totality by means of a planned transformation of the 
social relations of production. The path is cleared for ‘heroic-folkish’ 
organicism, which provides the basis necessary for totalitarian political 
theory to fulfill its social function. 
Naturalism 
In ever new formulations, heroic-folkish realism emphasizes the natural 
properties of the totality represented by the folk. The folk is ‘subject to 
blood’, it arises from the ‘soil’, it furnishes the homeland with 
indestructible force and permanence, it is united by characteristics of 
‘race’, the preservation of whose purity is the condition of the folk’s 
‘health’. In the train of this naturalism follows a glorification of the 
peasantry38 as the only estate still ‘bound to nature’. It is celebrated as 
the ‘creative, original source’, as the eternal pillar of society. The 
mythical glorification of the renewal of agriculture has its counterpart in 
the fight against the metropolis and its ‘unnatural’ spirit. This fight 
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expands into an attack on the rule of reason in general and sets loose all 
irrational powers – a movement that ends with the total 
functionalization of the mind. ‘Nature’ is the first in the series of 
restricting conditions to which reason is subordinated. The 
unconditioned authority of the state seems to be the last. ‘Nature’ as 
celebrated by organicism, however, does not appear as a factor of 
production in the context of actual relations of production, nor as a 
condition of production, nor as the basis, itself historical, of human 
history. Instead it becomes a myth, and as myth it hides the organicist 
depravation and forcible displacement of historical and social processes. 
Nature becomes the great antagonist of history. 
The naturalistic myth begins by apostrophizing the natural as 
‘eternal’ and ‘divinely willed’. This holds especially for the totality of the 
folk, whose naturalness is one of the myth’s primary claims. The 
particular destinies of individuals, their strivings and needs, their misery 
and their happiness – all this is void and perishable, for only the folk is 
permanent. The folk is nature itself as the substructure of history, as 
eternal substance, the eternally constant in the continual flux of 
economic and social relations. In contrast with the folk, the latter are 
accidental, ephemeral, and ‘insignificant’. 
These formulations announce a characteristic tendency of heroic-
folkish realism: its depravation of history to a merely temporal occurrence 
in which all structures are subjected to time and are therefore ‘inferior’. 
This dehistoricization marks all aspects of organicist theory: the 
devaluation of time in favor of space, the elevation of the static over the 
dynamic and the conservative over the revolutionary, the rejection of all 
dialectic, the glorification of tradition for its own sake.39 Never has 
history been taken less seriously than now, when it is primarily adjusted 
to the preservation and service of a national heritage, when revolutions 
are held to be ‘background noise’ or ‘disturbances’ of natural laws, and 
when the determination of human happiness and dignity is delivered 
over to natural forces of ‘blood’ and ‘soil’. In this dehistoricization of 
the historical, naturalist theory gives itself away; it expresses an interest 
in stabilizing a particular form of the conditions of life, one that can no 
longer be justified in its present historical situation. If history were really 
taken seriously, it could all too easily remind men that this form is in 
crisis and that possibilities for changing it can be derived from the 
history of its origins. In short, it could remind men that the established 
social order is transitory, that “the hour of its birth … is the hour of its 
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death” (Hegel). It is ideologically perpetuated when it is claimed to be 
the ‘natural order of life’. 
Nonetheless, the new doctrine of history and society resists speaking 
of race, folkhood, blood, and soil in terms of a naturalistic biologism. It 
stresses that it conceives of these natural-organic data as simultaneously 
and essentially ‘historical-spiritual’ facts out of which grows a historical 
‘community of destiny’. But if the word ‘destiny’ is supposed to do 
more than stop short of knowledge of the real motive forces and factors 
of history, then it cancels the organicist myth of the ‘natural community’ 
and thus the theoretical basis of the very philosophy of history from 
which it derives. Certainly every nation or people (folk) has its own 
destiny (insofar as it is an economic, geopolitical, and cultural unity), but 
it is precisely this destiny that cleaves the nation’s unity into social 
antagonisms. Common destinies affect the different groups within the 
nation in different ways, and each reacts to them differently. A war, 
which undoubtedly affects the entire nation, can throw the masses into 
terrible poverty while particular ruling strata derive nothing but 
advantages from it. In a general crisis the economically powerful have 
much more ample opportunities for resistance and for avoiding dire 
consequences than does the economically weaker majority. The 
community of destiny almost always operates at the expense of the large 
majority of the people: it thus cancels itself out as a community. In 
previous human history, this cleavage of national or communal unity 
into social antagonisms is not merely secondary, nor is it the fault or 
responsibility of individuals. Rather, it comprises history’s real content, 
which cannot be changed through adaptation to any sort of natural 
order. In history there are no longer any natural patterns that could 
serve as models and ideas for historical movement. Through the process 
in which men in society contend with nature and with their own 
historical reality (whose state at any given time is indicated by the 
various conditions and relations of life), ‘nature’ has long been 
historicized, i.e. to an increasing degree denuded of its naturalness and 
subjected to rational human planning and technology. Natural orders 
and data occur structured as economic and social relations (so that, for 
example, the peasant’s land is less a clod in the homeland than a holding 
in the mortgage section of the land register).40 
This real structure, it is true, remains hidden from the consciousness 
of most people. 
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The form of the social process of life, that is, the material process of 
production, strips off its nebulous, mystical veil as soon as it is under 
the conscious, planned control of freely associated men as their 
product.41 
Until then it will be in the interest of those groups whose economic 
situation contradicts the attainment of this goal to represent specific 
social relations as perpetual and thus ‘natural’ in order to preserve the 
established order and guard against the disturbance created by criticism. 
The path that organicist theory takes in following this interest leads 
beyond naturalizing the economy as such to the naturalization of the 
monopoly capitalist economy as such and of the mass poverty it brings 
about; all of these phenomena are sanctioned as ‘natural’. At the end of 
this path (of which we shall suggest only the most important stages) 
comes the point where ideology’s function of creating illusions turns 
into one of disillusionment: transfiguration and camouflage are replaced 
by open brutality. 
The economy is viewed as a ‘living organism’ that one cannot 
transform ‘in one blow’. It is constructed according to ‘primitive laws’ 
rooted in human ‘nature’. That is the first stage. 
The step from the economy in general to the current economy is 
quickly taken. The current crisis is ‘nature’s revenge’ on the “intellectual 
attempt to violate its laws. … But nature always wins in the end. …” 
The transfiguration of economic and social relations to natural 
archetypes must inevitably and repeatedly come up against the so 
completely ‘unnatural’ facticity of the current forms of life. In order to 
paper over this contradiction, a radical devaluation of the material 
sphere of existence, of the ‘external riches’ of life, is necessary. They are 
‘overcome’ in the ‘heroism’ of poverty and ‘service’, of sacrifice and 
discipline. For heroic-folkish realism, the fight against materialism is 
necessary in both theory and practice. It must disavow, in favour of 
‘ideal’ values (honor, morality, duty, heroism), the worldly happiness of 
men that the social order it upholds can never bring about. This 
tendency toward ‘idealism’, however, is countered by another very 
strong trend. For monopoly capitalism and its political situation demand 
from men the utmost exertion and permanent tension in the provision 
of the ‘worldly’ goods that are to be produced. It follows from this that 
all of life is comprehended under the categories of service and work – a 
pure ‘inner-worldly’ asceticism. Another factor that discredits idealism is 
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that classical idealism was essentially rationalist, an idealism of the 
‘mind’, of reason. To the extent that it always contains, in some form, 
the autonomy of reason and places human practice under the idea of 
knowledge engaged in active comprehension, it necessarily brings down 
upon itself the enmity of the total-authoritarian state. The latter has 
every cause to consider reason’s critique dangerous and hence to bind it 
to preordained states of fact. “German Idealism must therefore be 
overcome in form and content if we want to become a political, an 
active people”.42 
A fundamental ambiguity thus runs through antiliberalist theory. 
While on the one hand it advocates a constant, hard, almost cynical 
realism, on the other it extols ‘ideal’ values as the first and last meaning 
of life and cries out for the salvation of the ‘spirit’. We find two sets of 
pronouncements juxtaposed. The first attacks the weak ‘idealist’, 
alienated from the world, to the advantage of the new type, the heroic 
man: “He lives not from the mind, but from blood and earth. He lives 
not from culture, but from action”.43 The second consists of passages 
such as this: 
The banner of the spirit waves over mankind as its distinctive mark. 
Although from time to time we may be carried away by glorious and 
impulsive urges of the will, the spirit always re-establishes its rights.
 
44 
All sorts of ‘metaphysical certainties’ are conjured up, but they have 
probably never been as carelessly proffered and elevated to an official 
weltanschauung as today, when the final victory over the metaphysics of 
humanist idealism is announced while the big stick of imperialism is 
being brandished overhead: 
We no longer live in the age of education, of culture, of 
humanitarianism, and of the pure spirit, but rather under the necessity 
of struggle, of shaping political reality, of soldiery, of folkish discipline, 
of folkish honor and of the future of the folk. What is required of the 
men of this era, consequently, is not the idealist but the heroic attitude 
as both task and necessity of life.45 
Never, moreover, has that anti-idealist ‘shaping of reality’ been seen and 
interpreted in a bleaker and poorer manner: “Service that never ends 
because service and life coincide”.46 In fact, it takes a heroism that 
cannot possibly be rationally justified to make the sacrifice required for 
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the preservation of the established order. In view of the everyday 
poverty of the masses and the danger of new and terrible wars and 
crises, appealing to the ‘naturalness’ of this order is of no avail. It is not 
‘nature’ but capitalism in its true form that has the last word. We are 
now at the last stage, where this theory lets fall its veil of transfiguration 
and discloses the true face of the social order: “We hold … the lowering 
of the standard of living to be inevitable and deem the most urgent 
consideration to be the way we are to view this occurrence and react to 
it”. Thus theory’s efforts are not directed toward the elimination of 
mass poverty. To the contrary, it regards the growth of this poverty as 
its inevitable presupposition. Nowhere has the new ‘realism’ come 
closer to the truth, which it faithfully pursues as follows: “What is first 
necessary is that everyone realize that poverty, restriction, and especially 
the renunciation of ‘cultural goods’ are required of all”. Very likely, not 
everyone will concede this necessity: people “at the present time still 
resist [it] with biological individual instincts”. The main business of 
theory will thus be “to bring [these instincts] to heel”. The theoretician’s 
acumen lets him know that this cannot be accomplished by the “faculty 
of reason” alone, but only “when poverty again acquires the stamp of an 
ethical virtue, when poverty is no longer a shame or misfortune but 
rather a dignified attitude taken as a matter of course with regard to a 
grave and universal destiny”. And the theorist reveals to us the function 
of this and similar ‘ethics’: it is the “pedestal needed by the politician … 
in order to make policy decisions with certainty”.47 
Heroism, the ethic of poverty as the ‘pedestal’ of politics: here the 
struggle against the materialist worldview reveals itself in its final 
meaning, that of ‘bringing to heel’ instincts that rebel against the falling 
standard of living. A functional change in ideology, characteristic of 
certain stages of social development, has taken place. This ideology 
exhibits the status quo, but with a radical transvaluation of values: 
unhappiness is turned into grace, misery into blessing, poverty to 
destiny. Vice versa, striving for happiness and material improvement 
becomes sin and injustice. 
The performance of duty, the sacrifice, and the devotion that ‘heroic 
realism’ requires of men are brought into the service of a social order 
that perpetuates the misery and unhappiness of individuals. Although 
these sacrifices are made at the ‘brink of meaninglessness’, they have 
nonetheless a concealed, very ‘rational’ purpose: factually and 
ideologically stabilizing the current system of producing and 
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reproducing life.48 Heroic realism offends against the great ideas of duty, 
sacrifice, and devotion by programmatically incorporating into the 
apparatus of a system of domination what can only occur as the free gift 
of free men. 
As we have seen, the model of man projected by today’s heroic 
realism is of one whose existence is fulfilled in unquestioning sacrifices 
and unconditional acts of devotion, whose ethic is poverty and all of 
whose worldly goods have been melted down into service and 
discipline. This image stands in sharp opposition to all the ideals 
acquired by Western man in the last centuries. How justify such an 
existence? Since man’s material well-being is not its goal, it cannot be 
justified on the basis of his natural needs and instincts. But neither can 
its goal be his spiritual welfare, or salvation, since there is no room for 
justification by faith. And in the universal struggle against reason, 
justification by knowledge can no longer count as a justification. 
To the extent that totalitarian theory moves within the bounds of 
scientific discussion, it becomes aware of this problem. Thinking of the 
‘emergency’ in which sacrificing one’s own life and killing other men are 
demanded, Carl Schmitt inquires into the reason for such sacrifice: 
“There is no rational end, no norm however correct, no program 
however exemplary, no social ideal however beautiful, and no legitimacy 
or legality that could justify men’s killing one another”.49 What, then, 
remains as a possible justification? Only this: that there is a state of 
affairs that through its very existence and presence is exempt from all 
justification, i.e. an ‘existential’, ‘ontological’ state of affairs – 
justification by mere existence. ‘Existentialism’ in its political form 
becomes the theory of the (negative) justification of what can no longer 
be justified. 
Existentialism 
We shall be dealing here not with the philosophical form of 
existentialism but with its political form, i.e. that in which it has become 
a decisive element of totalitarian political theory. It must he stressed 
right from the start that in political existentialism there is not even an 
attempt to define the ‘existential’ conceptually. The only thing we have 
to go on in elucidating the intended meaning of the existential is the 
passage by Carl Schmitt cited above. There the existential appears 
essentially as a contrast to the ‘normative’, i.e. as something that cannot 
be placed under any norm lying outside it. From this it follows that one 
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absolutely cannot think, judge, or decide about an existential condition 
as a ‘non-partisan third [party]’. “The possibility of correct knowledge 
and understanding and therewith also the competence to participate in 
speaking and to judge is given here only by existential partaking and 
participation”.50 There is no fundamental or general criterion in 
existentialism for determining which facts and conditions are to be 
considered existential. That remains left in principle to the decision of 
the existential theoretician. But once he claims a state of fact as 
existential, all those who do not ‘participate and partake’ in its reality are 
to keep silent. Predominantly political conditions and relations are 
sanctioned here as existential, and within the political dimension it is the 
relation to the enemy,51 or war, that counts as the simply and absolutely 
existential relationship (‘the folk and folk membership’ have been added 
as a second, equally existential, relationship). 
Given this lack of any exact conceptual character, it is necessary to 
turn briefly from political to philosophical existentialism. The meaning 
of philosophical existentialism lay in regaining the full concretion of the 
historical subject in opposition to the abstract ‘logical’ subject of 
rational idealism, i.e. eliminating the domination, unshaken from 
Descartes to Husserl, of the ego cogito. Heidegger’s position before his 
Sein und Zeit was philosophy’s furthest advance in this direction. Then 
came the reaction. With good reason, philosophy avoided looking more 
carefully at the historical situation, with regard to its material facticity, of 
the subject to which it addressed itself. At this point concretion 
stopped, and philosophy remained content to talk of the nation’s ‘link 
with destiny’, of the ‘heritage’ that each individual has to adopt, and of 
the community of the ‘generation’, while the other dimensions of 
facticity were treated under such categories as ‘they’ (das Man), or ‘idle 
talk’ (das Gerede), and relegated in this way to ‘inauthentic’ existence. 
Philosophy did not go on to ask about the nature of this heritage, about 
the people’s mode of being, and about the real powers and forces that 
are history. It thus renounced every possibility of comprehending the 
facticity of historical situations and distinguishing between them. 
Instead, something like a new anthropology gradually began to 
crystallize, absorbing in an ever more superficial way the fertile 
discoveries of existential analysis. This anthropology then took on the 
job of furnishing a philosophical foundation for the ideal of man 
projected by heroic realism. 
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The theoretical man to whom the value concepts currently in circulation 
refer is a fiction. … Man is essentially a political creature, i.e. …, he is 
not a creature whose being is determined by his participation in a higher 
‘spiritual world’…, but he is rather an originally acting creature.52 
A total activation, concretization, and politicization of all dimensions of 
existence is demanded. The autonomy of thought and the objectivity 
and neutrality of science are repudiated as heresy or even as a political 
falsification on the part of liberalism. “We are active, enterprising beings 
and incur guilt if we deny this our essence: guilt by neutrality and 
tolerance”.53 The proclamation includes the affirmation that “all science 
is life-conditioned, reality-oriented, historically conditioned, and 
situationally bound”.54 Many of these theses have long been part of the 
conceptual makeup of scientific social theory. The conditions at their 
root have already been identified by historical materialism. That 
knowledge originally developed to fight the established order is now 
applied in its service shows how the dialectic realizes itself in the realm of 
theory: the stabilization of the current social structure is only possible in 
a way that at the same time sets free progressive forces of development. 
Politically, these forces are coerced into a form that obstructs their 
original movement and makes their liberating effect illusory. This 
change in function is simultaneously expressed in the attempt to ground 
them in theory. The concrete social meaning of positing man as a 
primarily historical, political, and politically acting being is revealed only 
when we ask: What manner of ‘historicity’ is meant, what form of 
political action and of practice is intended? What kind of action is it, 
then, that the new anthropology enjoins as the ‘authentic’ practice of 
man? 
Action does not mean ‘deciding in favor of’ …, for that presupposes 
that one knows in favor of what one is deciding; rather, action means 
‘setting off in a direction’, ‘taking sides’, by virtue of a mandate of 
destiny, by virtue of ‘one’s own right’. … It is really secondary to decide 
in favor of something that I have come to know.55 
This typical formulation sheds light on the sorry picture that ‘existential’ 
anthropology paints of active man. He acts – but he knows not what 
for. He acts – but he has not even decided for himself in favor of what 
he acts. He simply ‘takes sides’ or ‘goes into action’ – “It is really 
secondary to decide in favor of something I have come to know”. This 
anthropology derives its pathos from a radical devaluation of Logos as 
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knowledge that reveals and decides. It was Aristotle’s view that it is 
precisely Logos that distinguishes man from animal: the capacity “to set 
forth the expedient and the inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just 
and the unjust”.56 Existential anthropology believes that knowing the 
reason for one’s decision, the goal which gives all human action 
meaning and value, is secondary. It is essential only that a path be taken, 
that one take sides. “The horrifying differences of standpoint do not 
reside in the sphere of pure material objectivity” but rather “in the 
synthetic force of existentially rooted ways of looking at things”.57 Only 
when existential anthropology attains this irrational tone does it become 
capable of fulfilling its social function in the service of a system of 
domination to which nothing can be less opportune than a ‘material, 
objective’ justification of the action it requires. 
Seen in this perspective, the strong emphasis on the historicity of 
existence reveals itself as empty, for it is possible only on the basis of 
the above-mentioned depravation of history. Genuine historicity 
presupposes a cognitive relation of existence to the forces of history 
and, derived from it, the theoretical and practical critique of these forces. 
But in existential anthropology the corresponding relation is limited to 
one of accepting a ‘mandate’ issued to existence by the ‘folk’. It is 
considered self-evident that it is the ‘folk’ – and not any particular 
interest group – which issues the mandate and for which it is exercised. 
A secularized theological image of history emerges. Every folk receives 
its historical mandate as a ‘mission’ that is the first and last, the 
unrestricted obligation of existence. In a salto mortale (the speed of which 
cannot obscure that in it the entire tradition of philosophical and 
scientific knowledge is thrown by the board) the ‘will to knowledge’ is 
subjected to the alleged mandate of one’s own folk. And the folk is 
considered a unity and totality underlying the socio-economic sphere. 
Existentialism, too, sees in ‘earthy and bloody forces’ the real forces of 
history.58 Thus the existentialist currents, too, are nourished from the 
great naturalistic reservoir. 
On this point political existentialism is more sensitive than its 
philosophical counterpart. It knows that even the ‘earthy and bloody 
forces’ of a folk become historical only in particular political forms, that 
is, if a real structure of domination, the state, has been erected over the 
folk. Existentialism, too, needs an explicit political theory: the doctrine 
of the total state. We shall not provide here an express critique of this 
theory and shall stress only what is decisive in our context. 
Struggle Against Liberalism in Totalitarianism 
25 
Political relationships and conditions are interpreted as existential 
ones, as in accordance with Being. This view would be self-evident if it 
meant nothing more than that man, with respect to his nature,  
(physei), is a political organism. But it does mean more. We saw that the 
existential as such is exempt from any rational standard or norm lying 
beyond it; it is itself the absolute norm and is inaccessible to any and all 
rational criticism and justification. Accordingly, political conditions and 
relationships are now posited as the most emphatically significant 
factors ‘deciding’ existence. And within the political sphere all 
relationships are oriented in turn toward the most extreme ‘crisis’, 
toward the decision about the ‘state of emergency’, of war and peace. 
The true possessor of political power is defined as beyond all legality 
and legitimacy: “Sovereign is he who decides on the state of 
emergency”.59 Sovereignty is founded on the factual power to make this 
decision (decisionism). The basic political relationship is the ‘friend-
enemy relationship’. Its crisis is war, which proceeds until the enemy has 
been physically annihilated. There is no social relationship that does not 
in a crisis turn into a political relationship. Behind all economic, social, 
religious, and cultural relations stands total politicization. There is no 
sphere of private or public life, no legal or rational court of appeal that 
could oppose it. 
At this point occurs the release of progressive forces to which we 
have already referred. Total activation and politicization do away with 
the inhibiting neutrality of broad strata of the population and create, 
along a front never before matched in length and breadth, new forms of 
political struggle and new methods of political organization. The 
separation of state and society, which liberalism had attempted to carry 
out in the nineteenth century, is abolished: the state takes over the 
political integration of society. And, in the process of the 
existentialization and totalization of the political sphere, the state also 
becomes the bearer of the authentic potentialities of existence itself. It is 
not the state that is responsible to man but man who is responsible to 
the state; he is delivered over to it. At the level on which political 
existentialism moves, there can be absolutely no question whether the 
state in its ‘total’ form is right in making such demands, whether the 
system of domination that it defends with all available means guarantees 
anything like the possibility of more than illusory fulfilment for most 
men. The existentiality of the political structure is removed from such 
‘rationalistic’ questions; even asking them is a crime: “All these attempts 
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to dispute the state’s newly gained effective right signify sabotage. … 
Relentlessly to exterminate this sort of thought is the noblest duty of the 
state today”.60 
No longer founded on the pluralism of social interests and their 
parties, and exempt from all formal legality and legitimacy, this state’s 
form of domination is that of the authoritarian leader and his 
‘following’. 
In conscious opposition to the liberal and civil [bürgerlich] constitutional 
state, the national constitutional state, in its politics and constitutional 
law, has the form of the authoritarian leader-state [Führerstaat]. The 
authoritarian leader-state sees in state authority the most essential 
feature of the state.61 
Essentially, authoritarian leadership draws its political qualifications 
from two sources, which are themselves linked: an irrational, 
‘metaphysical’ power, and a ‘non-social’ power. The idea of 
‘justification’ still disquiets the theory: “An authoritarian government 
needs a justification that goes beyond the personal”. There is no 
material or rational justification. Thus the “justification must be 
metaphysical …. As a principle of state order, the distinction between 
leaders and led can be made only metaphysically”.62 The political and 
social meaning of the concept ‘metaphysical’ gives itself away: “A 
government that governs only because it has a mandate from the folk is 
not an authoritarian government. Authority is possible only if it comes 
from transcendence…”63 The word ‘transcendence’ ought to be taken 
seriously here. The foundation of authority lies beyond all social 
facticity, so that it does not depend on it for validation. Above all, it 
surpasses the ‘folk’s’ factual situation and power of comprehension: 
“Authority presupposes a status that is valid over against the folk 
because the folk does not confer it but acknowledges it”.64 
Acknowledgment is the foundation of authority: a truly ‘existential’ 
proof! 
Let us now briefly consider the ‘dialectical’ fate of existentialist 
theory in the total state. This dialectic is ‘passive’, for it passes over the 
theory without the latter being able to incorporate it and develop it 
further. With the realization of the total-authoritarian state, 
existentialism abolishes itself – rather, it undergoes abolition. 
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The total state must be a state of total responsibility. This means that 
the state becomes the only source and object of every individual’s 
duties. Being in this state of duty abolishes the private character of 
individual existence.65 
Existentialism, however, was originally based on the ‘private’ character 
of individual existence, its irremovable, personal ‘always-being-my-own’ 
(Jemeinigkeit). The total state takes over total responsibility for individual 
existence; existentialism had claimed the inalienable self-responsibility of 
existence. The total state decides existence in all its dimensions; 
existentialism had put forth as the fundamental category of existence 
that ‘decidedness’ (Entschlossenheit) which can be the project only of each 
individual existence. The total state demands total duty without even 
allowing inquiry into the truth of such obligation; existentialism (here in 
agreement with Kant) had celebrated the autonomous self-giving of 
duty as the real dignity of man. The total state has “overcome 
[individual freedom] as a postulate of human thought …”;66 
existentialism (again in accord with Kant) had placed “the essence of 
human freedom”, as the autonomy of the person67 at the origin of 
philosophizing, and made freedom the condition of truth.68 This 
freedom was seen as man’s ‘self-authorization’ for his existence and to 
the realm of beings as such; conversely man is now “authorized to 
freedom by the authoritatively led community of the folk”.69 
There would appear yet one escape from this hopeless 
heteronomism. One can screen the abolition of human freedom with 
the pretext that only the bad liberalist concept of freedom is being 
abolished and then define the ‘true’ concept of freedom somewhat as 
follows: “The essence of freedom lies precisely in obligation to the folk 
and the state”.70 Now even the most convinced liberal never denied that 
freedom does not exclude obligation but rather demands it. And since 
Aristotle, in the last book of the Nichomachean Ethics, inseparably linked 
the question of man’s ‘happiness’ to the question of the ‘best state’, 
essentially grounding ‘politics’ and ‘ethics’ in each other (with the 
former as the fulfilment of the latter), we know that freedom is an eminently 
political concept. Real freedom for individual existence (and not merely in 
the liberalist sense) is possible only in a specifically structured polis, a 
‘rationally’ organized society. In consciously politicizing the concept of 
existence, and deprivatizing and deinternalizing (Ent-lnnerlichung) the 
liberalist, idealist conception of man, the totalitarian view of the state 
represents progress – progress that leads beyond the basis of the 
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totalitarian state, propelling the theory beyond the social order that it 
affirms. As long as it remains within the latter’s bounds, the progress 
operates regressively: the process of politicizing and deprivatizing 
annihilates individual existence instead of truly raising it to 
‘universality’.71 This becomes clear in the antiliberalist concept of 
freedom. 
The political identification of freedom and obligation is more than 
an empty phrase only if the community to which the free individual is a 
priori obligated secures him the possibility of a fulfilled existence 
worthy of man, or if the community can be directed toward such a 
possibility. The question that the identity of freedom and political 
obligation (an identity which as such deserves to be recognized) impels 
one to ask, rather than dispenses one from asking, is this: What is this 
community like, to which I am to obligate myself? Can it sustain human 
happiness and dignity? The ‘natural’ affiliations of ‘blood’ and ‘soil’ 
alone can never justify the total surrender of the individual to the 
community. Man is more than nature, more than an animal, “and we 
can never leave off thinking. For man is a thinking being, that is how be 
distinguishes himself from animals”.72 Nor can totally delivering over 
the individual to the state that factually exists at a given moment be 
demanded merely on the grounds that man is ‘ontologically’ a political 
being or that political relationships are ‘existential’. Unless it is to 
annihilate human freedom rather than to fulfil it, the political obligation 
of freedom can be only the free practice of the individual himself. This 
practice begins with critique and ends with the free self-realization of 
the individual in a rationally organized society. This organization of 
society and this practice are the mortal enemies that political 
existentialism combats with all available means. 
Existentialism collapses the moment its political theory is realized. 
The total-authoritarian state for which it longed gives the lie to all its 
truths. Existentialism accompanies its debacle with a self-abasement 
unique in the history of ideas, bringing its own history to end as a satyr 
play. In philosophy, existentialism begins as the antagonist in a great 
debate with Western rationalism and idealism, intending to save their 
conceptual content by injecting it into the historical concretion of 
individual existence. It ends by radically denying its own origin; the 
struggle against reason drives it blindly into the arms of the powers that 
be. In their service and with their protection, it turns traitor to the great 
philosophy that it formerly celebrated as the culmination of Western 
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thought. The abyss between them is now unbridgeable. Kant was 
convinced that there are ‘inalienable’ human rights, which “man cannot 
surrender even if he so wills”. 
Human right must be kept sacred, no matter how great the sacrifice it 
costs the ruling powers. One cannot go only halfway and contrive a 
pragmatically conditioned right. … All politics, rather, must bend the 
knee before sacred human right….73 
Kant had obligated man to self-given duty, to free self-determination as 
the only fundamental law; existentialism annuls this law and obligates 
man “to the leader and the following that is immediately pledged to 
him”.74 Hegel could still believe that 
what is true, great, and divine in life is so through the Idea. … All that 
holds human life together and that has merit and validity is of a mental 
and spiritual [geistig] nature and this realm of the mind and spirit exists 
only through the consciousness of truth and right, through the 
comprehension of Ideas.75 
Today existentialism knows better: “Let not doctrines and ‘Ideas’ be the 
rules of your being. Today and in the future, only the Führer himself is 
German reality and its law.”76 
The question of philosophy’s ‘standpoint’ arose in the period of 
rationalist idealism as it does today. As Kant wrote, 
Here we see philosophy now accorded, in fact, a precarious standpoint, 
which is supposed to be stable in spite of not being supported by or 
attached to anything either in heaven or on earth. Here it is to prove its 
integrity as keeper of its own laws, not as the herald of those insinuated 
to it by some inveterate disposition or by who knows what tutelary 
nature….77 
Today philosophy is accorded just the opposite standpoint: 
What should philosophy do in this hour? Perhaps there is left for it 
today only the business of justifying, through employment of its 
profound knowledge of man, those who want not to know but to act.78 
With relentless consistency, this philosophy has followed through to the 
end the road from critical idealism to ‘existential’ opportunism. 
Existentialism, which at one time understood itself to be the heir of 
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German Idealism, has given up the greatest intellectual heritage of 
German history. It was not with Hegel’s death but only now that the 
Fall of the Titans of German philosophy occurs.79 At that time, in the 
nineteenth century, its decisive achievements were preserved in a new 
form in scientific social theory and the critique of political economy. 
Today the fate of the labor movement, in which the heritage of this 
philosophy was preserved, is clouded with uncertainty. 
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The Concept of Essence 
In philosophy, there are fundamental concepts whose metaphysical 
character sets them far apart from the sociohistorical roots of thought. 
That their content remains the same in the most diverse philosophical 
theories would appear the soundest justification for the idea of a 
‘philosophia perennis’. Yet even these loftiest conceptions of philosophy 
are subject to historical development. It is not so much their content as 
it is their position and function within philosophical systems which 
changes. Once this is seen, it becomes clear that these very concepts 
provide a clearer indication of the historical transformation of 
philosophy than those whose contents are far closer to facticity. Their 
metaphysical character betrays more than it conceals. For so much of 
men’s real struggles and desires went into the metaphysical quest for an 
ultimate unity, truth, and universality of Being1 that they could not have 
failed to find expression in the derived forms of the philosophical 
tradition. 
The concept of essence belongs to these categories. Its manifold 
forms have as their common content the abstraction and isolation of 
the one true Being from the constantly changing multiplicity of 
appearances. Under the name of ‘essence’ this Being is made into the 
object of ‘authentic’, certain, and secure knowledge. The way in which 
modern philosophy has understood and established knowledge of 
essence contrasts with that of ancient and medieval philosophy. The 
historical situation of the bourgeoisie, the bearer of modern philosophy, 
comes out in modern interpretations of the relation of essence and 
appearance. According to the view characteristic of the dawning 
bourgeois era, the critical autonomy of rational subjectivity is to 
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establish and justify the ultimate essential truths on which all theoretical 
and practical truth depends. The essence of man and of things is 
contained in the freedom of the thinking individual, the ego cogito. At the 
close of this era, knowledge of essence has primarily the function of 
binding the critical freedom of the individual to pregiven, 
unconditionally valid necessities. It is no longer the spontaneity of the 
concept but the receptivity of intuition that serves as the organon of the 
doctrine of essence. Cognition culminates in recognition, where it 
remains fixated. Husserl’s phenomenology can be considered a delayed 
attempt to reinvigorate bourgeois theory with the basic forces and 
concepts of German Idealism (in which the doctrine of essence had 
found its classical form). Although eliminating their critical (Kantian) 
orientation, Husserl’s philosophy thus still belongs to the liberalist 
period. The material eidetics (Scheler) that came in Husserl’s train, 
however, represents the transition to a new stage: the preparation of 
thought for the ideology of authoritarian forms of domination. The 
intuition of essence is misused to establish orders of value in which the 
relations of hierarchy and subordination required by the established 
order are derived from the ‘essence’ of man, of nationality, and of race. 
From Descartes to modern eidetics, the concept of essence has 
followed a course leading from autonomy to heteronomy, from the 
proclamation of the free, rational individual to his surrender to the 
powers of the authoritarian state. 
The current form of the doctrine of essence no longer preserves the 
comprehension that led to the separation of essence and appearance; 
neither does the abstract cancellation of this separation demanded by 
positivism. A theory that wants to eradicate from science the concept of 
essence succumbs to helpless relativism, thus promoting the very 
powers whose reactionary thought it wants to combat. Positivism 
cannot provide an effective critique of the idealist doctrine of essence. 
Doing so devolves upon the materialist dialectic. Before this task is 
attempted, we shall analyze some typical forms of the idealist doctrine 
of essence. 
 
* 
 
In Plato’s theory of Ideas, where the concept of essence was first clearly 
formulated, it was an outcome of the quest for the unity and universality 
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of Being in view of the multiplicity and changeability of beings. That 
things, even though each of them is ‘individual’, are nevertheless similar 
and dissimilar, like and unlike; that in the endless multiplicity of their 
attributes they are comprehended as one and the same; that quite 
diverse phenomena accord in being considered good, beautiful, just, 
unjust, and so forth; in short, that the world of beings is divided into 
species and genera, subsumed under the highest categories, and known 
by means of universal concepts is the philosophical substratum of the 
problem of essence. This problem was not one of epistemology alone. 
For when the unity in multiplicity, the universal, is conceived as what 
truly exists, critical and ethical elements enter into the concept of 
essence. The isolation of the one universal Being is connected to that of 
authentic Being from inauthentic, of what should and can be from what 
is. The Being of things is not exhausted in what they immediately are; 
they do not appear as they could be. The form of their immediate 
existence is imperfect when measured against their potentialities, which 
comprehension reveals as the image of their essence. Their eidos, or 
Idea, becomes the criterion by means of which the distance between 
existence and what it could be, its essence, is measured in each case. 
Accordingly, the attributes of this concept of essence do not have a 
primarily logical or epistemological basis. Seeking the unity, universality, 
and permanence of Being and ‘remembering’ the essence are motivated 
by the critical consciousness of ‘bad’ facticity, of unrealized 
potentialities. The essence as potentiality becomes a force within 
existence. Beginning with the late version of the theory of Ideas in the 
Sophist and the Philebus, the Idea as dynamis enters into the process in 
which ‘true Being’ originates as the result of becoming. This is the first 
form in which the critical and dynamic character of the concept of 
essence is fully realized. The Idea means fundamentally the agathon, or 
what exists as it can be according to its own measure; existence is in 
motion toward this agathon.2 The dynamic of this relation also governs 
Aristotelian ontology. The concepts of essence ousia and ti en einai 
attempt to grasp the manner in which beings constitute and preserve 
themselves as identical in the various phases of their movement. From 
Plato on the ancient theory of essence was impelled by the unrest of the 
unresolved tension between essence and existence. 
The Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages pacified the critical 
consciousness of this antithesis in an onto-theological principle, which it 
eternalized as a structural law of the created world. For Thomas 
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Aquinas the essence, as essentia of existence, is that according to, 
through, and in which existence is what it is. The essentia is, in other 
words, the inner structure of existence, in which it operates as the 
principle of form for each kind of being. The essence has always already 
been realized in whatever is the case; yet – and this is the crucial point – 
this reality is never that of the essence itself. In all finite being, essence 
and existence are ontologically separated. The latter supervenes to the 
former ‘from outside’, and, in relation to existence, the essence as such 
has the ontological character of pure potentiality, potentia transcendentalis. 
It is eternal, unchanging, and necessary: the ‘Idea’ as the original model 
of existence in the divine intellect. The essence conceived in this way 
can become real only through a principle that is ‘exterior’ to it. In its 
material concreteness, the form of its real existence remains an 
irrevocable contingency.3 Human beings are thus exonerated from 
concern with the ‘ontic’ difference between essence and existence in the 
realm of finite being.4 
No matter how much it mitigated the critical tensions implied in the 
concept of essence, Thomistic philosophy persevered in conceiving the 
difference between essence and existence as indicative of a characteristic 
of beings themselves, as they are given to man in spatio-temporal reality. 
In this way, the reduction of the problem of essence to one of logic and 
epistemology was impeded. This reduction occurred only in the 
development of modern thought that began with Descartes and ended 
with Husserl. The concept of essence enters the sphere of the self-
certain ego cogito, or transcendental subjectivity. Liberated from the 
bonds and obligations of the medieval order and empowered to shape 
his own world, the autonomous individual saw his reason presented 
with the task that had been metaphysically hypostatized in the doctrine 
of essence: realizing the authentic potentialities of beings on the basis of 
the discovery that nature can be controlled. Essence became the object 
of theoretical and practical reason. The transcendental, subjective form 
of the concept of essence is typical of bourgeois theory and was first 
fully worked out by Descartes. 
In his attempt to provide philosophy with a new foundation, 
Descartes sought an instance of absolutely certain, necessary, and 
universally valid knowledge. He found it in the individual’s 
consciousness, in the ego cogitans. To a considerable extent, the concept 
of theory guiding Descartes was patterned on mathematically 
formulated natural science, but this does not adequately account for the 
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significance of his approach. At the same time, science was making its 
pioneering discoveries, and the ideal of ‘objectively’ ascertained 
knowledge, fulfilled in a nature subjected to calculation and domination, 
seemed attainable as never before. Why then did Descartes have 
recourse to the ‘subjective’ certainty of the ego cogito? Why is his 
anchoring of theory in the consciousness of subjectivity to be found 
right alongside his mechanistic philosophy, his analytical geometry, and 
his treatise on machines? 
The difficulty of circumscribing the significance of Descartes’ 
approach derives from its thoroughly contradictory nature: 
simultaneous liberation and impotence, representing the simultaneous 
affirmation and flight or protest with which the individual, released 
from medieval hierarchy, reacted to the law of bourgeois society. 
Universal doubt, the demand that the proof of all judgments be 
appealed to the sovereign reason of the individual, and the 
incorporation of mathematics and mechanics into philosophy expressed 
the new, self-possessed individuality that appeared with demands for the 
free shaping of the conditions of life and for the subjection of nature 
and its newly discovered wealth. Intense activism is manifest in the 
programmatic connection, emphasized by Descartes, between theory 
and practice: theory, absolutely certain of its knowledge, is to serve as a 
sure organon of practice. “It suffices to judge well in order to do well, 
and to judge as well as one can in order to do one’s best, that is to say, 
to acquire … all the other goods that one can acquire.”5 Descartes 
believed in a philosophie pratique instead of the ancient philosophie spéculative, 
a practical philosophy 
by means of which, knowing the force and the actions of fire, water, air, 
the stars, the heavens, and all the other bodies that surround us … we 
should be able to utilize them in like manner for all the uses to which 
they are suited and thus render ourselves masters and possessors of 
nature.6 
But in the contemporary form of social organization, the domination of 
nature through rational methods of production as envisioned by 
Descartes was neither joined to nor directed by the sovereign reason of 
the associated individuals. The fate of bourgeois society announces itself 
in its philosophy. When the liberated individual as the subject of 
practice actually sets himself to shaping the conditions of his life, he 
sees himself subjected to the laws of the commodity market, which 
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operates as blind economic laws of behind his back. At most, his first 
step, the beginning of his career, can appear free, as though dictated by 
his own reason. All subsequent ones are prescribed him by the 
conditions of a commodity-producing society, and he must observe 
them if he does not want to go under. 
The transparent relations of dependence characteristic of the 
medieval order were replaced by a system in which relations of 
dependence could no longer be grasped as such by the individual. The 
conditions of labor become autonomous; subjected to their mechanism, 
the individual’s fate in such a society appears as a mere contingency. 
Spatio-temporal reality becomes a merely ‘external’ world that is not 
rationally connected with man’s authentic potential, his ‘substance’ or 
‘essence’. This external reality is not organized by the activity of human 
freedom, although modern science shows such organization to be 
possible and modern philosophy requires it as a task. In practice, the 
fulfillment of this task comes up against an obstacle whose removal 
would lead beyond this society’s limits. As long as philosophy does not 
adopt the idea of a real transformation, the critique of reason stops at 
the status quo and becomes a critique of pure thought. The uncertainty 
and unfreedom of the external world is countered by the certainty and 
freedom of thought as the individual’s only remaining power base. He 
must recognize that he must conquer himself rather than fortune, his 
wants rather than ‘the order of the world’, and “that there is nothing 
aside from our thoughts which is completely within our power, so that, 
after we have done our best with regard to things outside us, all wherein 
we fail to succeed is absolutely impossible on our part”.7 If the 
individual is to be salvaged and human freedom to be preserved, then 
the ‘essence’ of man must be located in thought. Here is where his 
authentic potentialities and the ontological certainty of his existence 
must be found: “I conclude with assurance that my essence consists 
exclusively in my being a thing that thinks, or a substance whose entire 
essence or nature is only to think.”8 
It is often asserted today that Descartes, by beginning with the ego 
cogito, committed the original sin of modern philosophy, that he placed a 
completely abstract concept of the individual at the basis of theory. But 
his abstract concept of the individual is animated by concern with 
human freedom: measuring the truth of all conditions of life against the 
standard of rational thought. Hegel said of Descartes: “It is the interest 
of freedom that is fundamental here. What is known to be true is to 
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have the function of preserving our freedom through our thinking.”9 
That this freedom is freedom ‘only’ of thought, that only the ‘abstract’ 
individual is free, that concern with human freedom becomes concern 
with the absolute certainty of thought, demonstrate the historical 
veracity of Cartesian philosophy. As the counterpart to his factual 
unfreedom, the individual, aiming at the greatest truth and certainty 
possible within bourgeois practice, is left only with the freedom of 
thought. The ‘reason’ of this epoch is necessarily ‘abstract’; in order to 
remain true to itself and avoid falling into irrationality, reason must 
disregard not only the given form of spatio-temporal existence, but even 
the concrete content of thought at any time, and retain only thought as 
such, the pure form of all cogitationes. Reason cannot unfold itself in the 
rational domination and shaping of objects by free individuals. Rather, 
objectivity becomes a postulate of pure knowledge and is thus released 
from the ‘interest of freedom’: 
The impulse to freedom is in fact basic, but predominating, at least in 
consciousness, is the goal of arriving at something solid and objective – 
the element of objectivity, not the moment of subjectivity (i.e. that it is 
posited, known, and verified by me).10 
After Descartes defined the essence of man as ‘thinking’ and thought as 
fundamentum inconcussum (unshakable foundation), the problem of essence 
moved into the sphere of cognitive subjectivity. The question of essence 
– of the truth, unity, and authenticity of Being – became the question of 
the truth, unity, and authenticity of knowledge. Post-Cartesian idealism 
retains this fundamental philosophical idea of the bourgeois period, the 
idea that the ‘organization’ of existing things in accordance with their 
comprehended potentialities is a function of the free, critical reason of 
the individual. In the reified world in which work relations are no longer 
‘essentially’ related to men’s potentialities and appear rather as an effect 
of over-powering conditions of production, the idea that an 
organization of existing things in terms of their ‘essential’ relationships 
could be the result of a future change disappears; organization becomes 
a matter of pure cognition. In transcendental philosophy the notion of a 
critical, rational organization of existing things underwent the decisive 
reduction to a formal a priori that has always already preceded any 
factual experience. To be sure, the relation of the a priori syntheses to 
experience is in the mode of absolute simultaneity; but in that the 
syntheses, which are eternally valid, precede every possible future 
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experience and cannot be surpassed by any future experience, the 
essence of man as cognitive subject and of the objects of cognition is 
cut off from the future and oriented toward the past. This is the 
dominant motif of the transcendental method, the method specific to 
bourgeois philosophy.  
With Kant the characteristics of essence – such as unity, universality, 
permanence – reappear in the context of pure theoretical reason, where 
they are incorporated partly in the pure concepts of the understanding 
or in their transcendental apperception, partly in the transcendental 
Ideas of reason. Thus they appear on the one hand as the categorical 
forms of conceptual synthesis, which are prior to all future experience, 
and on the other as Ideas or pure concepts of reason which “extend 
beyond the limit of all experience”, in which “no object can ever appear 
that would be adequate to the transcendental Idea”.11 In the first case, 
the critical and dynamic opposition of essence to experience is 
eliminated by being completely absorbed into the timeless history of 
cognition. In the second it is more immediately and explicitly clear that 
the problem of essence has been taken up into ‘reason’ – and not only 
because Kant consciously associated himself with the Platonic doctrine 
of essence by calling the concepts of reason ‘Ideas’. Reason is the locus 
of the final unity, totality, and universality of knowledge: “the faculty 
that unifies the rules of the understanding under principles”.12 As a pure 
concept of reason, the Idea is directed toward the “totality of the 
conditions for a given conditioned thing”; it is the “concept of the 
unconditioned”.13 Now, Kant says that these Ideas “perhaps make 
possible a transition from natural concepts to practical ones”.14 The age-
old philosophical question of realizing essence in existence becomes 
here the problem of the transition from the concepts of theoretical to 
those of practical reason. Kant emphasized that reason’s interest in 
these Ideas was ‘a practical interest’: in the Ideas the “foundation stones 
of morality and religion”15 were at stake. And precisely here that 
thought whose structure Kant is unfolding becomes tangled in 
paralogisms and antinomies, in a “natural and unavoidable illusion”, 
which “is still deceptive even when one is no longer at its mercy”.16 
It is characteristic of the historical situation of idealist thought that 
the ‘Ideas’ as concepts of reason become part of the dialectic of 
transcendental illusion and that when the dialectic first reappears in 
idealism it is one of illusion: of necessary illusion. The essence of man is 
still seen as lying in reason, “which alone is called upon to do away with 
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all errors”; Kant still insists that this reason “knows no other judge than 
universal human reason, in which each man has a voice; and since it is 
from reason that every improvement of which our condition is capable 
must spring”, freedom is its original right “and may not be restricted”.17 
But it is not accidental that two different concepts of reason are 
intertwined in Kant’s work: reason as the unifying totality of man’s 
cognitive faculty (as which it is the subject of the ‘critiques’ of pure and 
practical reason), and reason in a narrower sense, as a single faculty that 
rises ‘above’ the understanding, as the faculty of those ‘Ideas’ that can 
never be adequately represented in experience and have a merely 
regulative function. It is reason in this second, more narrow sense 
through which, for Kant, the transition to practical concepts occurs. It 
occurs under the aegis of the concept of freedom: the ‘Idea’ is 
transformed into a ‘postulate’ and the ‘postulate’ into a ‘fact’ of practical 
reason. In this way reason’s freedom undergoes still another limitation. 
Through the stipulation that man’s free reason be united with the 
empirical world of necessity, freedom is hypostatized as a timeless 
occurrence: it can exercise its causality on the empirical world only 
insofar as the world has no effect whatsoever on it. Free reason is 
limited in function to furnishing the determining ground of actions, to 
‘beginning’ them. Once begun, actions enter the unbreakable causal 
nexus of natural necessity, and they proceed in accordance with its laws 
forever after. 
Thus this doctrine mirrors the fate of a world in which rational 
human freedom always can take only the initial step freely, only to 
encounter afterward an uncontrolled necessity which remains 
contingent with respect to reason. The causality of reason, operating in 
one direction only, cuts off the possibility of the empirical world 
affecting the intelligible essence of man. It thus imprisons this essence 
in a past without future: 
The intelligible essence of every thing, and especially of man, stands, 
according to this [idealism] outside of every causal connection, as it 
stands outside of or above all time. Thus it can never be determined by 
anything that has gone before it, in that it rather is prior, not so much 
temporally as logically, to everything else that is or becomes within it.18 
 
* 
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In the development of transcendental philosophy after Kant, this 
stabilization of the concept of essence was broken down and a dynamic 
theory of essence achieved. Hegel’s dialectic, in which this dynamic 
theory of essence was developed, received no further elaboration in 
idealist philosophy: its development forms part of a different trend of 
thought and will be discussed later. When Husserl undertook to found 
anew the theory of essence, he based it on the theory of transcendental 
subjectivity as it was worked out from Descartes to Kant. 
Phenomenology did not, to be sure, start out as transcendental 
philosophy. The pathos of purely descriptive, scientific objectivity 
which characterizes the Logische Untersuchungen (‘Logical Investigations’) 
is indicative of an inner connection with positivism, even where Husserl 
attacks it. Husserl himself pointed to Hume as the first to “make serious 
use of Descartes’ pure inward focus”.19 But where the theory of essence 
becomes central in Husserl’s philosophy, its elaboration forces 
phenomenology to base itself ever more radically on transcendental 
apriorism. For this reason the stage represented by the Logische 
Untersuchungen does not need to be considered here. 
Husserl defines essence in opposition to the individual, spatio-
temporally existing real thing, the ‘fact’, object of all empirical sciences: 
the significance of this contingency, which is called facticity, is limited 
by its correlation to a necessity that does not stand for the mere factual 
existence of a valid rule for the co-ordination of spatio-temporal facts; 
rather, it has the character of essential necessity and is thus related to 
essential universality. 
Part of the “meaning of everything contingent … is to have an essence 
and thus an eidos that is to be grasped in its purity. This eidos is a 
component of essential truths of various levels of generality.”20 At first 
glance, these attributes do not differ at all from those of the traditional 
conception of essence as quidditas and essentia, as it was formulated by 
the Scholastics and incorporated into philosophy. But the context in 
which phenomenology deals with the concept of essence is completely 
different: the sphere of transcendental consciousness, ‘purged’ of all acts 
intending spatio-temporal existence. For Husserl, the concept of 
essence is relevant only within the dimension of pure subjectivity that 
remains as a residuum after the phenomenological “annihilation of the 
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world” and that “precedes the being of the world as constituting in itself 
the meaning of that being” – a “completely self-contained reality”, 
“something existing absolutely”.21 The essential truths that make their 
appearance in this dimension “do not contain the slightest assertion 
about facts, and thus from them alone not even the most meager factual 
truth can be derived”.22 
After his Ideen (‘Ideas’), Husserl programmatically defined his 
philosophical work in relation to Descartes. The relationship of Husserl 
to Descartes is not only one within the history of philosophy: it is the 
relationship of advanced bourgeois thought to its beginnings. Transcendental 
phenomenology itself represents, in its own content, an endpoint. Its 
attempt at a new foundation of philosophy as rigorous science presents 
itself as the end, no longer to be surpassed, of the line of thought that 
tried to anchor the absolute certainty, necessity, and universal validity of 
knowledge in the ego cogito. Once again the fundamental characteristics 
of bourgeois theory are at stake, and in the struggle for them resignation 
and the transition to a new stage are already in evidence. Only in this 
context does the significance of phenomenology’s restitution of the 
concept of essence become clear. 
In his Formale und transzendentale Logik (‘Formal and Transcendental 
Logic’) Husserl gives an account of his relation to Descartes and to 
transcendental philosophy. He sees Descartes as the originator of 
transcendental philosophy and accepts this origin as valid for himself as 
well, for “all objective knowledge must be founded on the single 
apodictic givenness … of the ego cogito”.23 But he calls it a great error that 
Descartes saw in this ego a “primary, indubitably existing particle of the 
world” and deduced the rest of the world from it. This ‘realism’ on 
Descartes’ part, according to Husserl, is a naïve prejudice with which 
phenomenology cannot concur.24 On the other hand, the Kantian 
critique of reason ‘erred’ in directing itself toward the constitution of 
the given spatiotemporal world rather than toward ‘all possible 
worlds’.25 Thus, for Husserl, Kant’s critical thought remained caught in 
‘mundane’ realism. Phenomenology insisted on distinguishing itself 
from the start from this critical thought: “Phenomenology cannot 
distance itself from critical thought, because it was never at one with 
it”.26 
Now, it is precisely this point – where the ego cogito is construed as an 
‘indubitably existing particle of the world’ and at the same time serves as 
Negations 
42 
the only springboard into the world – that links Cartesian philosophy 
with the progressive tendencies of the bourgeoisie. Only when the ego 
as something really existing in the world becomes the first certainty in 
the realm of beings can its reason provide the critical standard of real 
knowledge and serve as the organon for the ordering of life. And only 
as long as reason is constitutively directed toward empirically given 
‘material’ can its spontaneity be more than mere imagination. Once this 
connection between rational thought and spatio-temporal reality is 
severed, the ‘interest of freedom’ disappears completely from 
philosophy. 
But this severance belongs from the start to the program of the 
phenomenological reductions. Spatio-temporal facts in their spatio-
temporal relevance are excluded from the field of genuine 
phenomenological study. What remains after the first reduction are the 
facts of consciousness, a world whose factual quality and richness are 
‘the same’ as the ‘natural’ world’s – with one very decisive difference: 
the phenomenological index modifies the meaning of reality in such a 
way as to make all facts, as facts of intentional consciousness, of equal 
validity;27 they are ‘exemplary’ in principle. Thus 
the whole spatio-temporal world, to which man and the human ego 
ascribe themselves as subordinate individual realities, acquires the 
meaning of merely intentional being, that is, being that has the merely 
secondary and relative meaning of being for a consciousness. It is a 
being posited by consciousness in its experiences, a being which in 
principle can be intuited and determined only as that which is identical 
in the motivated manifolds of appearances but which aside from that is 
nothing.28 
The full import of this reduction of facts to ‘exemplars’ is revealed in 
the phenomenological definition of the relation of essence and fact in 
the prehension29 of essence (Wesenserfassung). In a second reduction, the 
essential content and essential organization of the facts of consciousness 
are distinguished from their factual being. Thus all contents of 
consciousness function equally as ‘exemplary’: the elucidation of essence 
(Wesenserklärung) can take place on the basis of a perception or any other 
kind of representation – moreover and significantly, “free fantasies 
acquire a preferential position with respect to perceptions”.30 Essence 
results as the invariant within the infinitely manifold variations which 
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representational acts undertake with regard to their object. Variation 
resulting in essence is generated 
in the freedom of pure fantasy and in the pure consciousness of 
arbitrariness – of ‘pure at-all-ness’ … thereby simultaneously entering a 
horizon of openly and endlessly manifold free possibilities for ever new 
variants. This variation is thus fully free, unbound from all a priori facts. 
It comprises all variants of the openly endless horizon, including the 
‘example’ itself, freed of all facticity, as something ‘arbitrary’. … In this 
variation, they are in a continuous, pervasive synthesis of ‘coinciding 
opposites’. But in this very coincidence appears the invariant, that which 
is necessarily constant in the free and continuously reformed variation, 
that which is indivisibly the same in that which is other and recurrently 
other – in short, universal essence – to which all ‘thinkable’ modifications 
of the example remain tied.31 
This text, which leads deep into the inner mechanism of the 
phenomenological prehension of essence, also provides the best insight 
into the changed function of the theory of essence. All the decisive 
concepts which played a role in the theory of essence since its 
beginnings reappear here, and all in a characteristically changed form. 
Freedom has become a mark of pure fantasy, as the free arbitrariness of 
ideational possibilities of variation. The constant, identical, and 
necessary is no longer sought as the Being of beings but as what is 
invariant in the infinite manifold of representational modifications of 
‘exemplars’. Possibility is no longer a force straining toward reality; 
rather, in its open endlessness it belongs to mere imagination.32 
As the ego cogito and the essence which appear to it become the 
object of phenomenology, there is no longer a critical tension between 
them and factual existence. Phenomenology is therewith in principle a 
descriptive philosophy: it always aims only at describing what is as it is and 
as it presents itself, not, for instance, at showing what could and should 
be. The theoretical radicalness which seemed audible in the call, ‘To the 
things themselves!’ reveals its quietistic, indeed positivistic, character as 
phenomenology progresses. The ‘things’ become so for phenomenology 
only after they have been stripped of their actual materially objective 
character and have entered the ‘leveling’ sphere of transcendental 
subjectivity for which everything is equi-valent (in-different) as a fact of 
consciousness. In this dimension, speaking of essence no longer means 
setting reality against its potentiality and what exists against what could 
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be; essence has a purely descriptive and epistemological character. A 
philosophy that considers “all pre-given beings with their exact 
evidence” equally ‘prejudgments’33 no longer has any basis for 
distinguishing critically among these beings. Universal freedom from 
presuppositions here becomes equivalent to universal acknowledgment. 
Phenomenology’s concept of essence is so far removed from any critical 
significance that it regards both the essential and the inessential, the 
object of phantasy as well as that of perception, as ‘facts’. The 
epistemological antipositivism of this doctrine ill conceals its positivistic 
orientation. 
The abatement of the dynamic movement contained in the concept 
of essence can also be seen in the few remnants of a position on 
Husserl’s part with regard to knowledge of (spatio-temporal) facticity. 
The formal epistemological version of the concept of essence lets 
facticity subsist as a self-contained realm ‘alongside’ the realm of 
essence. To know it does not involve changing or abolishing any aspect 
of it, but ‘only understanding’. “Through my phenomenological 
reflection, the transcendent world … is neither abolished, devalued, nor 
changed, but only understood…”.34 The phenomenological epoché, 
which was intended to be so much more radical than Descartes’ 
methodical doubt, contains a quietistic indifference, which regresses 
behind Descartes, with regard to the established order. With Husserl, 
concern with the present has become concern with eternity: the eternity 
of pure science, whose timeless and absolute truth is supposed to 
provide the present with security. He considers the ‘spiritual distress’ of 
our time the ‘most radical distress of life’ and declares: 
We must not sacrifice eternity for the sake of alleviating our distress in 
the present. We must not bequeath to our descendants an accumulation 
of distress such that it becomes an ultimately indestructible evil.35 
Positivistic indifference, however, is only one way in which the altered 
function of transcendental philosophy is expressed in phenomenology. 
Phenomenology appeared on the scene with the radical claim of 
beginning anew. That phenomenology explicitly speaks once more of 
‘essence’ in opposition to ‘fact’ and makes essence the object of an 
independent ‘intuition’ is a significant novelty that cannot be explained 
exclusively as a development of the transcendental method. The pathos 
of the evidence of universal, necessary, and objective truths, the demand 
of arriving at ‘the things themselves’, and the renaissance of metaphysics 
Concept of Essence 
45 
in the wake of phenomenology belong to a new historical trend. While 
retaining the transcendental approach philosophy professes to be truly 
concrete and to take concrete objects as its point of departure. A sign of 
material ‘objectivity’ and diversity can be seen in the renewed 
consideration of essence as the object of an independent, originally 
‘giving’ intuition. It is significant that phenomenology claims that the 
verification, ‘meaning’, and truth of cognitive judgments no longer 
reside on the ‘side of the subject’, of the ego cogito, but on the ‘side of the 
object’. It is the object itself which appears there and whose essence 
prescribes, as it were, the cognitive acts directed toward it. The 
phenomenological doctrine of essence binds the transcendental freedom 
of the ego cogito to objectively pregiven essences and essential objects. 
This is the point where, within phenomenology, the new situation of 
thought imposes itself: the introduction of material eidetics, in which 
the entire perspective is changed. The philosophy of the bourgeois era 
was founded by Descartes as a subjective and idealist one, and this 
resulted from an inner necessity. Every attempt to ground philosophy in 
objectivity, in the sphere of material reality, without attacking the real 
presuppositions of its conceptual character, i.e. without integrating into 
the theory a practice aimed at transformation, necessarily surrenders its 
rationally critical character and becomes heteronomous. This fate befell 
the material doctrine of essence; it led, just as with positivism, to the 
subjection of theory to the ‘given’ powers and hierarchies. With regard 
to knowledge, the basic meaning of the intuition of essence is that it 
‘lets itself be given’ its object, that it passively accepts it and binds itself 
to it as ‘something absolutely given’.36 That which gives itself in evident 
‘congruent unity’ (Deckungseinheit) is “at the same time absolute Being, 
and the object that is now the object of such Being, such pure essence, 
is to an ideal degree adequately given”.37 The intuition of essence is 
(despite the ‘freedom’ of ideational variations) receptive. At the apex of 
philosophy, the receptivity of the intuition of essence replaces the 
spontaneity of the comprehending understanding that is inseparable 
from the idea of critical reason. 
The sacrifice of the idea of critical reason paved the way to 
resignation for the doctrine of essence, to its gradual transition to a new 
ideology. Bourgeois philosophy lost the Archimedian point where it had 
anchored the freedom of the knowing individual, and without it, it has 
no basis from which the weapon of critique can be employed against the 
claims of specific facts and hierarchies to be ‘essential’. The material 
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doctrine of essence began with the elaboration of a new ethics, which 
was outlined in opposition to Kant’s ethics. The lawlike character of 
ethical valuation no longer resides in the obedience of the autonomous 
individual to a freely self-given, absolutely obligatory, ‘norm’, but 
follows, to the contrary, “from the effectiveness of personally structured 
prototypes and antitypes”.38 
I assert, in other words, that value systems, and especially the systems of 
norms and laws that depend on them and which man obeys or disobeys, 
are in the last analysis always to be reduced to personal prototypes, to value 
patterns in the form of a person. We do not choose them, for they 
possess us and attract us before we can choose.39 
Material value-ethics (Wertethik) becomes the ethics of personal 
prototypes, where the norms of action are no longer given by individual 
or universal reason, but are instead received; here, too, the autonomy of 
freedom is replaced by receptive heteronomy. This is part of the 
annunciation of the ideology of the monopoly-capitalist period, in 
which domination by the most powerful economic groups is effected by 
means of the delegation of power to prototypical leader personalities 
and in which the interests of these groups are concealed by means of 
the image of an essentially personal order of values (leadership and 
following, status order, racial elite, and so forth). The intuition of 
essence helps to set up ‘essential’ hierarchies in which the material and 
vital values of human life occupy the lowest rank, while the types of the 
saint, the genius, and the hero take first place. Renunciation, sacrifice, 
and humility are considered ‘essential’ as the central values of the 
individual, while ‘blood and soil’ are supposed to constitute the ‘essence’ 
of the nation (Volkstum). We shall not delineate here the further 
development of these theories. It was our intention only to indicate 
their conceptual links to the material doctrine of essence.40 
The function of the intuition of essence in material eidetics leads to 
the abdication of the critical freedom of reason, to the cancellation of its 
autonomy. From Descartes on, the idea of the autonomy of reason was 
linked to the progressive tendencies of the bourgeoisie. Its restriction to 
abstract cognitive reason characterized the retreat of these tendencies. 
In the epoch of monopoly capitalism, reason is replaced by the 
acquiescent acknowledgment of ‘essential’ givens, in whose verification 
reason initially plays only a derivative role, and subsequently none at all. 
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It is material eidetics against which the positivist attack on the 
concept of essence was directed. The positivist opposition to the 
‘metaphysics’ of the doctrine of essence conceived itself primarily as an 
epistemological critique: our experience of reality (reality by no means 
being identified with the immediately given) does not at all justify the 
assumption of two ontologically different ‘worlds’, an assumption 
presupposed by the opposition of thing and appearance, essence and 
fact. 
There is no fact that compels or even justifies us in making such a 
contrast between two irreducible realities…. We arrive at a satisfactory 
picture of the world only when we accord eveything real, the contents of 
consciousness as well as all Being outside of consciousness, the same 
sort and the same degree of reality, without any distinction. All things 
are in the same sense self-subsistent, yet all are in the same sense 
interdependent.41 
With this contention, positivism takes a decisive step beyond 
epistemological empiricism. For with its concept of fact, the facticity of 
an object of knowledge establishes not only its ‘reality’ but 
simultaneously its cognitive equi-valence to every other reality. With 
respect to knowledge, all facts are as such equi-valent. The world of 
facts is, so to speak, one-dimensional. The real is ‘absolutely (schlechthin) 
real’ and as such precludes any metaphysical or critical transcendence 
toward essence. 
There is only one reality, which is always essence and cannot be 
decomposed into essence and appearance. There are, to be sure, many 
sorts of real objects, perhaps even infinitely many, but there is only one 
sort of reality, and all of them partake of it equally.42 
Here the thesis of the essentiality of the facts is associated with absolute 
acknowledgment of reality, ‘which is always essence’. Cognition, freed 
from the tension between facts and essence, becomes recognition. The 
very theory that intended to eliminate from science the concept of 
essence makes the same sacrifice of critical reason performed by 
phenomenological eidetics in liberating essence from all opposition to 
spatio-temporal facts and arriving at an equi-valence of all facts for 
transcendental consciousness. When all facts are indiscriminately held to 
be essential, and when each fact is indiscriminately held to be an 
essence, philosophy’s attitude toward reality is fundamentally identical. 
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To be sure, positivism comprehended the critical and moral motivation 
of the theory of essence: “One kind of Being is considered higher, more 
genuine, more noble, and more important than the other, i.e. an 
evaluative conception has been introduced”.43 But for it this is only a 
confusion of the “evaluative viewpoint with the logical viewpoint”, the 
proton pseudos or false premise of a scientific theory. Positivism adheres 
to the bourgeois ideal of presuppositionless, pure theory, in which the 
absence of ‘ethical neutrality’ or the commitment of taking a position 
signifies delinquency in rigor. Compared with the ideology which 
material eidetics became, in which the language of the essential priority 
of specific values concealed their establishment by regressive social 
interests, positivism retains a certain critical tendency. But the world of 
‘absolutely real’ facts is dominated by powers concerned with the 
preservation of this form of reality, in the interest of small and powerful 
economic groups, against the already real possibility of another form of 
reality; and the tension between essence and appearance determines the 
historical image of reality in the shape of universal social contradiction. 
Under these conditions a theory for which reality is ‘always essence’ can 
only be one of resignation. As with phenomenological eidetics, the 
positivist annulment of the opposition of essence and fact is not a new 
beginning, but an end. 
 
* 
 
The theme of the philosophical theories of the last decades has been the 
reconsideration of bourgeois thought’s traditional preoccupation with 
absolutely certain, unconditioned, universally valid knowledge. Concern 
for the self-certain critical freedom of the individual was transformed 
into this epistemological ideal. The various forms of transcendental 
reduction reflect the stages of the historical development of this thought 
up to its adaptation to the anti-individualistic and antirationalistic 
ideology of the present. From it both the ‘interest of freedom’ and 
interest in the true happiness of the individual have disappeared. The 
social groups which during their rise to power developed and supported 
these interests oppose them under present forms of domination. The 
critical impulses in the theory of essence, abandoned by eidetics as well 
as positivism, have been incorporated into materialist theory. Here, 
however, the concept of essence takes on a new form. This theory 
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conceived concern with the essence of man as the task of a rational 
organization of society, to be achieved through practice that alters its 
present form. Materialist theory thus transcends the given state of fact 
and moves toward a different potentiality, proceeding from immediate 
appearance to the essence that appears in it. But here appearance and 
essence become members of a real antithesis arising from the particular 
historical structure of the social process of life. The essence of man and 
of things appears within that structure; what men and things could 
genuinely be appears in ‘bad’, ‘perverted’ form. At the same time, 
however, appears the possibility of negating this perversion and 
realizing in history that which could be. This antagonistic character of 
the historical process as it is today turns the opposition of essence and 
appearance into a dialectical relationship and this relationship into an 
object of the dialectic. Materialist theory takes up the concept of essence 
where philosophy last treated it as a dialectical concept – in Hegel’s 
Logic. 
For Hegel appearance and essence are two modes of being which 
stand in reciprocal relation to one another, so that the existence of 
appearance presupposes the suppression of merely self-subsistent 
essence. Essence is essence only through appearing, that is, through 
emerging from its mere self-subsistence: ‘Essence must appear’. And 
appearance, as the appearance of what is in itself, becomes “what the 
thing in itself is, or its truth”.44 “By this token essence is neither in back 
of nor beyond appearance; rather, existence is appearance because it is 
essence that exists.”45 Hegel conceives of essence as a process in which 
‘mediated being’ is posited through the overcoming of unmediated 
being; essence has a history. And the critical theme of the theory of 
essence is reactivated in the meaning of this history, in this movement 
from unmediated ‘Being’ through ‘essence’ to mediated ‘existence’. 
“When, further, it is said that all things have an essence, what is being 
expressed is that they are not in reality what they show themselves to 
be”, “that their immediate existence does not correspond to what they 
are in themselves”.46 The movement of essence has the task of doing 
away with this bad immediacy and positing the sphere of beings (das 
Seiende) as that which it is in itself: “Now the process of reality is itself of 
this sort. Reality is not simply something which is immediately, but 
rather, as essential Being, it is the overcoming of its own immediacy and 
therefore mediates itself with itself.”47 
Negations 
50 
Essence is conceived as something which ‘has become’, as a ‘result’ 
that itself must reappear as a result and that enters into relation with the 
dynamic categories of the inessential, illusion, and appearance. In this 
way, it is conceived as part of a process which takes place between 
unmediated Being, its overcoming and preservation in essence (as its 
being-in-itself) and the realization of this essence. But with Hegel the 
process remains ontological; it is the Being of beings which undergoes it 
and is its subject. It thereby proves itself to be Logos, ‘reason’. The 
movement through which unmediated Being is ‘recollected’48 to essence 
as to its being-in-itself, ‘reflection’, in which immediacy is overcome and 
posited again as mediated existence, is a determination of Being itself, of 
Being as essence. “Essence as such is one with its reflection and not 
distinguished from the latter’s own movement.”49 It is not man who 
recollects essence, who grasps the world of beings which confronts him, 
overcomes its bad immediacy and posits it anew through the knowledge 
of essence; rather, for Hegel all this occurs within rational Being itself. 
Man participates in this process only as the subject of cognition, insofar 
as he himself is rational Being. 
Hegel’s conception of essence already contains all the elements of a 
dynamic historical theory of essence, but in a dimension where they 
cannot be effective. Essence is for Hegel a movement, but a movement 
in which there is no longer any actual change, a movement which takes 
place within itself. “Essence is the absolute unity of being-in-itself and 
being-for-itself; the process of its determination thus remains within this 
unity and is neither a becoming nor a transition to something else”; it is 
“the movement of becoming and of transition which remains within 
itself”.50 Hegel transposes the tension between what could be and what 
exists, between being-in-itself (essence) and appearance, into the very 
structure of Being; as such it is always prior to all states of fact. Hegel’s 
theory of essence remains transcendental. 
 
* 
 
When the materialist dialectic as social theory confronts the opposition 
of essence and appearance, the concern for man which governs it gives 
the critical motif in the theory of essence a new sharpness. The tension 
between potentiality and actuality, between what men and things could 
be and what they are in fact, is one of the dynamic focal points of this 
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theory of society. It sees therein not a transcendental structure of Being 
and an immutable ontological difference but a historical relationship 
which can be transformed in this life by real men; the incongruity of 
potentiality and actuality incites knowledge to become part of the 
practice of transformation. That appearance does not immediately 
coincide with essence, that self-subsistent potentialities are not realized, 
that the particular stands in conflict with the general, that chance on the 
one hand and blind necessity on the other rule the world – these 
conditions represent tasks set for men’s rational practice. For the theory 
associated with this practice, the statement that all science would be 
superfluous when “the form of appearance and the essence of things 
immediately coincided”51 has a new meaning. What is the significance 
here of the divergence of essence and appearance, and of what sort is 
the process of transcendence from appearance to essence? 
To the interest governing the materialist dialectic, its object, the 
totality of the process of social evolution, appears as an inherently 
multidimensional, organized structure. It is by no means the case that all 
of its data are equally relevant or ‘factual’. Some phenomena lie close to 
the surface, others form part of the central mechanism. From this 
distinction results a first and still completely formal concretion of 
essence as what is essential: in a very general sense, essence is the 
totality of the social process as it is organized in a particular historical 
epoch. In relation to this process every individual factor, considered as 
an isolated unit, is ‘inessential’, insofar as its ‘essence’, i.e. the concept of 
the real content of an appearance, can be grasped only in the light of its 
relation to the totality of the process. Now the latter is structured in a 
second way; even though they interact, the various levels of social reality 
nevertheless are grounded in one fundamental level. The manner in 
which this occurs determines the whole of life. In the current historical 
period, the economy as the fundamental level has become ‘essential’ in 
such a way that all other levels have become its ‘manifestations’ 
(Erscheinungsform). 
In materialist theory the difference between appearance 
(manifestation) and essence takes on a third significance, one which 
permits a further concretion of its object. Basic to the present form of 
social organization, the antagonisms of the capitalist production 
process, is the fact that the central phenomena connected with this 
process do not immediately appear to men as what they are ‘in reality’, 
but in masked, ‘perverted’ form. In the cases of work relations, the 
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divisions of the social and political hierarchy, the institutions of justice, 
education, and science, the form in which they appear conceals their 
origin and their true function in the total social process. To the extent 
that individuals and groups base their actions and thoughts on 
immediate appearances, the latter are, of course, not ‘mere’ appearances 
but themselves factors essential to the functioning of the process and to 
the maintenance of its organization. Nevertheless, in the course of the 
process a stage is reached where it is possible to comprehend the 
essence in the manifestation and to understand that the difference 
between essence and appearance is a historical constellation of social 
relationships. The nature of this difference and the necessarily 
dichotomous character it gives to materialist theory will be discussed 
below. 
The three meanings which we have indicated here of the difference 
between essence and appearance in materialist theory permit an initial 
understanding of those characteristics fundamental to the dialectical 
concept of essence. The transcendence leading from facts to essence is 
historical. Through it, given facts are understood as appearances whose 
essence can be comprehended only in the context of particular historical 
tendencies aiming at a different form of reality. The theory’s historical 
interest enters constitutively into its conceptual scheme and makes the 
transcendence of ‘facts’ toward their essence critical and polemical. 
Measured against their real potentialities, the facts reveal themselves to 
be the ‘bad’ manifestations of a content which must be realized by 
doing away with these manifestations in opposition to the interests and 
powers connected with them. Thus, even in the first form in which we 
encounter it, the dialectical concept of essence is distinguishable from 
phenomenology’s conception of neutral essences as well as from 
positivism’s neutral leveling of essence. In place of a static 
epistemological relationship of essence to fact emerges a critical and 
dynamic relationship of essence to appearance as parts of a historical 
process. 
Connecting at its roots the problem of essence to social practice 
restructures the concept of essence in its relation to all other concepts 
by orienting it toward the essence of man. Concern with man moves to 
the center of theory; man must be freed from real need and real misery 
to achieve the liberation of becoming himself. When the essence of man 
becomes the object of inquiry in this way, the relation of essence and 
appearance is posited as a historical disproportion (Miss-Verhältnis). At 
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the stage of development that man has presently reached, real 
potentialities for the fulfillment of human life are at hand in all areas, 
potentialities which are not realized in the present social structure. Here 
the concept of what could be, of inherent possibilities, acquires a precise 
meaning. What man can be in a given historical situation is determinable 
with regard to the following factors: the measure of control of natural 
and social productive forces, the level of the organization of labor, the 
development of needs in relation to possibilities for their fulfillment 
(especially the relation of what is necessary for the reproduction of life 
to the ‘free’ needs for gratification and happiness, for the ‘good and the 
beautiful’), the availability, as material to be appropriated, of a wealth of 
cultural values in all areas of life. This definition of essence already 
implies the whole theory of history that deduces the totality of the 
conditions of life from the mode of social organization and that at the 
same time provides the methodological and conceptual tools making 
possible knowledge of the historical tendencies effective at a particular 
time. On the basis of this theory the essence of man is understood in 
connection with those tendencies which have as their goal a new form 
of social life as the ‘Idea’ of that which practice must realize. Considered 
this way, the image of man represents not only what can already be 
made of man today, what ‘in itself’ can already be today, but also – and 
this is the polemical demand theory raises by means of this concept of 
essence – the real fulfillment of everything that man desires to be when 
he understands himself in terms of his potentialities. 
In making this demand of the essence of man, theory points the way 
from the bad current state of humanity to a mankind that disposes of 
the goods available to it in such a way that they are distributed in 
accordance with the true needs of the community. Here men would 
themselves take on the planning and shaping of the social process of life 
and not leave it to the arbitrariness of competition and the blind 
necessity of reified economic relations. The power of the conditions of 
labor over life, along with the separation of the immediate producers 
from the means of labor, would be abolished. Instead of life being 
placed in the service of labor, labor would become a means of life. 
Instead of degrading cultural values to the rank of privilege and object 
of ‘leisure’, men would really make them part of the common existence. 
These determinations of essence are distinguished from utopia in that 
theory can demonstrate the concrete roads to their realization and can 
adduce as evidence those attempts at realization which are already under 
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way. Of course these insights cannot be arrived at through a 
contemplative attitude; in order to justify them knowledge can have 
recourse neither to evidence afforded by mere perception nor to a 
universal system of values in which they are anchored. The truth of this 
model of essence is preserved better in human misery and suffering and 
the struggle to overcome them than in the forms and concepts of pure 
thought. This truth is ‘indeterminate’ and remains necessarily so as long 
as it is measured against the idea of unconditionally certain knowledge. 
For it is fulfilled only through historical action, and its concretion can 
thus result only post festum. 
When orientation toward historical practice replaces orientation 
toward the absolute certainty and universal validity of knowledge that 
prevailed in the traditional doctrine of essence, then the concept of 
essence ceases to be one of pure theory. Consequently it can no longer 
be fulfilled in pure thought and pure intuition. This does not mean that 
it gives up its claim to truth or that it contents itself with a ‘truth’ valid 
only for particular individuals and groups.52 But its verification occurs 
only within the total structure of the theory in which it has its place and 
where it is corroborated by all the other concepts. One criterion for the 
objective validity of dialectical theory’s separation of essence and 
appearance is the suitability of its concept for service as the organizing 
principle in the explanation of a given group of appearances (e.g. 
constellations of political power among states of a specific era, their 
alliances, and conflicts). If the historical structure (e.g. ‘imperialism’) 
postulated as ‘essential’ for the explanation of such a grouping makes it 
possible to comprehend causally the situation both in its individual 
phases as well as in terms of the tendencies effective within it, then it is 
really the essential in that manifold of appearances. This determination 
of essence is true; it has held good within the theory. Yet the theory of 
which it is a part is itself at the same time a factor in the historical 
struggles that it aims to comprehend: only in them can the essential 
theoretical truths be ultimately verified.53 And from this very historicity 
of dialectical concepts grows a new kind of ‘universal validity’ and 
objectivity. 
The materialist concept of essence is a historical concept. Essence is 
conceivable only as the essence of a particular ‘appearance’, whose 
factual form is viewed with regard to what it is in itself and what it could 
be (but is not in fact). This relation, however, originates in history and 
changes in history. To every attempt to ‘historicize’ the concept of 
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essence, the traditional doctrine of essence has objected that viewing the 
factually given appearance with regard to what it is in itself presupposes 
‘having’ this being-in-itself. In other words, according to this view, 
‘measuring’ the appearance against its essence, indeed, merely referring 
to a being as an ‘appearance’ that does not immediately coincide with 
what it is in itself, presupposes prior acquaintance with the essence 
through intuition. Since Plato’s theory of Ideas, this has been a principal 
motive for establishing the concept of essence as an a priori one. In 
truth, an a priori element is at work here, but one confirming the 
historicity of the concept of essence. It leads back into history rather 
than out of it. The immemorially acquired image of essence was formed 
in mankind’s historical experience, which is preserved in the present 
form of reality so that it can be ‘remembered’ and ‘refined’ to the status 
of essence. All historical struggles for a better organization of the 
impoverished conditions of existence, as well as all of suffering 
mankind’s religious and ethical ideal conceptions of a more just order of 
things, are preserved in the dialectical concept of the essence of man, 
where they have become elements of the historical practice linked to 
dialectical theory. There can also be experience of potentialities that 
have never been realized. They can be derived from reality as forces and 
tendencies. The a priori nature of the concept of essence has by no 
means always been comprehended transcendentally and 
suprahistorically. And the traces of the past within the concept of 
essence can be understood as an allusion to a historical condition,54 as in 
Aristotle’s notion of essence as ‘that which Being was’ and Hegel’s 
notion of the ‘recollection’ of Being to essence.55 Hegel speaks of 
essence as of ‘timelessly past’ Being. Past, because it is an image of 
being-in-itself that no longer corresponds to immediate existence; 
timeless, because recollection has preserved it and kept it from 
disappearing into the past. In idealist philosophy the timeless past 
dominates the concept of essence. But when theory associates itself 
with the progressive forces of history, the recollection of what can 
authentically be becomes a power that shapes the future. The 
demonstration and preservation of essence become the motive idea of 
practice aimed at transformation. 
Here the thorough difference of the materialist concept of essence 
from that of idealist philosophy becomes clear for the first time. Just as 
the content of the materialist notion is historical and oriented toward 
practice, the way in which it is arrived at is also determined by historical 
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and practical presuppositions. It is not an object of the contemplative 
receptivity of perception, nor is it a synthesis performed by the 
spontaneity of pure understanding. Rather, it is determined within the 
framework set by the historical goals with which materialist theory is 
linked. Not only do the interests resulting from these goals play a role in 
establishing what is essential, they enter into the content of the concept 
of essence. And yet the theory’s particular interests are fulfilled in a real 
‘universality’, that of the general interest, whose material objectivity (in 
contrast to the formal ‘universal validity’ of the idealist concept of 
essence) allows essence to validate itself as essence. Even positivism has 
acknowledged that theory is determined by interests: “Trends in 
scientific research are … never socially neutral, even though they are 
not always at the center of social conflict”; the sort of ‘propositional 
systems’ set up depends on the ‘social situation’ of ‘the group that 
promotes or tolerates this research’.56 But positivism concludes from 
this only that systems of hypotheses may be set up in more than one 
way and that all types can satisfy the requirements of internal 
consistency and accordance with ‘protocol sentences’. It either holds the 
theories’ different interests (like the ‘facts’) to be indifferent with respect 
to knowledge or, to compensate for the indeterminacy factor, 
incorporates them into the propositional system as ‘personal’ 
evaluations made by the scientist. In contrast to all other theories, 
materialist theory, precisely by virtue of its guiding interest, advances a 
claim to truth for which value-free positivism affords absolutely no 
basis. Of the many social interests, it represents one and only one, 
which claims verifiability as ‘general’ and ‘objective’. Its claim differs 
completely from those put forth by all other philosophical theories, for 
it rejects the adequacy of a priori logical or epistemological validation. 
To be sure, it can be negatively delimited from all antirationalistic 
theories in that all its propositions must justify themselves before men’s 
critical reason, and the ‘interest of freedom’, originally the foundation of 
the philosophy of reason, is thus preserved in materialist theory. The 
source of materialist theory’s substantial difference is that its particular 
interests aim at an organization of life in which the individual’s fate 
depends no longer on chance and the blind necessity of uncontrolled 
economic relationships but rather on planned shaping of social 
potentialities. In such a society particular interests can be integrated into 
a universality which is thus concrete as a community and no longer 
abstract as a ‘universal’. For the material conditions of life, previously 
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unmastered, can now be incorporated into a general plan. They can be 
organized through and by individuals’ social freedom; that is, they can 
be linked to the ‘essence’ of the individual. At the end of the process, 
when former social antagonisms have been overcome in such a 
community, the ‘subjectivity’ of materialist theory becomes objectivity – 
in the form of an existence where the interests of individuals are truly 
preserved in the community. 
But this material universality of theory presupposes a complete 
change in its subject, which is no longer the isolated, abstract individual 
at the basis of idealist philosophy. Consciousness no longer stands at 
the beginning of thought as the fundamentum inconcussum of truth, and it 
no longer stands at the end as the bearer of the freedom of pure will 
and pure knowledge. Theory has moved to another subject; its concepts 
are generated by the consciousness of specific groups and individuals 
who are part of the fight for a more rational organization of society. 
Only when it has changed its historical standpoint in this way can 
theory meet the desideratum for which philosophy has struggled in vain 
in the last few decades. Dilthey’s lifework can be regarded as an attempt 
to replace the abstract epistemological subject, who has been the 
starting point for philosophy since Descartes and in whose veins runs 
“not real blood but the diluted lymph of reason as mere mental 
activity”, with concrete historical man in his ‘real life process’.57 Since 
Dilthey, the various trends of Lebensphilosophie (philosophy of life) and 
existentialism have concerned themselves with the concrete ‘historicity’ 
of theory; phenomenology, too, as was mentioned above, was conceived 
as the philosophy of concrete material objectivity (Sachlichkeit). All such 
efforts had to fail, because they were linked (at first unconsciously, later 
consciously) to the very interests and aims whose theory they opposed. 
They did not attack the presupposition of bourgeois philosophy’s 
abstractness: the actual unfreedom and powerlessness of the individual 
in an anarchic production process. Consequently, the place of abstract 
reason was taken by an equally abstract ‘historicity’, which amounted at 
best to a relativism addressed indifferently to all social groups and 
structures. 
Materialist theory moves beyond historical relativism in linking itself 
with those social forces which the historical situation reveals to be 
progressive and truly ‘universal’. It understands all theory as an element 
of the social process of life, borne by particular historical interests. 
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Hitherto these interests have governed theory primarily ‘behind its 
back’, unconsciously. As long as the production process operates 
unconsciously and by chance, so to speak, it reproduces life only in a 
bad form. It changes its content entirely when the reproduction of life is 
qualitatively (as well as quantitatively) improved by becoming a task for 
conscious planning. Similarly, the conceptual content of theory changes 
when its interest is consciously directed toward this task, for it then 
represents in its true form what formerly functioned as an unconscious 
motivation. The relationship of the historical concept of essence to 
traditional general concepts of essence is of this type. Behind the 
traditional concepts, too, lie concrete historical aims, but in the course 
of tradition they were watered down to general formal structural 
concepts and lost their dynamism. Once understood again as historical 
concepts, the original critical tension between them and reality is 
restored. What is true in them is preserved in the materialist notion of 
essence and expressed in accordance with the changed historical 
situation. Aristotle’s doctrine of the essence of man is not 
comprehensible simply through his general ‘definition’ of man as 	 
 ; 	 

 (zoon logon echon; zoon politikon), for it 
presupposes his metaphysics as well as his ethics, politics, rhetoric, and 
psychology, from which come the notions logos, politikon, zoon. It 
presupposes no less his postulation of domination and servitude as 
modes of Being and his view of the role of material labor in the totality 
of the areas of life. In translating logos as ratio and defining man as 
‘rational’ late antiquity and the Middle Ages integrated man’s being into 
Christian theology’s worldview. The meaning of the Aristotelian 
definition was thereby completely transformed, even though the 
definitions are literally the same. In a later period, the appeal to reason 
as that which is essential in man served to proclaim the freedom of the 
autonomous individual in bourgeois society. But at the same time, when 
man is conceived to be free only as a rational being, whole dimensions 
of existence become ‘inessential’, of no bearing on man’s essence. For 
Kant, ‘being master or servant’ is one of the ‘inessential (ausserwesentlich) 
characteristics’ of man,58 designating only an accidental and ‘external 
relation of man’. The connection, essential to Aristotle, between being 
master or servant and the particular mode of possessing logos,59 reason, 
is completely dissolved. That relationships which were originally held to 
be essential should become inessential indicates a total change in the 
content of the concept of essence, even though reason is maintained as 
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a dimension of the concept. That domination and servitude now appear 
contingent and inessential ensues from the form of human social 
organization which the new concept of essence reflects. With respect to 
the essence of man, the contingency of the master-servant relationship 
results from the blind necessity which the power of reified conditions of 
labor over the producers appears to be. Contingency is recognized as 
such, but its cause is not yet understood. Since ‘external relations’ are 
not organized in accordance with man’s needs and potentialities, with 
his ‘essence’, they remain as a contingency outside the philosophical 
determination of essence as well. 
This determination of the essence of man, which does not include 
‘external relations’ such as domination and servitude or the place of the 
individual in the material process of production in man’s ‘essential 
characteristics’, is true insofar as it comprehends man as he actually 
exists in the bourgeois epoch. Beyond that, it has no validity. When the 
associated individuals themselves have taken over the direction of the 
life process and have made the totality of social relations the work of 
their reason and their freedom, what man is in himself will be related to 
his existence in a new way. The formerly contingent and ‘inessential’ will 
now represent the fulfillment of the most authentic potentialities. Man 
will then have to be ‘defined’ not as a free rational being in opposition 
to contingent conditions of life but as the free and rational creator of his 
conditions of life, as the creator of a better and happier life. 
So far we have attempted to show the significance of the problem of 
essence for materialist theory chiefly in terms of the concept of the 
essence of man. This has been by no means an arbitrary example. 
According to the theory’s governing concern for real, concretely existing 
men, the questions raised by this concept are really essential to 
knowledge, and the theory must be linked to them at every point: not in 
the abstract form in which they have been presented here but as 
objective circumstances of a given state of the whole society, which in 
each case is concretized and transformed in historical practice. In this 
context, the way some other concepts of the theory of essence develop 
and take on new meaning will be outlined in what follows. 
The essence that the theory attempts to conceptualize appeared first 
in the form of man’s potentiality within a particular historical situation, in 
conflict with his immediate existence. The connection of the concept of 
essence with that of potentiality is as old as the problem of essence 
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itself; it received its first explicit philosophical interpretation in 
Aristotle’s notion of 
μ (dynamis). In the postmedieval 
philosophical tradition the ‘potential’ nature of essence increasingly lost 
its connection with the notions of force, striving, and tendency and 
became a matter of (formal and transcendental) logic. Hegel reinstated 
the notion of ‘real possibility’ (potentiality) in his theory of essence: 
Formal possibility is reflection-into-itself (Reflexion-in-sich) only as 
abstract identity, the fact that something is not self-contradictory. But to 
the extent that one goes into the attributes, the circumstances, and the 
conditions of a thing in order to know its possibility, one is no longer 
restricting oneself to formal possibility but considering its real 
possibility. This real possibility is itself immediate existence.60 
Real possibility exists. Therefore it can be known as such by theory, and 
as known it can be taken up by the practice for which theory is the 
guide and be transformed into reality. For Hegel the existence of a 
thing’s real possibility consists in the “existing manifold of 
circumstances which relate to it”.61 The idealist dialectic considers this 
manifold ‘indifferent’; in the materialist dialectic, in keeping with the 
latter’s historical interests, it is accentuated and operates as a tendency in 
men’s actions and in the course of things. The basis for its 
determination has already been indicated. Reality, where man’s essence 
is determined, is the totality of the relations of production. It is no mere 
‘existing manifold of circumstances’, but rather a structure whose 
organization can be analyzed, and within which it is possible to 
distinguish between form and content, essence and appearance, the 
concealed and the obvious. Its content is the maintenance and 
reproduction of society as a whole – the actual process of production 
and reproduction, based on a given level of the productive forces and of 
technology. Its form is the turnover of the production process as the 
realization of capital. Form and content can be separated, for the former 
is only a particular historical pattern in which the latter is realized; there 
are tendencies toward the abolition of the form at work in the content. 
When considered with regard to them, distinguished from its given 
form, and seen with a view to a different form, in which it would no 
longer function as the realization of capital, the content enters the mode 
of real possibility. In doing so it loses none of its reality, while 
preserving all its wealth, the full range of the productive forces it has 
acquired, and the power and amplitude of the work techniques it has 
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developed. All this is, in fact, a condition for the transition to the new 
form. The content is reality in a ‘bad’ form; it is possibility in that its 
emancipation from this form and its realization in a new form are still to 
be accomplished through men’s social practice – but, given the 
conditions at hand, this transformation can be accomplished. This is 
what makes the possibility real. 
Thus the dialectical relationship between reality and possibility is 
fulfilled: “When real possibility overcomes itself, something double is 
overcome, for it is itself double in being both reality and possibility.”62 
Reality is overcome by being comprehended as the mere possibility of 
another reality; possibility is overcome by being realized (in this 
different reality). The relationships of possibility and reality and of form 
and content typify a trait of all the ways in which the opposition of 
essence and appearance appears in the materialist dialectic: both 
members of the relationship are real in the emphatic sense. The form, 
for instance, is no less real than the content; it does not exist only 
‘subjectively’ or ‘ideally’. All such distinctions take place and change 
within the framework of the totality of society. This framework itself is 
never transcended, not even in concepts such as essence and 
potentiality. But its historical appearance is always shaped by particular 
interests and forces and is transcended under the direction of new ones. 
Essence and appearance belong to different spheres of interests and 
forces, as do potentiality and actuality, content and form. Nevertheless, 
the distinctions are not on that account indifferent or arbitrary; they 
apply not only to those who formulate them but also to their 
opponents. For these distinctions conceive the social totality from the 
standpoint of a set of goals toward which the particular goals of 
individuals can be transcended by being preserved in the real 
universality of a community. 
The conceptual scheme of materialist theory in its present form 
exhibits a dialectical dichotomy grounded in the structure of its object. 
It derives from the antagonistic character of the social life process as the 
identity of the processes of production on the one hand and the 
realization of capital on the other. From this basis the antagonism 
permeates all areas of life. It brings about the differentiation of true and 
false consciousness (the former represented by correct theory, which 
transcends the form of the production process in the direction of its 
content, the latter by consciousness that remains on this side of such 
transcendence and considers the historical form of the production 
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process to be eternally valid). Correspondingly, there are two different 
modes in which phenomena appear to and for consciousness. The 
concealment and distortion of decisive social matters in the 
consciousness of the subjects of the production process are caused by 
the independence from the subject attained by the conditions and 
relations of work, a process that necessarily follows from the capitalist 
form of production. This is why it is necessary to distinguish between 
essence and appearance in all their various forms. To the consciousness 
of men dominated by reified social relations, the latter appear in a 
distorted form which does not correspond to their true content – their 
origin and their actual function in this process. But they are not by that 
token in any way ‘unreal’. It is precisely in their distorted form and as 
motives and ‘foci’ in the calculating consciousness of those groups who 
control the process of production that they are very real factors which 
at first confront the immediate producers, degraded to mere objects, as 
independent, blindly necessary powers. Theory, which aims at 
overcoming this distortion, has the task of moving beyond appearance 
to essence and explicating its content as it appears to true 
consciousness. 
At this level the tension between essence and appearance, between 
authentic potentiality and immediate existence, is reflected anew in the 
concrete notions with which theory attempts to grasp the social process 
of life in its antagonistic character. These concepts belong to two levels; 
some deal with phenomena in their reified form, as they appear 
immediately, and others aim at their real content, as it presents itself to 
theory once its phenomenal form has been transcended. Thus Marxian 
economics works with two different sets of concepts, corresponding to 
these levels. One set describes the economic process in its immediate 
appearance as production and reproduction, that is, it abstracts from its 
character as a process of capital realization. To this group belong 
concepts such as entrepreneurial profit and wages, employer and 
employee. The relations they designate are ‘real’, even though they are 
only the forms in which things appear; they determine the thought and 
action of men insofar as they are the subjects and objects of the 
production process. The second set comprehends the same process in 
its antagonistic unity of production process and process of capital 
realization and relates every individual factor to this totality. The 
relations represented in the first set by such concepts as wages and 
entrepreneur, are here grasped by means of categories in which the class 
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character of this method of production is expressed (for instance, 
surplus value). Both groups of concepts are equally necessary to the 
understanding of the antagonistic reality; nevertheless, they are not on 
the same level. In terms of dialectical theory, the second group of 
concepts, which has been derived from the totality of the social 
dynamic, is intended to grasp the essence and the true content of the 
manifestations which the first group describes as they appear. 
The dialectical concepts transcend given social reality in the 
direction of another historical structure which is present as a tendency 
in the given reality. The positive concept of essence, culminating in the 
concept of the essence of man, which sustains all critical and polemical 
distinctions between essence and appearance as their guiding principle 
and model, is rooted in this potential structure. In terms of the positive 
concept of essence, all categories that describe the given form of 
existence as historically mutable become ‘ironic’: they contain their own 
negation. In economic theory this irony finds its expression in the 
relationship of the two sets of concepts. If, for instance, it is said that 
concepts such as wages, the value of labor, and entrepreneurial profit 
are only categories of manifestations behind which are hidden the 
‘essential relations’ of the second set of concepts, it is also true that 
these essential relations represent the truth of the manifestations only 
insofar as the concepts which comprehend them already contain their 
own negation and transcendence – the image of a social organization 
without surplus value. All materialist concepts contain an accusation and 
an imperative. 
When the imperative has been fulfilled, when practice has created 
men’s new social organization, the new essence of man appears in 
reality. Then the current historical form of the antithesis of essence and 
appearance, which expresses primarily the externality, lack of planning, 
and blind necessity of the present material conditions of life in the face 
of the individuals’ true needs and potentialities, will have disappeared. 
But this does not mean that all grounds for the distinction between 
essence and appearance, potentiality and immediate existence would 
cease. Nature remains a realm of necessity; the overcoming of need 
(Not), and the satisfaction of human wants will remain a struggle – a 
struggle, to be sure, which it will only then be possible to conduct in a 
manner worthy of man and without historically obsolete forms of social 
conflict. Into it will go the theoretical energy which has hitherto spent 
itself in the concern with absolutely certain and universally valid 
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knowledge. The characteristics of essence no longer need to be 
stabilized in timeless eternal forms. The truth according to which the 
particular interests are preserved in the universal, the resulting objective 
‘validity’ of the universal, and the transparent rationality of the life 
process, will all have to prove themselves in the practice of the 
associated individuals and no longer in an absolute consciousness 
divorced from practice. 
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The Affirmative Character of Culture1 
The doctrine that all human knowledge is oriented toward practice 
belonged to the nucleus of ancient philosophy. It was Aristotle’s view 
that the truths arrived at through knowledge should direct practice in 
daily life as in the arts and sciences. In their struggle for existence, men 
need the effort of knowledge, the search for truth, because what is 
good, beneficial, and right for them is not immediately evident. Artisan 
and merchant, captain and physician, general and statesman – each must 
have correct knowledge in his field in order to be capable of acting as 
the changing situation demands. While Aristotle maintained the 
practical character of every instance of knowledge, he made a significant 
distinction between forms of knowledge. He ordered them, as it were, 
in a hierarchy of value whose nadir is functional acquaintance with the 
necessities of everyday life and whose zenith is philosophical 
knowledge. The latter has no purpose outside itself. Rather, it occurs 
only for its own sake and to afford men felicity. Within this hierarchy 
there is a fundamental break between the necessary and useful on the 
one hand and the ‘beautiful’ on the other. “The whole of life is further 
divided into two parts, business and leisure, war and peace, and of 
actions some aim at what is necessary and useful, and some at what is 
beautiful [ ].”2 Since this division is not itself questioned, and 
since, together with other regions of the ‘beautiful’, ‘pure’ theory 
congeals into an independent activity alongside and above other 
activities, philosophy’s original demand disintegrates: the demand that 
practice be guided by known truths. Separating the useful and necessary 
from the beautiful and from enjoyment initiated a development that 
abandons the field to the materialism of bourgeois practice on the one 
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hand and to the appeasement of happiness and the mind within the 
preserve of ‘culture’ on the other. 
One theme continually recurs in the reasons given for the relegation 
of the highest form of knowledge and of pleasure to pure, purposeless 
theory: the world of necessity, of everyday provision for life, is 
inconstant, insecure, unfree – not merely in fact, but in essence. 
Disposal over material goods is never entirely the work of human 
industry and wisdom, for it is subject to the rule of contingency. The 
individual who places his highest goal, happiness, in these goods makes 
himself the slave of men and things. He surrenders his freedom. Wealth 
and well-being do not come or persist due to his autonomous decision 
but rather through the changeable fortune of opaque circumstances. 
Man thus subjects his existence to a purpose situated outside him. Of 
itself, such an external purpose can vitiate and enslave men only if the 
material conditions of life are poorly ordered, that is, if their 
reproduction is regulated through the anarchy of opposing social 
interests. In this order the preservation of the common existence is 
incompatible with individual happiness and freedom. Insofar as 
philosophy is concerned with man’s happiness – and the theory of 
classical antiquity held it to be the highest good – it cannot find it in the 
established material organization of life. That is why it must transcend 
this order’s facticity. 
Along with metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, this 
transcendence also affects psychology. Like the extrapsychic3 world, the 
human soul is divided into a lower and a higher region. The history of 
the soul transpires between the poles of sensuality4 and reason. The 
devaluation of sensuality results from the same motives as that of the 
material world: because sensuality is a realm of anarchy, of inconstancy, 
and of unfreedom. Sensual pleasure is not in itself bad. It is bad 
because, like man’s lower activities, it is fulfilled in a bad order. The 
‘lower parts of the soul’ drive man to covet gain and possessions, 
purchase and sale. He is led to “admire and value nothing but wealth 
and its possessors”.5 Accordingly the ‘appetitive’ part of the soul, which 
is oriented toward sensual pleasure, is also termed by Plato the ‘money-
loving’ part, “because money is the principal means of satisfying desires 
of this kind”.6 
All the ontological classifications of ancient idealism express the 
badness of a social reality in which knowledge of the truth about human 
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existence is no longer incorporated into practice. The world of the true, 
the good, and the beautiful is in fact an ‘ideal’ world insofar as it lies 
beyond the existing conditions of life, beyond a form of existence in 
which the majority of men either work as slaves or spend their life in 
commerce, with only a small group having the opportunity of being 
concerned with anything more than the provision and preservation of 
the necessary. When the reproduction of material life takes place under 
the rule of the commodity form and continually renews the poverty of 
class society, then the good, beautiful, and true are transcendent to this 
life. And if everything requisite to preserving and securing material life is 
produced in this form, then whatever lies beyond it is certainly 
‘superfluous’. What is of authentic import to man, the highest truths, 
the highest goods, and the highest joys, is separated in significance from 
the necessary by an abyss. They are a ‘luxury’. Aristotle did not conceal 
this state of affairs. ‘First philosophy’, which includes the highest good 
and the highest pleasure, is a function of the leisure of the few, for 
whom all necessities of life are already adequately taken care of. ‘Pure 
theory’ is appropriated as the profession of an elite and cordoned off 
with iron chains from the majority of mankind. Aristotle did not assert 
that the good, the beautiful, and the true are universally valid and 
obligatory values which should also permeate and transfigure ‘from 
above’ the realm of necessity, of the material provision for life. Only 
when this claim is raised are we in the presence of the concept of 
culture that became central to bourgeois practice and its corresponding 
weltanschauung. The ancient theory of the higher value of truths above 
the realm of necessity includes as well the ‘higher’ level of society. For 
these truths are supposed to have their abode in the ruling social strata, 
whose dominant status is in turn confirmed by the theory insofar as 
concern with the highest truths is supposed to be their profession. 
In Aristotelian philosophy, ancient theory is precisely at the point 
where idealism retreats in the face of social contradictions and expresses 
them as ontological conditions. Platonic philosophy still contended with 
the social order of commercial Athens. Plato’s idealism is interlaced 
with motifs of social criticism. What appears as facticity from the 
standpoint of the Ideas is the material world in which men and things 
encounter one another as commodities. The just order of the soul is 
destroyed by 
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the passion for wealth which leaves a man not a moment of leisure to 
attend to anything beyond his personal fortunes. So long as a citizen’s 
whole soul is wrapped up in these, he cannot give a thought to anything 
but the day’s takings.7 
And the authentic, basic demand of idealism is that this material world 
be transformed and improved in accordance with the truths yielded by 
knowledge of the Ideas. Plato’s answer to this demand is his program 
for a reorganization of society. This program reveals what Plato sees as 
the root of evil. He demands, for the ruling strata, the abolition of 
private property (even in women and children) and the prohibition of 
trade. This same program, however, tries to root the contradictions of 
class society in the depths of human nature, thereby perpetuating them. 
While the majority of the members of the state are engaged for their 
entire lives in the cheerless business of providing for the necessities of 
life, enjoyment of the true, the good, and the beautiful is reserved for a 
small elite. Although Aristotle still lets ethics terminate in politics, for 
him the reorganization of society no longer occupies a central role in 
philosophy. To the extent to which he is more ‘realistic’ than Plato, his 
idealism is more resigned in the face of the historical tasks of mankind. 
The true philosopher is for him no longer essentially the true statesman. 
The distance between facticity and Idea has increased precisely because 
they are conceived of as in closer relationship. The purport of idealism, 
viz. the realization of the Idea, dissipates. The history of idealism is also 
the history of its coming to terms with the established order. 
Behind the ontological and epistemological separation of the realm 
of the senses and the realm of Ideas, of sensuousness and reason, of 
necessity and beauty, stands not only the rejection of a bad historical 
form of existence, but also its exoneration. The material world (i.e. the 
manifold forms of the respective ‘lower’ member of this relation) is in 
itself mere matter, mere potentiality, akin more to Non-Being than to 
Being. It becomes real only insofar as it partakes of the ‘higher’ world. 
In all these forms the material world remains bare matter or stuff for 
something outside it which alone gives it value. All and any truth, 
goodness, and beauty can accrue to it only ‘from above’ by the grace of 
the Idea. All activity relating to the material provision of life remains in 
its essence untrue, bad, and ugly. Even with these characteristics, 
however, such activity is as necessary as matter is for the Idea. The 
misery of slave labor, the degradation of men and things to 
commodities, the joylessness and lowliness in which the totality of the 
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material conditions of existence continuously reproduces itself, all these 
do not fall within the sphere of interest of idealist philosophy, for they 
are not yet the actual reality that constitutes the object of this 
philosophy. Due to its irrevocably material quality, material practice is 
exonerated from responsibility for the true, good, and beautiful, which 
is instead taken care of by the pursuit of theory. The ontological 
cleavage of ideal from material values tranquillizes idealism in all that 
regards the material processes of life. In idealism, a specific historical 
form of the division of labor and of social stratification takes on the 
eternal, metaphysical form of the relationship of necessity and beauty, 
of matter and Idea. 
In the bourgeois epoch the theory of the relationship between 
necessity and beauty, labor and enjoyment, underwent decisive changes. 
First, the view that concern with the highest values is appropriated as a 
profession by particular social strata disappears. In its place emerges the 
thesis of the universality and universal validity of ‘culture’. With good 
conscience, the theory of antiquity had expressed the fact that most 
men had to spend their lives providing for necessities while a small 
number devoted themselves to enjoyment and truth. Although the fact 
has not changed, the good conscience has disappeared. Free 
competition places individuals in the relation of buyers and sellers of 
labor power. The pure abstractness to which men are reduced in their 
social relations extends as well to intercourse with ideas. It is no longer 
supposed to be the case that some are born to and suited to labor and 
others to leisure, some to necessity and others to beauty. Just as each 
individual’s relation to the market is immediate (without his personal 
qualities and needs being relevant except as commodities), so his 
relations to God, to beauty, to goodness, and to truth are relations of 
immediacy. As abstract beings, all men are supposed to participate 
equally in these values. As in material practice the product separates 
itself from the producers and becomes independent as the universal 
reified form of the ‘commodity’, so in cultural practice a work and its 
content congeal into universally valid ‘values’. By their very nature the 
truth of a philosophical judgment, the goodness of a moral action, and 
the beauty of a work of art should appeal to everyone, relate to 
everyone, be binding upon everyone. Without distinction of sex or 
birth, regardless of their position in the process of production, 
individuals must subordinate themselves to cultural values. They must 
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absorb them into their lives and let their existence be permeated and 
transfigured by them. ‘Civilization’ is animated and inspired by ‘culture’. 
This is not the place to discuss the various attempts to define 
culture. There is a concept of culture that can serve as an important 
instrument of social research because it expresses the implication of the 
mind in the historical process of society. It signifies the totality of social 
life in a given situation, insofar as both the areas of ideational 
reproduction (culture in the narrower sense, the ‘spiritual world’) and of 
material reproduction (‘civilization’) form a historically distinguishable 
and comprehensible unity.8 There is, however, another fairly widespread 
usage of the concept of culture, in which the spiritual world is lifted out 
of its social context, making culture a (false) collective noun and 
attributing (false) universality to it. This second concept of culture 
(clearly seen in such expressions as ‘national culture’, ‘Germanic 
culture’, or ‘Roman culture’) plays off the spiritual world against the 
material world by holding up culture as the realm of authentic values 
and self-contained ends in opposition to the world of social utility and 
means. Through the use of this concept, culture is distinguished from 
civilization and sociologically and valuationally removed from the social 
process.9 This concept itself has developed on the basis of a specific 
historical form of culture, which is termed ‘affirmative culture’ in what 
follows. By affirmative culture is meant that culture of the bourgeois 
epoch which led in the course of its own development to the 
segregation from civilization of the mental and spiritual world as an 
independent realm of value that is also considered superior to 
civilization. Its decisive characteristic is the assertion of a universally 
obligatory, eternally better and more valuable world that must be 
unconditionally affirmed: a world essentially different from the factual 
world of the daily struggle for existence, yet realizable by every 
individual for himself ‘from within’, without any transformation of the 
state of fact. It is only in this culture that cultural activities and objects 
gain that value which elevates them above the everyday sphere. Their 
reception becomes an act of celebration and exaltation. 
Although the distinction between civilization and culture may have 
joined only recently the mental equipment of the social and cultural 
sciences, the state of affairs that it expresses has long been characteristic 
of the conduct of life and the weltanschauung of the bourgeois era. 
‘Civilization and culture’ is not simply a translation of the ancient 
relation of purposeful and purposeless, necessary and beautiful. As the 
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purposeless and beautiful were internalized and, along with the qualities 
of binding universal validity and sublime beauty, made into the cultural 
values of the bourgeoisie, a realm of apparent unity and apparent 
freedom was constructed within culture in which the antagonistic 
relations of existence were supposed to be stabilized and pacified. 
Culture affirms and conceals the new conditions of social life. 
In antiquity, the world of the beautiful beyond necessity was 
essentially a world of happiness and enjoyment. The ancient theory had 
never doubted that men’s concern was ultimately their worldly 
gratification, their happiness. Ultimately, not immediately: for man’s 
first concern is the struggle for the preservation and protection of mere 
existence. In view of the meager development of the productive forces 
in the ancient economy, it never occurred to philosophy that material 
practice could ever be fashioned in such a way that it would itself 
contain the space and time for happiness. Anxiety stands at the source 
of all idealistic doctrines that look for the highest felicity in ideational 
practice: anxiety about the uncertainty of all the conditions of life, about 
the contingency of loss, of dependence, and of poverty, but anxiety also 
about satiation, ennui, and envy of men and the gods. Nonetheless, 
anxiety about happiness, which drove philosophy to separate beauty and 
necessity, preserves the demand for happiness even within the separated 
sphere. Happiness becomes a preserve, in order for it to be able to be 
present at all. What man is to find in the philosophical knowledge of the 
true, the good, and the beautiful is ultimate pleasure, which has all the 
opposite characteristics of material facticity: permanence in change, 
purity amidst impurity, freedom amidst unfreedom. 
The abstract individual who emerges as the subject of practice at the 
beginning of the bourgeois epoch also becomes the bearer of a new 
claim to happiness, merely on the basis of the new constellation of 
social forces. No longer acting as the representative or delegate of 
higher social bodies, each separate individual is supposed to take the 
provision of his needs and the fulfillment of his wants into his own 
hands and be in immediate relation to his ‘vocation’, to his purpose and 
goals, without the social, ecclesiastical, and political mediations of 
feudalism. In this situation the individual was allotted more room for 
individual requirements and satisfactions: room which developing 
capitalist production began to fill with more and more objects of 
possible satisfaction in the form of commodities. To this extent, the 
bourgeois liberation of the individual made possible a new happiness. 
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But the universality of this happiness is immediately canceled, since 
the abstract equality of men realizes itself in capitalist production as 
concrete inequality. Only a small number of men dispose of the 
purchasing power required for the quantity of goods necessary in order 
to secure happiness. Equality does not extend to the conditions for 
attaining the means. For the strata of the rural and urban proletariat, on 
whom the bourgeoisie depended in their struggle against the feudal 
powers, abstract equality could have meaning only as real equality. For 
the bourgeoisie, when it came to power, abstract equality sufficed for 
the flourishing of real individual freedom and real individual happiness, 
since it already disposed of the material conditions that could bring 
about such satisfaction. Indeed, stopping at the stage of abstract 
freedom belonged to the conditions of bourgeois rule, which would 
have been endangered by a transition from abstract to concrete 
universality. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie could not give up the 
general character of its demand (that equality be extended to all men) 
without denouncing itself and openly proclaiming to the ruled strata 
that, for the majority, everything was still the same with regard to the 
improvement of the conditions of life. Such a concession became even 
less likely as growing social wealth made the real fulfillment of this 
general demand possible while there was in contrast the relatively 
increasing poverty of the poor in city and country. Thus the demand 
became a postulate, and its object a mere idea. The vocation of man, to 
whom general fulfillment is denied in the material world, is hypostatized 
as an ideal. 
The rising bourgeois groups had based their demand for a new 
social freedom on the universality of human reason. Against the belief 
in the divinely instituted eternity of a restrictive order they maintained 
their belief in progress, in a better future. But reason and freedom did 
not extend beyond these groups’ interest, which came into increasing 
opposition to the interest of the majority. To accusing questions the 
bourgeoisie gave a decisive answer: affirmative culture. The latter is 
fundamentally idealist. To the need of the isolated individual it responds 
with general humanity, to bodily misery with the beauty of the soul, to 
external bondage with internal freedom, to brutal egoism with the duty 
of the realm of virtue. Whereas during the period of the militant rise of 
the new society all of these ideas had a progressive character by pointing 
beyond the attained organization of existence, they entered increasingly 
into the service of the suppression of the discontented masses and of 
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mere self-justifying exaltation, once bourgeois rule began to be 
stabilized. They concealed the physical and psychic vitiation of the 
individual. 
But bourgeois idealism is not merely ideology, for it expresses a 
correct objective content. It contains not only the justification of the 
established form of existence, but also the pain of its establishment: not 
only quiescence about what is, but also remembrance of what could be. 
By making suffering and sorrow into eternal, universal forces, great 
bourgeois art has continually shattered in the hearts of men the facile 
resignation of everyday life. By painting in the luminous colors of this 
world the beauty of men and things and trans-mundane happiness, it 
has planted real longing alongside poor consolation and false 
consecration in the soil of bourgeois life. This art raised pain and 
sorrow, desperation and loneliness, to the level of metaphysical powers 
and set individuals against one another and the gods in the nakedness of 
physical immediacy, beyond all social mediations. This exaggeration 
contains the higher truth that such a world cannot be changed 
piecemeal, but only through its destruction. Classical bourgeois art put 
its ideal forms at such a distance from everyday occurrence that those 
whose suffering and hope reside in daily life could only rediscover 
themselves through a leap into a totally other world. In this way art 
nourished the belief that all previous history had been only the dark and 
tragic prehistory of a coming existence. And philosophy took this idea 
seriously enough to be concerned about its realization. Hegel’s system is 
the last protest against the degradation of the idea: against playing 
officiously with the mind as though it were an object that really has 
nothing to do with human history. At least idealism maintained that the 
materialism of bourgeois practice is not the last word and that mankind 
must be led beyond it. Thus idealism belongs to a more progressive 
stage of development than later positivism, which in fighting 
metaphysical ideas eliminates not only their metaphysical character, but 
their content as well. It thus links itself inevitably to the status quo. 
Culture is supposed to assume concern for the individual’s claim to 
happiness. But the social antagonisms at the root of culture let it admit 
this claim only in an internalized and rationalized form. In a society that 
reproduces itself through economic competition, the mere demand for a 
happier social existence constitutes rebellion. For if men value the 
enjoyment of worldly happiness, then they certainly cannot value 
acquisitive activity, profit, and the authority of the economic powers 
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that preserve the existence of this society. The claim to happiness has a 
dangerous ring in an order that for the majority means need, privation, 
and toil. The contradictions of such an order provide the impetus to the 
idealization of that claim. But the real gratification of individuals cannot 
be contained by an idealistic dynamic which either continually 
postpones gratifcation or transmutes it into striving for the unattained. 
It can only be realized against idealist culture, and only against this 
culture is it propagated as a general demand: the demand for a real 
transformation of the material conditions of existence, for a new life, 
for a new form of labor and of enjoyment. Thus it has remained active 
in the revolutionary groups that have fought the expanding new system 
of injustice since the waning of the Middle Ages. And while idealism 
surrenders the earth to bourgeois society and makes its ideas unreal by 
finding satisfaction in heaven and the soul, materialist philosophy takes 
seriously the concern for happiness and fights for its realization in 
history. In the philosophy of the Enlightenment, this connection 
becomes clear. 
False philosophy can, like theology, promise us an eternal happiness 
and, cradling us in beautiful chimeras, lead us there at the expense of 
our days or our pleasure. Quite different and wiser, true philosophy 
affords only a temporal happiness. It sows roses and flowers in our path 
and teaches us to pick them.10 
Idealist philosophy, too, admits the centrality of human happiness. But 
in its controversy with stoicism, the Enlightenment adopted precisely 
that form of the claim to happiness which is incompatible with idealism 
and with which affirmative culture cannot deal: 
And how we shall be anti-Stoics! These philosophers are strict, sad, and 
hard; we shall be tender, joyful, and agreeable. All soul, they abstract 
from their body; all body, we shall abstract from our soul. They show 
themselves inaccessible to pleasure and pain; we shall be proud to feel 
both the one and the other. Aiming at the sublime, they elevate 
themselves above all occurrences and believe themselves to be truly 
men only insofar as they cease to exist. Ourselves, we shall not control 
what governs us, although circumstances will not command our 
feelings. By acknowledging their lordship and our bondage, we shall try 
to make them agreeable to us, in the conviction that it is here that the 
happiness of life resides. Finally, we shall believe ourselves that much 
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happier, the more we feel nature, humanity, and all social virtues. We 
shall recognize none but these, nor any life other than this one.11 
 
* 
 
In its idea of pure humanity, affirmative culture took up the historical 
demand for the general liberation of the individual. “If we consider 
mankind as we know it according to the laws which it embodies, we 
find nothing higher in man than humanity.”12 This concept is meant to 
comprise everything that is directed toward “man’s noble education to 
reason and freedom, to more refined senses and instincts, to the most 
delicate and the heartiest health, to the fulfillment and domination of 
the earth”.13 All human laws and forms of government are to have the 
exclusive purpose of “enabling man, free from attack by others, to 
exercise his powers and acquire a more beautiful and freer enjoyment of 
life”.14 The highest point which man can attain is a community of free 
and rational persons in which each has the same opportunity to unfold 
and fulfill all of his powers. The concept of the person, in which the 
struggle against repressive collectivities has remained active through the 
present, disregards social conflicts and conventions and addresses itself 
to all individuals. No one relieves the individual of the burden of his 
existence, but no one prescribes his rights and sphere of action – no one 
except the ‘law in his own breast’. 
Nature intended that man generate entirely out of himself everything 
going beyond the mechanical organization of his animal existence, and 
that he partake of no other happiness or perfection than that which he 
provides for himself, free of instinct, by means of his own reason.15 
All wealth and all poverty derive from him and react back upon him. 
Each individual is immediate to himself: without worldly or heavenly 
mediations. And this immediacy also holds for his relations to others. 
The clearest representation of this idea of the person is to be found in 
classical literature since Shakespeare. In its dramas, individuals are so 
close to one another that between them there is nothing that is in 
principle ineffable or inexpressible. Verse makes possible what has 
already become impossible in prosaic reality. In poetry men can 
transcend all social isolation and distance and speak of the first and last 
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things. They overcome the factual loneliness in the glow of great and 
beautiful words; they may even let loneliness appear in its metaphysical 
beauty. Criminal and saint, prince and servant, sage and fool, rich and 
poor join in discussion whose free flow is supposed to give rise to truth. 
The unity represented by art and the pure humanity of its persons are 
unreal; they are the counterimage of what occurs in social reality. The 
critical and revolutionary force of the ideal, which in its very unreality 
keeps alive the best desires of men amidst a bad reality, becomes 
clearest in those times when the satiated social strata have accomplished 
the betrayal of their own ideals. The ideal, to be sure, was conceived in 
such a fashion that its regressive and apologetic, rather than its 
progressive and critical, characteristics predominated. Its realization is 
supposed to be effected through the cultural education of individuals. 
Culture means not so much a better world as a nobler one: a world to 
be brought about not through the overthrow of the material order of 
life but through events in the individual’s soul. Humanity becomes an 
inner state. Freedom, goodness, and beauty become spiritual qualities: 
understanding for everything human, knowledge about the greatness of 
all times, appreciation of everything difficult and sublime, respect for 
history in which all of this has become what it is. This inner state is to 
be the source of action that does not come into conflict with the given 
order. Culture belongs not to him who comprehends the truths of 
humanity as a battle cry, but to him in whom they have become a 
posture which leads to a mode of proper behavior: exhibiting harmony 
and reflectiveness even in daily routine. Culture should ennoble the 
given by permeating it, rather than putting something new in its place. It 
thus exalts the individual without freeing him from his factual 
debasement. Culture speaks of the dignity of ‘man’ without concerning 
itself with a concretely more dignified status for men. The beauty of 
culture is above all an inner beauty and can only reach the external 
world from within. Its realm is essentially a realm of the soul. 
That culture is a matter of spiritual (seelisch) values is constitutive of 
the affirmative concept of culture at least since Herder. Spiritual values 
belong to the definition of culture in contrast to mere civilization. 
Alfred Weber was merely summing up a conceptual scheme with a long 
history when he wrote: 
Culture … is merely spiritual expression and spiritual will and thus the 
expression and will of an ‘essence’ that lies behind all intellectual 
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mastery of existence, of a ‘soul’ that, in its striving for expression and in 
its willing, pays no regard to purposiveness and utility…. From this 
follows the concept of culture as the prevailing form in which the 
spiritual is expressed and released in the materially and spiritually given 
substance of existence.16 
The soul posited by this interpretation is other and more than the 
totality of psychic forces and mechanisms (such as might be the object 
of empirical psychology). Rather, this noncorporeal being of man is 
asserted as the real substance of the individual. 
The character of the soul as substance has since Descartes been 
founded upon the uniqueness of the ego as res cogitans. While the entire 
world outside the ego becomes in principle one of measurable matter 
with calculable motion, the ego is the only dimension of reality to evade 
the materialistic rationality of the rising bourgeoisie. By coming into 
opposition to the corporeal world as a substance differing from it in 
essence, the ego is subjected to a remarkable division into two regions. 
The ego as the subject of thought (mens, mind) remains, in the 
independence of self-certainty, on this side of the being of matter – its a 
priori, as it were – while Descartes attempts to explain materialistically 
the ego as soul (anima), as the subject of ‘passions’ (love and hate, joy 
and sorrow, shame, jealousy, regret, gratitude, and so forth). The 
passions of the soul are traced to blood circulation and its 
transformation in the brain. This reduction does not quite succeed. To 
be sure, all muscular movements and sense perceptions are thought to 
depend on the nerves, which “are like small filaments or small pipes that 
all come from the brain”, but the nerves themselves contain “a certain 
very fine air or wind called animal spirits”.17 Despite this immaterial 
residue, the tendency of the interpretation is clear: the ego is either mind 
(thought, cogito me cogitare) or, insofar as it is not merely thought (cogitatio), 
it is no longer authentically ego, but rather corporeal. In the latter case, 
the properties and activities ascribed to it belonged to res extensa.18 Yet 
they do not quite admit of being dissolved into matter. The soul remains 
an unmastered intermediate realm between the unshakable self-certainty 
of pure thought and the mathematical and physical certainty of material 
being. Already in the original project of rationalism there is no room in 
the system for what is later considered actually to compose the soul, viz. 
the individual’s feelings, appetites, desires, and instincts. The position 
within rationalism of empirical psychology, i.e. of the discipline really 
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dealing with the human soul, is characteristic, for it exists although 
reason is unable to legitimate it. 
Kant polemized against the treatment of empirical psychology 
within rational metaphysics (by Baumgarten). Empirical psychology 
must be “completely banished from the domain of metaphysics; it is 
indeed already completely excluded by the very idea of the latter 
science”. But, he goes on, “in conformity, however, with scholastic 
usage we must allow it some sort of a place (although as an episode 
only) in metaphysics, and this from economical motives, because it is 
not yet so rich as to be able to form a subject of study by itself, and yet 
is too important to be entirely excluded and forced to settle 
elsewhere…. It is thus merely a stranger who is taken in for a short 
while until he finds a home of his own, in a complete anthropology”.19 
And in his metaphysics lectures of 1792–93 Kant expressed himself 
even more sceptically about this ‘stranger’: “Is an empirical psychology 
possible as science? No – our knowledge of the soul is entirely too 
limited”.20 
Rationalism’s estrangement from the soul points to an important 
state of affairs. For in fact the soul does not enter into the social labor 
process. Concrete labor is reduced to abstract labor that makes possible 
the exchange of the products of labor as commodities. The idea of the 
soul seems to allude to those areas of life which cannot be managed by 
the abstract reason of bourgeois practice. It is as though the processing 
of matter is accomplished only by a part of the res cogitans: by technical 
reason. Beginning with the division of labor in manufacture and 
brought to completion in machine industry, “the intellectual [geistigen] 
potencies of the material process of production” come into opposition 
to the immediate producers as “the property of another and as a power 
that rules them”.21 To the extent that thought is not immediately 
technical reason, it has freed itself since Descartes from conscious 
connection with social practice and tolerates the reification that it itself 
promotes. When in this practice human relations appear as material 
relations, as the very laws of things, philosophy abandons the individual 
to this appearance by retreating and re-establishing itself at the level of 
the transcendental constitution of the world in pure subjectivity. 
Transcendental philosophy does not make contact with reification, for it 
investigates only the process of cognition of the immemorially (je schon) 
reified world. 
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The soul is not comprehended by the dichotomy of res cogitans and 
res extensa, for it cannot be understood merely as one or the other. Kant 
destroyed rational psychology without arriving at an empirical 
psychology. For Hegel, every single attribute of the soul is 
comprehended from the standpoint of mind (Geist), into which the soul 
passes over (übergeht); for mind reveals itself to be the soul’s true 
content. The soul is essentially characterized by its “not yet being 
mind”.22 Where Hegel treats psychology, i.e. the human soul, in his 
doctrine of subjective mind, the guiding principle is no longer soul but 
mind. Hegel deals with the soul principally as part of ‘anthropology’, 
where it is still completely “bound to the attributes of nature”.23 He 
examines planetary life on a general scale, natural racial distinctions, the 
ages of man, magic, somnambulism, various forms of psychopathic self-
images, and – only for a few pages – the ‘real soul’. For him the latter is 
nothing but the transition to the ego of consciousness, wherewith the 
anthropological doctrine of soul is already left behind, and the 
phenomenology of mind arrived at. The soul is thus allotted to 
physiological anthropology on the one hand and the philosophy of 
mind on the other. Even in the greatest system of bourgeois rationalism 
there is no place for the independence of the soul. The authentic objects 
of psychology, feelings, instincts, and will, are conceived only as forms 
of the existence of mind. 
With its concept of the soul, however, affirmative culture means 
precisely what is not mind. Indeed, the concept of soul comes into ever 
sharper contradiction to the concept of mind. What is meant by soul “is 
forever inaccessible to the lucid mind, to the understanding, or to 
empirical, factual research. … One could sooner dissect with a knife a 
theme by Beethoven or dissolve it with an acid than analyze the soul 
with the means of abstract thought”.24 In the idea of the soul, the 
noncorporeal faculties, activities, and properties of man (according to 
the traditional classifications, reason, will, and appetite) are combined in 
an indivisible unity that manifestly endures through all of the 
individual’s behavior and, indeed, constitutes his individuality. 
The concept of the soul typical of affirmative culture was not 
developed by philosophy, and the examples from Descartes, Kant, and 
Hegel were intended only to illustrate philosophy’s embarrassment with 
regard to the soul.25 This concept found its first positive expression in 
the literature of the Renaissance. Here the soul is in the first instance an 
unexplored part of the world to be discovered and enjoyed. To it are 
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extended those demands with whose proclamation the new society 
accompanied the rational domination of the world by liberated man: 
freedom and the intrinsic worth of the individual. The riches of the 
soul, of the ‘inner life’, were thus the correlate of the new-found riches 
of external life. Interest in the neglected “individual, incomparable, 
living states” of the soul belonged to the program of “living out one’s 
life fully and entirely”.26 Concern with the soul “reacts upon the 
increasing differentiation of individualities and augments man’s 
consciousness of enjoying life with a natural development rooted in 
man’s essence”.27 Seen from the standpoint of the consummated 
affirmative culture of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this 
spiritual demand appears as an unfulfilled promise. The idea of ‘natural 
development’ remains, but it signifies primarily inner development. In 
the external world the soul cannot freely ‘live itself out’. The 
organization of this world by the capitalist labor process has turned the 
development of the individual into economic competition and left the 
satisfaction of his needs to the commodity market. Affirmative culture 
uses the soul as a protest against reification, only to succumb to it in the 
end. The soul is sheltered as the only area of life that has not been 
drawn into the social labor process. 
The word ‘soul’ gives the higher man a feeling of his inner existence, 
separated from all that is real or has evolved, a very definite feeling of 
the most secret and genuine potentialities of his life, his destiny, his 
history. In the early stages of the languages of all cultures, the word 
‘soul’ is a sign that encompasses everything that is not world.28 
And in this – negative – quality it now becomes the only still 
immaculate guarantor of bourgeois ideals. The soul glorifies resignation. 
The ideal that man, individual, irreplaceable man, beyond all natural and 
social distinctions, be the ultimate end; that truth, goodness, and justice 
hold between men; that all human weaknesses be expiated by humanity 
– this ideal can be represented, in a society determined by the economic 
law of value, only by the soul and as spiritual occurrence. All else is 
inhuman and discredited. The soul alone obviously has no exchange 
value. The value of the soul does not enter into the body in such a way 
as to congeal into an object and become a commodity. There can be a 
beautiful soul in an ugly body, a healthy one in a sick body, a noble one 
in a common body – and vice versa. There is a kernel of truth in the 
proposition that what happens to the body cannot affect the soul. But 
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in the established order this truth has taken on a terrible form. The 
freedom of the soul was used to excuse the poverty, martyrdom, and 
bondage of the body. It served the ideological surrender of existence to 
the economy of capitalism. Correctly understood, however, spiritual 
freedom does not mean the participation of man in an eternal beyond 
where everything is righted when the individual can no longer benefit 
from it. Rather, it anticipates the higher truth that in this world a form 
of social existence is possible in which the economy does not preempt 
the entire life of individuals. Man does not live by bread alone; this truth 
is thoroughly falsified by the interpretation that spiritual nourishment is 
an adequate substitute for too little bread. 
The soul appears to escape reification just as it does the law of value. 
As a matter of fact, it can almost be defined by the assertion that 
through its means all reified relations are dissolved into human relations 
and negated. The soul institutes an all-encompassing inner community 
of men that spans the centuries. “The first thought in the first human 
soul links up with the last thought in the last human soul.”29 In the 
realm of culture spiritual education and spiritual greatness overcome the 
inequality and unfreedom of everyday competition, for men participate 
in culture as free and equal beings. He who looks to the soul sees 
through economic relations to men in themselves. Where the soul 
speaks, the contingent position and merit of men in the social process 
are transcended. Love breaks through barriers between rich and poor, 
high and lowly. Friendship keeps faith even with the outcast and 
despised, and truth raises its voice even before the tyrant’s throne. 
Despite all social obstacles and encroachments, the soul develops in the 
individual’s interior. The most cramped surroundings are large enough 
to expand into an infinite environment for the soul. In its classical era, 
affirmative culture continually poetized the soul in such a manner. The 
individual’s soul is first set off from, and against, his body. Its adoption 
as the decisive area of life can have two meanings: the release of 
sensuality (as the irrelevant area of life) or, to the contrary, the 
subjection of sensuality to the domination of the soul. Affirmative 
culture unequivocally took the second course. Release of sensuality 
would be release of enjoyment, which presupposes the absence of guilty 
conscience and the real possibility of gratification. In bourgeois society, 
such a trend is increasingly opposed by the necessity of disciplining 
discontented masses. The internalization of enjoyment through 
spiritualization therefore becomes one of the decisive tasks of cultural 
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education. By being incorporated into spiritual life, sensuality is to be 
harnessed and transfigured. From the coupling of sensuality and the 
soul proceeds the bourgeois idea of love. 
The spiritualization of sensuality fuses matter with heaven and death 
with eternity. The weaker the belief in a heavenly beyond, the stronger 
the veneration of the spiritual beyond. The idea of love absorbs the 
longing for the permanence of worldly happiness, for the blessing of the 
unconditional, for the conquest of termination. In bourgeois poetry, 
lovers love in opposition to everyday inconstancy, to the demands of 
reality, to the subjugation of the individual, and to death. Death does 
not come from outside, but from love itself. The liberation of the 
individual was effected in a society based not on solidarity but on 
conflict of interests among individuals. The individual has the character 
of an independent, self-sufficient monad. His relation to the (human 
and nonhuman) world is either abstractly immediate (the individual 
constitutes the world immemorially in itself as knowing, feeling, and 
willing ego) or abstractly mediated (i.e. determined by the blind laws of 
the production of commodities and of the market). In neither case is the 
monadic isolation of the individual overcome. To do so would mean the 
establishment of real solidarity and presupposes the replacement of 
individualist society by a higher form of social existence. 
The idea of love, however, requires that the individual overcome 
monadic isolation and find fulfillment through the surrender of 
individuality in the unconditional solidarity of two persons. In a society 
in which conflict of interest is the principium individuationis, this complete 
surrender can appear in pure form only in death. For only death 
eliminates all of the external conditions that destroy permanent 
solidarity and in the struggle with which individuals wear themselves 
out. It appears not as the cessation of existence in nothingness, but 
rather as the only possible consummation of love and thus as its deepest 
significance. 
While in art love is elevated to tragedy, it threatens to become mere 
duty and habit in everyday bourgeois life. Love contains the 
individualistic principle of the new society: it demands exclusiveness. 
The latter appears in the requirement of unconditional fidelity which, 
originating in the soul, should also be obligatory for sensuality. But the 
spiritualization of sensuality demands of the latter what it cannot 
achieve: withdrawal from change and fluctuation and absorption into 
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the unity and indivisibility of the person. Just at this point, inwardness 
and outwardness, potentiality and reality are supposed to be found in a 
pre-established harmony which the anarchic principle of society 
destroys everywhere. This contradiction makes exclusive fidelity untrue 
and vitiates sensuality, which finds an outlet in the furtive improprieties 
of the petit bourgeois. 
Purely private relationships such as love and friendship are the only 
realm in which the dominion of the soul is supposed to be immediately 
confirmed in reality. Otherwise the soul has primarily the function of 
elevating men to the ideal without urging the latter’s realization. The 
soul has a tranquilizing effect. Because it is exempted from reification, it 
suffers from it least, consequently meeting it with the least resistance. 
Since the soul’s meaning and worth do not fall within historical reality, it 
can maintain itself unharmed in a bad reality. Spiritual joys are cheaper 
than bodily ones; they are less dangerous and are granted more willingly. 
An essential difference between the soul and the mind is that the former 
is not oriented toward critical knowledge of truth. The soul can 
understand what the mind must condemn. Conceptual knowledge 
attempts to distinguish the one from the other and resolves 
contradiction only on the basis of the ‘dispassionately proceeding 
necessity of the object’, while the soul rapidly reconciles all ‘external’ 
antitheses in some ‘internal’ unity. If there is a Western, Germanic, 
Faustian soul, then a Western, Germanic, and Faustian culture belongs 
to it, and feudal, capitalist, and socialist societies are nothing but 
manifestations of such souls. Their firm antitheses dissolve into the 
beautiful and profound unity of culture. The reconciliatory nature of the 
soul manifests itself clearly where psychology is made the organon of 
the social and cultural sciences, without foundation in a theory of 
society that penetrates behind culture. The soul has a strong affinity 
with historicism. As early as Herder we find the idea that the soul, freed 
from rationalism, should be capable of universal empathy (einfühlen). He 
adjures the soul, 
Entire nature of the soul that rules all things, that models all other 
inclinations and psychic forces after itself and tinges even the most 
indifferent actions – in order to feel these, do not answer in words, but 
penetrate into the epoch, into the region of heaven, into all of history, 
feel yourself into everything….30 
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With its property of universal empathy the soul devalues the distinction 
between true and false, good and bad, or rational and irrational that can 
be made through the analysis of social reality with regard to the 
attainable potentialities of the organization of material existence. Every 
historical epoch, then, as Ranke stated, manifests but another facet of 
the same human spirit. Each one possesses its own meaning, “and its 
value rests not on what results from it, but on its very existence, on its 
own self”.31 Soul has nothing to do with the correctness of what it 
expresses. It can do honor to a bad cause (as in Dostoevski’s case).32 In 
the struggle for a better human future, profound and refined souls may 
stand aside or on the wrong side. The soul takes fright at the hard truth 
of theory, which points up the necessity of changing an impoverished 
form of existence. How can an external transformation determine the 
authentic, inner substance of man? Soul lets one be soft and compliant, 
submitting to the facts; for, after all, they do not really matter. In this 
way the soul was able to become a useful factor in the technique of 
mass domination when, in the epoch of authoritarian states, all available 
forces had to be mobilized against a real transformation of social 
existence. With the help of the soul, the bourgeoisie in advanced 
capitalist society buried its ideals of an earlier period. That soul is of the 
essence makes a good slogan when only power is of the essence. 
But the soul really is essential – as the unexpressed, unfulfilled life of 
the individual. The culture of souls absorbed in a false form those 
forces and wants which could find no place in everyday life. The cultural 
ideal assimilated men’s longing for a happier life: for humanity, 
goodness, joy, truth, and solidarity. Only, in this ideal, they are all 
furnished with the affirmative accent of belonging to a higher, purer, 
nonprosaic world. They are either internalized as the duty of the 
individual soul (to achieve what is constantly betrayed in the external 
existence of the whole) or represented as objects of art (whereby their 
reality is relegated to a realm essentially different from that of everyday 
life). There is a good reason for the exemplification of the cultural ideal 
in art, for only in art has bourgeois society tolerated its own ideals and 
taken them seriously as a general demand. What counts as utopia, 
phantasy, and rebellion in the world of fact is allowed in art. There 
affirmative culture has displayed the forgotten truths over which 
‘realism’ triumphs in daily life. The medium of beauty decontaminates 
truth and sets it apart from the present. What occurs in art occurs with 
no obligation. When this beautiful world is not completely represented 
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as something long past (the classic artistic portrayal of victorious 
humanity, Goethe’s Iphigenie, is a ‘historical’ drama), it is deprived of 
concrete relevance by the magic of beauty. 
In the medium of beauty, men have been permitted to partake of 
happiness. But even beauty has been affirmed with good conscience 
only in the ideal of art, for it contains a dangerous violence that 
threatens the given form of existence. The immediate sensuousness of 
beauty immediately suggests sensual happiness. According to Hume the 
power to stimulate pleasure belongs to the essential character of beauty. 
Pleasure is not merely a by-product of beauty, but constitutes its very 
essence.33 And for Nietzsche beauty reawakens ‘aphrodisiac bliss’. He 
polemizes against Kant’s definition of the beautiful as the object of 
completely disinterested pleasure (Wohlgefallen) and opposes to it 
Stendhal’s assertion that beauty is ‘une promesse de bonheur’.34 Therein 
lies its danger in a society that must rationalize and regulate happiness. 
Beauty is fundamentally shameless.35 It displays what may not be 
promised openly and what is denied the majority. In the region of mere 
sensuality, separated from its connection with the ideal, beauty falls prey 
to the general devaluation of this sphere. Loosed from all spiritual and 
mental demands, beauty may be enjoyed in good conscience only in well 
delimited areas, with the awareness that it is only for a short period of 
relaxation or dissipation. 
Bourgeois society has liberated individuals, but as persons who are 
to keep themselves in check. From the beginning, the prohibition of 
pleasure was a condition of freedom. A society split into classes can 
afford to make man into a means of pleasure only in the form of 
bondage and exploitation. Since in the new order the regulated classes 
rendered services not immediately, with their persons, but only 
mediated by the production of surplus value for the market, it was 
considered inhuman to exploit an underling’s body as a source of 
pleasure, i.e., to use men directly as means (Kant). On the other hand, 
harnessing their bodies and intelligence for profit was considered a 
natural activation of freedom. Correspondingly, for the poor, hiring 
oneself out to work in a factory became a moral duty, while hiring out 
one’s body as a means to pleasure was depravity and ‘prostitution’. Also, 
in this society, poverty is a condition of profit and power, yet 
dependence takes place in the medium of abstract freedom. The sale of 
labor power is supposed to occur due to the poor man’s own decision. 
He labors in the service of his employer, while he may keep for himself 
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and cultivate as a sacred preserve the abstraction that is his person-in-
itself, separated from its socially valuable functions. He is supposed to 
keep it pure. The prohibition against marketing the body not merely as 
an instrument of labor but as an instrument of pleasure as well is one of 
the chief social and psychological roots of bourgeois patriarchal 
ideology. Here reification has firm limits important to the system. 
Nonetheless, insofar as the body becomes a commodity as a 
manifestation or bearer of the sexual function, this occurs subject to 
general contempt. The taboo is violated. This holds not only for 
prostitution but for all production of pleasure that does not occur for 
reasons of ‘social hygiene’ in the service of reproduction. 
Those social strata, however, which are kept back in semi-medieval 
forms, pushed to the lowest margin of society, and thoroughly 
demoralized, provide, even in these circumstances, an anticipatory 
memory. When the body has completely become an object, a beautiful 
thing, it can foreshadow a new happiness. In suffering the most extreme 
reification man triumphs over reification. The artistry of the beautiful 
body, its effortless agility and relaxation, which can be displayed today 
only in the circus, vaudeville, and burlesque, herald the joy to which 
men will attain in being liberated from the ideal, once mankind, having 
become a true subject, succeeds in the mastery of matter. When all links 
to the affirmative ideal have been dissolved, when in the context of an 
existence marked by knowledge it becomes possible to have real 
enjoyment without any rationalization and without the least puritanical 
guilt feeling, when sensuality, in other words, is entirely released by the 
soul, then the first glimmer of a new culture emerges. 
But in affirmative culture, the ‘soulless’ regions do not belong to 
culture. Like every other commodity of the sphere of civilization, they 
are openly abandoned to the economic law of value. Only spiritual 
beauty and spiritual enjoyment are left in culture. According to 
Shaftesbury, it follows from the inability of animals to know and enjoy 
beauty 
“that neither can man by the same sense or brutish part conceive or 
enjoy beauty; but all the beauty and good he enjoys is in a nobler way, 
and by the help of what is noblest, his mind and reason.” … When you 
place a joy elsewhere than in the mind, the enjoyment itself will be no 
beautiful subject, nor of any graceful or agreeable appearance.36 
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Only in the medium of ideal beauty, in art, was happiness permitted to 
be reproduced as a cultural value in the totality of social life. Not so in 
the two areas of culture which in other respects share with art in the 
representation of ideal truth: philosophy and religion. In its idealist 
trend, philosophy became increasingly distrustful of happiness, and 
religion accorded it a place only in the hereafter. Ideal beauty was the 
form in which yearning could be expressed and happiness enjoyed. 
Thus art became the presage of possible truth. Classical German 
aesthetics comprehended the relation between beauty and truth in the 
idea of an aesthetic education of the human species. Schiller says that 
the ‘political problem’ of a better organization of society “must take the 
path through the aesthetic realm, because it is through beauty that one 
arrives at freedom”.37 And in his poem Die Künstler (‘The Artists’) he 
expresses the relation between the established and the coming culture in 
the lines: “What we have here perceived as beauty/ We shall some day 
encounter as truth” (“Was wir als Schönheit hier empfunden/ Wird einst als 
Wahrheit uns entgegengehn”). With respect to the extent of socially 
permitted truth and to the form of attained happiness, art is the highest 
and most representative area within affirmative culture. “Culture: 
dominion of art over life” – this was Nietzsche’s definition.38 What 
entitles art to this unique role? 
Unlike the truth of theory, the beauty of art is compatible with the 
bad present, despite and within which it can afford happiness. True 
theory recognizes the misery and lack of happiness prevailing in the 
established order. Even when it shows the way to transformation, it 
offers no consolation that reconciles one to the present. In a world 
without happiness, however, happiness cannot but be a consolation: the 
consolation of a beautiful moment in an interminable chain of 
misfortune. The enjoyment of happiness is compressed into a 
momentary episode. But the moment embodies the bitterness of its 
disappearance. Given the isolation of lone individuals, there is no one in 
whom one’s own happiness can be preserved after the moment passes, 
no one who is not subject to the same isolation. Ephemerality which 
does not leave behind solidarity among the survivors must be 
eternalized in order to become at all bearable. For it recurs in every 
moment of existence and in each one, as it were, it anticipates death. 
Because every moment comprehends death, the beautiful moment must 
be eternalized in order to make possible anything like happiness. In the 
Negations 
88 
happiness it proffers, affirmative culture eternalizes the beautiful 
moment; it immortalizes the ephemeral. 
One of the decisive social tasks of affirmative culture is based on 
this contradiction between the insufferable mutability of a bad existence 
and the need for happiness in order to make such existence bearable. 
Within this existence the resolution can be only illusory. And the 
possibility of a solution rests precisely on the character of artistic beauty 
as illusion. On the one hand the enjoyment of happiness is permitted 
only in spiritualized, idealized form. On the other, idealization annuls 
the meaning of happiness. For the ideal cannot be enjoyed, since all 
pleasure is foreign to it and would destroy the rigor and purity that must 
adhere to it in idealless reality if it is to be able to carry out its 
internalizing, disciplining function. The ideal emulated by the person 
who renounces his instincts and places himself under the categorical 
imperative of duty (this Kantian ideal is merely the epitome of all 
affirmative tendencies of culture) is insensitive to happiness. It can 
provide neither happiness nor consolation since it never affords 
gratification in the present. If the individual is ever to come under the 
power of the ideal to the extent of believing that his concrete longings 
and needs are to be found in it – found moreover in a state of 
fulfillment and gratification, then the ideal must give the illusion of 
granting present satisfaction. It is this illusory reality that neither 
philosophy nor religion can attain. Only art achieves it – in the medium 
of beauty. Goethe disclosed the deceptive and consoling role of beauty 
when he wrote: 
The human mind finds itself in a glorious state when it admires, when it 
worships, when it exalts an object and is exalted by it. Only it cannot 
long abide in this condition. The universal left it cold, the ideal elevated 
it above itself. Now, however, it would like to return to itself. It would 
like to enjoy again the earlier inclination that it cherished toward the 
individual without returning to a state of limitation, and does not want 
to let the significant, that which exalts the mind, depart. What would 
become of the mind in this condition if beauty did not intervene and 
happily solve the riddle! Only beauty gives life and warmth to the 
scientific; and by moderating the high and significant and showering it 
with heavenly charm, beauty brings us closer to it. A beautiful work of 
art has come full circle; it is now a sort of individual that we can 
embrace with affection, that we can appropriate.39 
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What is decisive in this connection is not that art represents ideal reality, 
but that it represents it as beautiful reality. Beauty gives the ideal the 
character of the charming, the gladdening, and the gratifying – of 
happiness. It alone perfects the illusion of art. For only through it does 
the illusory world arouse the appearance of familiarity, of being present: 
in short, of reality. Illusion (Schein) really enables something to appear 
(erscheinen): in the beauty of the work of art, longing is momentarily 
fulfilled. The percipient experiences happiness. And once it has taken 
form in the work, the beautiful moment can be continually repeated. It 
is eternalized in the art work. In artistic enjoyment, the percipient can 
always reproduce such happiness. 
Affirmative culture was the historical form in which were preserved 
those human wants which surpassed the material reproduction of 
existence. To that extent, what is true of the form of social reality to 
which it belonged holds for it as well: right is on its side. Certainly, it 
exonerated ‘external conditions’ from responsibility for the ‘vocation of 
man’, thus stabilizing their injustice. But it also held up to them as a task 
the image of a better order. The image is distorted, and the distortion 
falsified all cultural values of the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless it is an image 
of happiness. There is an element of earthly delight in the works of 
great bourgeois art, even when they portray heaven. The individual 
enjoys beauty, goodness, splendor, peace, and victorious joy. He even 
enjoys pain and suffering, cruelty and crime. He experiences liberation. 
And he understands, and encounters understanding for and in response 
to, his instincts and demands. Reification is transpierced in private. In 
art one does not have to be ‘realistic’, for man is at stake, not his 
occupation or status. Suffering is suffering and joy is joy. The world 
appears as what it is behind the commodity form: a landscape is really a 
landscape, a man really a man, a thing really a thing. 
In the form of existence to which affirmative culture belongs, 
“happiness in existing … is possible only as happiness in illusion”.40 But 
this illusion has a real effect, producing satisfaction. The latter’s 
meaning, though, is decisively altered; it enters the service of the status 
quo. The rebellious idea becomes an accessory in justification. The truth 
of a higher world, of a higher good than material existence, conceals the 
truth that a better material existence can be created in which such 
happiness is realized. In affirmative culture even unhappiness becomes a 
means of subordination and acquiescence. By exhibiting the beautiful as 
present, art pacifies rebellious desire. Together with the other cultural 
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areas it has contributed to the great educational achievement of so 
disciplining the liberated individual, for whom the new freedom has 
brought a new form of bondage, that he tolerates the unfreedom of 
social existence. The potentiality of a richer life, a potentiality disclosed 
with the help of modern thought, and the impoverished actual form of 
life have come into open opposition, repeatedly compelling this thought 
to internalize its own demands and deflect its own conclusions. It took a 
centuries-long education to help make bearable the daily reproduced 
shock that arises from the contradiction between the constant sermon 
of the inalienable freedom, majesty, and dignity of the person, the 
magnificence and autonomy of reason, the goodness of humanity and 
of impartial charity and justice, on the one hand, and the general 
degradation of the majority of mankind, the irrationality of the social life 
process, the victory of the labor market over humanity, and of profit 
over charity, on the other. “The entire counterfeit of transcendence and 
of the hereafter has grown up on the basis of an impoverished life …”,41 
but the injection of cultural happiness into unhappiness and the 
spiritualization of sensuality mitigate the misery and the sickness of that 
life to a ‘healthy’ work capacity. This is the real miracle of affirmative 
culture. Men can feel themselves happy even without being so at all. 
The effect of illusion renders incorrect even one’s own assertion that 
one is happy. The individual, thrown back upon himself, learns to bear 
and, in a certain sense, to love his isolation. Factual loneliness is 
sublimated to metaphysical loneliness and, as such, is accorded the 
entire aura and rapture of inner plenitude alongside external poverty. In 
its idea of personality affirmative culture reproduces and glorifies 
individuals’ social isolation and impoverishment. 
The personality is the bearer of the cultural ideal. It is supposed to 
represent happiness in the form in which this culture proclaims it as the 
highest good: private harmony amidst general anarchy, joyful activity 
amidst bitter labor. The personality has absorbed everything good and 
cast off or refined everything bad. It matters not that man lives. What 
matters is only that he live as well as possible. That is one of the 
precepts of affirmative culture. ‘Well’ here refers essentially to culture: 
participating in spiritual and mental values, patterning individual 
existence after the humanity of the soul and the breadth of the mind. 
The happiness of unrationalized enjoyment has been omitted from the 
ideal of felicity. The latter may not violate the laws of the established 
order and, indeed, does not need to violate them, for it is to be realized 
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immanently. The personality, which in developed affirmative culture is 
supposed to be the ‘highest happiness’ of man, must respect the 
foundations of the status quo: deference to given relations of 
domination belongs to its virtues. It may only kick over the traces if it 
remains conscious of what it is doing and takes it back afterward. 
It was not always so. Formerly, at the beginning of the new era, the 
personality showed another face. Like the soul whose completed human 
embodiment it was supposed to be, it belonged in the first instance to 
the ideology of the bourgeois liberation of the individual. The person 
was the source of all forces and properties that made the individual 
capable of mastering his fate and shaping his environment in 
accordance with his needs. Jacob Burckhardt depicted this idea of the 
personality in his description of the ‘uomo universale’ of the 
Renaissance.42 If the individual was addressed as a personality, this was 
to emphasize that all that he made of himself he owed only to himself, 
not to his ancestors, his social status, or God. The distinguishing mark 
of the personality was not soul (in the sense of the ‘beautiful soul’) but 
power, influence, fame: a life as extensive and as full of deeds as 
possible. 
In the concept of personality which has been representative of 
affirmative culture since Kant, there is nothing left of this expansive 
activism. The personality remains lord of its existence only as a spiritual 
and ethical subject. “Freedom and independence from the mechanism 
of nature as a whole”, which is now the token of its nature,43 is only an 
‘intelligible’ freedom that accepts the given circumstances of life as the 
material of duty. Space for external fulfillment has shrunk; space for 
inner fulfillment has expanded considerably. The individual has learned 
to place all demands primarily upon himself. The rule of the soul has 
become more exacting inwardly and more modest outwardly. The 
person is no longer a springboard for attacking the world, but rather a 
protected line of retreat behind the front. In its inwardness, as an ethical 
person, it is the individual’s only secure possession, the only one he can 
never lose.44 It is no longer the source of conquest, but of renunciation. 
Personality characterizes above all him who renounces, who ekes out 
fulfillment within given conditions, no matter how poor they might be. 
He finds happiness in the Establishment. But even in this impoverished 
form, the idea of personality contains a progressive aspect: the 
individual is still the ultimate concern. To be sure, culture individuates 
men to the isolation of self-contained personalities whose fulfillment 
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lies within themselves. But this corresponds to a method of discipline 
still liberal in nature, for it exempts a concrete region of private life 
from domination. It lets the individual subsist as a person as long as he 
does not disturb the labor process, and lets the immanent laws of this 
labor process, i.e. economic forces, take care of men’s social integration. 
 
* 
 
Changes occur as soon as the preservation of the established form of 
the labor process can no longer gain its end with merely partial 
mobilization (leaving the individual’s private life in reserve), but rather 
requires ‘total mobilization’, through which the individual must be 
subjected in all spheres of his existence to the discipline of the 
authoritarian state. Now the bourgeoisie comes into conflict with its 
own culture. Total mobilization in the era of monopoly capitalism is 
incompatible with the progressive aspects of culture centered about the 
idea of personality. The self-abolition of affirmative culture begins. 
The loud pugnacity of the authoritarian state against the ‘liberal 
ideals’ of humanity, individuality, and rationality and against idealist art 
and philosophy cannot conceal that what is occurring is a process of 
self-abolition. Just as the social reorganization involved in passing from 
parliamentary democracy to an authoritarian leadership-state is only a 
reorganization within the established order, so the cultural 
reorganization in which liberalist idealism changes into ‘heroic realism’ 
takes place within affirmative culture itself. Its nature is to provide a 
new defense of old forms of existence. The basic function of culture 
remains the same. Only the ways in which it exercises this function 
change. 
The identity of content preserved within a complete change of form 
is particularly visible in the idea of internalization. The latter, involving 
the conversion of explosive instincts and forces into spiritual 
dimensions, had been one of the strongest levers of the disciplining 
process.45 Affirmative culture had canceled social antagonisms in an 
abstract internal community. As persons, in their spiritual freedom and 
dignity, all men were considered of equal value. High above factual 
antitheses lay the realm of cultural solidarity. During the most recent 
period of affirmative culture, this abstract internal community (abstract 
because it left the real antagonisms untouched) has turned into an 
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equally abstract external community. The individual is inserted into a 
false collectivity (race, folk, blood, and soil). But this externalization has 
the same function as internalization: renunciation and subjection to the 
status quo, made bearable by the real appearance of gratification. That 
individuals freed for over four hundred years march with so little 
trouble in the communal columns of the authoritarian state is due in no 
small measure to affirmative culture.  
The new methods of discipline would not be possible without 
casting off the progressive elements contained in the earlier stages of 
culture. Seen from the standpoint of the most recent development, the 
culture of those stages seems like a happy past. But no matter how 
much the authoritarian reorganization of existence actually serves only 
the interests of small social groups, it presents itself, like its predecessor, 
as the way in which the social totality preserves itself in the changed 
situation. To that extent it represents – in a bad form and to the 
increasing unhappiness of the majority – the interest of all individuals 
whose existence is bound up with the preservation of this order. And it 
is this order in which idealist culture was implicated. This double 
contradiction is in part the source of the weakness with which culture 
today protests against its new form. 
The extent to which idealist inwardness is related to heroic 
outwardness is shown by their united front against the mind. Along 
with the high esteem for the mind which was characteristic of several 
areas and bearers of affirmative culture, a deep contempt for the mind 
was always present in bourgeois practice. It could find its justification in 
philosophy’s lack of concern for the real problems of men. But there 
were still other reasons why affirmative culture was essentially a culture 
of the soul and not of the mind. Even before its decline the mind was 
always somewhat suspect. It is more tangible, more demanding, and 
nearer to reality than the soul. Its critical lucidity and rationality and its 
contradiction of irrational facticity are difficult to hide and to silence. 
Hegel goes poorly with an authoritarian state; he was for the mind, 
while the moderns are for the soul and for feeling. The mind cannot 
escape reality without denying itself; the soul can, and is supposed to do 
so. It is precisely because the soul dwells beyond the economy that the 
latter can manage it so easily. The soul derives its value from its 
property of not being subjected to the law of value. An individual full of 
soul is more compliant, acquiesces more humbly to fate, and is better at 
obeying authority. For he gets to keep for himself the entire wealth of 
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his soul and can exalt himself tragically and heroically. The intensive 
education to inner freedom that has been in progress since Luther is 
now, when inner freedom abolishes itself by turning into outer 
unfreedom, bearing its choicest fruit. While the mind falls prey to hate 
and contempt, the soul is still cherished. Liberalism is even reproached 
with no longer caring for ‘soul and ethical content’. “Greatness of soul 
and personality with strong character”, and “the infinite expansion of 
the soul” are extolled as the “deepest spiritual feature of classic art”.46 
The festivals and celebrations of the authoritarian state, its parades, its 
physiognomy, and the speeches of its leaders are all addressed to the 
soul. They go to the heart, even when their intent is power. 
The outlines of the heroic form of affirmative culture were most 
clearly drawn during the period of ideological preparation for the 
authoritarian state. Noteworthy is hostility to the “academic and artistic 
[museal] establishment” and to the “grotesque forms of edification” it 
has taken on.47 This cultural establishment is judged and rejected from 
the standpoint of the requisites of total mobilization. It 
represents nothing other than one of the last oases of bourgeois 
security. It provides the apparently most plausible excuse for avoiding 
political decision. 
Cultural propaganda is 
a sort of opium that veils danger and calls forth the deceptive 
consciousness of order. But this is an unbearable luxury in a situation in 
which the need of the day is not to speak of tradition, but to create it. 
We live in a period of history in which everything depends on an 
immense mobilization and concentration of available forces.48 
Mobilization and concentration for what? What Ernst Jünger could still 
designate as the salvation of the ‘totality of our life’, as the creation of a 
heroic world of labor, and so forth, reveals itself in action increasingly 
as the reshaping of all of human existence in the service of the most 
powerful economic interests. They also determine the demands for a 
new culture. The requisite intensification and expansion of labor 
discipline make occupation with the “ideals of an objective science and 
of an art existing for its own sake” appear a waste of time. It seems 
desirable to cast off ballast in this area. “Our entire so-called culture 
cannot prevent even the smallest neighboring state from violating the 
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border”, which is really what is primary. The world must know that the 
government would not hesitate for a minute “to auction off all art 
treasures in the museums if national defense required it”.49 This attitude 
determines the shape of the new culture that is to replace the old. It 
must be represented by young and reckless leadership. “The less 
education of the usual kind possessed by this stratum, the better it will 
be.”50 
The cynical suggestions offered by Jünger are vague and restricted 
primarily to art. “Just as the victor writes history, i.e., creates his myth, 
so he decides what is to count as art.”51 Even art must enter the service 
of national defense and of labor and military discipline. (Jünger 
mentions city planning: the dismemberment of large city blocks in order 
to disperse the masses in the event of war and revolution, the military 
organization of the countryside, and so forth.) Insofar as such culture 
aims at the enrichment, beautification, and security of the authoritarian 
state, it is marked by its social function of organizing the whole society 
in the interest of a few economically powerful groups and their hangers-
on. Hence its attributes of humility, sacrifice, poverty, and dutifulness 
on the one hand, and extreme will to power, impulse to expansion, and 
technical and military perfection on the other. “The task of total 
mobilization is the transformation of life into energy as manifested in 
economics, technology, and transportation by the whirring of wheels or, 
on the battlefield, by fire and movement.”52 The idealist cult of 
inwardness and the heroic cult of the state serve a fundamentally 
identical social order to which the individual is now completely 
sacrificed. Whereas formerly cultural exaltation was to satisfy the 
personal wish for happiness, now the individual’s happiness is to 
disappear completely in the greatness of the folk. While culture formerly 
appeased the demand for happiness in real illusion, it is now to teach 
the individual that he may not advance such a claim at all: “The given 
criterion lies in the worker’s way of life. What is necessary is not to 
improve this way of life, but to lend it an ultimate and decisive 
significance”.53 Here, too, ‘exaltation’ replaces transformation. 
Demolishing culture in this way is thus an expression of the utmost 
intensification of tendencies fundamental to affirmative culture. 
Overcoming these tendencies in any real sense would lead not to 
demolishing culture as such but to abolishing its affirmative character. 
Affirmative culture was the counterimage of an order in which the 
material reproduction of life left no space or time for those regions of 
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existence which the ancients had designated as the ‘beautiful’. It became 
customary to see the entire sphere of material reproduction as 
essentially tainted with the blemish of poverty, severity, and injustice 
and to abandon or suppress any demands protesting it. The orientation 
of all traditional cultural philosophy, i.e. setting culture apart from 
civilization and from the material life process, is based upon 
acknowledging as perpetual this historical situation. The latter is 
metaphysically exculpated by the theory of culture according to which 
life must be “deadened to a certain extent” in order “to arrive at goods 
of independent value”.54 
The integration of culture into the material life process is considered 
a sin against the mind and the soul. As a matter of fact, its occurrence 
would only make explicit what has long been in effect blindly, since not 
only the production but also the reception of cultural goods is already 
governed by the law of value. Yet the reproach is justified to the extent 
that until now such resorption has taken place only in the form of 
utilitarianism. The latter is simply the obverse of affirmative culture. Its 
concept of utility is nothing but that of the businessman who enters 
happiness in his books as an inevitable expense: as necessary regimen 
and recreation. Happiness is calculated at the outset with regard to its 
utility just as the chance of profit is weighed in relation to risk and cost. 
It is thus smoothly integrated into the economic principle of this 
society. In utilitarianism the interest of the individual remains linked to 
the basic interest of the established order. His happiness is harmless, 
and this harmlessness is preserved even in the organization of leisure in 
the authoritarian state. Whatever joy is permitted is now organized. The 
idyllic countryside, the site of Sunday happiness, is transformed into 
drilling grounds, the picnic of the petit bourgeois is replaced by 
scouting. Harmlessness generates its own negation. 
From the standpoint of the interest of the status quo, the real 
abolition of affirmative culture must appear utopian. For it goes beyond 
the social totality in which culture has been enmeshed. Insofar as in 
Western thought culture has meant affirmative culture, the abolition of 
its affirmative character will appear as the abolition of culture as such. 
To the extent that culture has transmuted fulfillable, but factually 
unfulfilled, longings and instincts, it will lose its object. The assertion 
that today culture has become unnecessary contains a dynamic, 
progressive element. It is only that culture’s lack of object in the 
authoritarian state derives not from fulfillment but from the awareness 
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that even keeping alive the desire for fulfillment is dangerous in the 
present situation. When culture gets to the point of having to sustain 
fulfillment itself and no longer merely desire, it will no longer be able to 
do so in contents that, as such, bear an affirmative character. ‘Gratitude’ 
will then perhaps really be its essence, as Nietzsche asserted of all 
beautiful and great art.55 Beauty will find a new embodiment when it no 
longer is represented as real illusion but, instead, expresses reality and 
joy in reality. A foretaste of such potentialities can be had in 
experiencing the unassuming display of Greek statues or the music of 
Mozart or late Beethoven. Perhaps, however, beauty and its enjoyment 
will not even devolve upon art. Perhaps art as such will have no objects. 
For the common man it has been confined to museums for at least a 
century. The museum was the most suitable place for reproducing in the 
individual withdrawal from facticity and the consolation of being 
elevated to a more dignified world – an experience limited by temporal 
restriction to special occasions. This museum-like quality was also 
present in the ceremonious treatment of the classics, where dignity 
alone was enough to still all explosive elements. What a classic writer or 
thinker did or said did not have to be taken too seriously, for it 
belonged to another world and could not come into conflict with this 
one. The authoritarian state’s polemic against the cultural (museal) 
establishment contains an element of correct knowledge. But when it 
opposes ‘grotesque forms of edification’, it only wants to replace 
obsolete methods of affirmation with more modern ones. 
Every attempt to sketch out the counterimage of affirmative culture 
comes up against the ineradicable cliché about the fools’ paradise. It 
would be better to accept this cliché than the one about the 
transformation of the earth into a gigantic community center, which 
seems to be at the root of some theories of culture. There is talk of a 
“general diffusion of cultural values”, of the “right of all members of 
the nation [Volk] to cultural benefits”, of “raising the level of the 
nation’s physical, spiritual, and ethical culture”.56 But all this would be 
merely raising the ideology of a conflicted society to the conscious 
mode of life of another, making a new virtue out of its necessity. When 
Kautsky speaks of the ‘coming happiness’, he means primarily “the 
gladdening effects of scientific work”, and “sympathetic enjoyment in 
the areas of science and art, nature, sport, and games”.57 “Everything 
hitherto created in the way of culture should be … put at the disposal of 
the masses”, whose task is “to conquer this entire culture for 
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themselves”.58 This can mean nothing other than winning the masses to 
the social order that is affirmed by the ‘entire culture’. Such views miss 
the main point: the abolition of this culture. It is not the primitive, 
materialistic element of the idea of fools’ paradise that is false, but its 
perpetuation. As long as the world is mutable there will be enough 
conflict, sorrow, and suffering to destroy the idyllic picture. As long as 
there is a realm of necessity, there will be enough need. Even a 
nonaffirmative culture will be burdened with mutability and necessity: 
dancing on the volcano, laughter in sorrow, flirtation with death. As 
long as this is true, the reproduction of life will still involve the 
reproduction of culture: the molding of unfulfilled longings and the 
purification of unfulfilled instincts. In affirmative culture, renunciation 
is linked to the external vitiation of the individual, to his compliance 
with a bad order. The struggle against ephemerality does not liberate 
sensuality but devalues it and is, indeed, possible only on the basis of 
this devaluation. This unhappiness is not metaphysical. It is the product 
of an irrational social organization. By eliminating affirmative culture, 
the abolition of this social organization will not eliminate individuality, 
but realize it. And “if we are ever happy at all, we can do nothing other 
than promote culture”.59 
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4 
Philosophy and Critical Theory 
From the beginning the critical theory of society was constantly 
involved in philosophical as well as social issues and controversies. At 
the time of its origin, in the thirties and forties of the nineteenth 
century, philosophy was the most advanced form of consciousness, and 
by comparison real conditions in Germany were backward. Criticism of 
the established order there began as a critique of that consciousness, 
because otherwise it would have confronted its object at an earlier and 
less advanced historical stage than that which had already attained reality 
in countries outside Germany. Once critical theory had recognized the 
responsibility of economic conditions for the totality of the established 
world and comprehended the social framework in which reality was 
organized, philosophy became superfluous as an independent scientific 
discipline dealing with the structure of reality. Furthermore, problems 
bearing on the potentialities of man and of reason could now be 
approached from the standpoint of economics. 
Philosophy thus appears within the economic concepts of 
materialist theory, each of which is more than an economic concept of 
the sort employed by the academic discipline of economics. It is more 
due to the theory’s claim to explain the totality of man and his world in 
terms of his social being. Yet it would be false on that account to reduce 
these concepts to philosophical ones. To the contrary, the philosophical 
contents relevant to the theory are to be educed from the economic 
structure. They refer to conditions that, when forgotten, threaten the 
theory as a whole. 
In the conviction of its founders the critical theory of society is 
essentially linked with materialism. This does not mean that it thereby 
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sets itself up as a philosophical system in opposition to other 
philosophical systems. The theory of society is an economic, not a 
philosophical, system. There are two basic elements linking materialism 
to correct social theory: concern with human happiness, and the 
conviction that it can be attained only through a transformation of the 
material conditions of existence. The actual course of the 
transformation and the fundamental measures to be taken in order to 
arrive at a rational organization of society are prescribed by analysis of 
economic and political conditions in the given historical situation. The 
subsequent construction of the new society cannot be the object of 
theory, for it is to occur as the free creation of the liberated individuals. 
When reason has been realized as the rational organization of mankind, 
philosophy is left without an object. For philosophy, to the extent that it 
has been, up to the present, more than an occupation or a discipline 
within the given division of labor, has drawn its life from reason’s not 
yet being reality. 
Reason is the fundamental category of philosophical thought, the 
only one by means of which it has bound itself to human destiny. 
Philosophy wanted to discover the ultimate and most general grounds 
of Being. Under the name of reason it conceived the idea of an 
authentic Being in which all significant antitheses (of subject and object, 
essence and appearance, thought and being) were reconciled. Connected 
with this idea was the conviction that what exists is not immediately and 
already rational but must rather be brought to reason. Reason represents 
the highest potentiality of man and of existence; the two belong 
together. For when reason is accorded the status of substance, this 
means that at its highest level, as authentic reality, the world no longer 
stands opposed to the rational thought of men as mere material 
objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit). Rather, it is now comprehended by 
thought and defined as a concept (Begriff). That is, the external, 
antithetical character of material objectivity is overcome in a process 
through which the identity of subject and object is established as the 
rational, conceptual structure that is common to both. In its structure 
the world is considered accessible to reason, dependent on it, and 
dominated by it. In this form philosophy is idealism; it subsumes being 
under thought. But through this first thesis that made philosophy into 
rationalism and idealism it became critical philosophy as well. As the 
given world was bound up with rational thought and, indeed, 
ontologically dependent on it, all that contradicted reason or was not 
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rational was posited as something that had to be overcome. Reason was 
established as a critical tribunal. In the philosophy of the bourgeois era 
reason took on the form of rational subjectivity. Man, the individual, 
was to examine and judge everything given by means of the power of 
his knowledge. Thus the concept of reason contains the concept of 
freedom as well. For such examination and judgment would be 
meaningless if man were not free to act in accordance with his insight 
and to bring what confronts him into accordance with reason. 
Philosophy teaches us that all properties of mind subsist only through 
freedom, that all are only means for freedom, and that all seek and 
produce only freedom. To speculative philosophy belongs the 
knowledge that freedom is that alone which is true of mind.1 
Hegel was only drawing a conclusion from the entire philosophical 
tradition when he identified reason and freedom. Freedom is the ‘formal 
element’ of rationality, the only form in which reason can be.2 
With the concept of reason as freedom, philosophy seems to reach 
its limit. What remains outstanding to the realization of reason is not a 
philosophical task. Hegel saw the history of philosophy as having 
reached its definitive conclusion at this point. However, this meant for 
mankind not a better future but the bad present that this condition 
perpetuates. Kant had, of course, written essays on universal history 
with cosmopolitan intent, and on perpetual peace. But his 
transcendental philosophy aroused the belief that the realization of 
reason through factual transformation was unnecessary, since 
individuals could become rational and free within the established order. 
In its basic concepts this philosophy fell prey to the order of the 
bourgeois epoch. In a world without reason, reason is only the 
semblance of rationality; in a state of general unfreedom, freedom is 
only a semblance of being free. This semblance is generated by the 
internalization of idealism. Reason and freedom become tasks that the 
individual is to fulfill within himself, and he can do so regardless of 
external conditions. Freedom does not contradict necessity, but, to the 
contrary, necessarily presupposes it. Only he is free who recognizes the 
necessary as necessary, thereby overcoming its mere necessity and 
elevating it to the sphere of reason. This is equivalent to asserting that a 
person born crippled, who cannot be cured at the given state of medical 
science, overcomes this necessity when he gives reason and freedom 
scope within his crippled existence, i.e. if from the start he always posits 
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his needs, goals, and actions only as the needs, goals, and actions of a 
cripple. Idealist rationalism canceled the given antithesis of freedom and 
necessity so that freedom can never trespass upon necessity. Rather, it 
modestly sets up house within necessity. Hegel once said that this 
suspension of necessity ‘transfigures necessity into freedom’.3 
Freedom, however, can be the truth of necessity only when necessity 
is already true ‘in itself’. Idealist rationalism’s attachment to the status 
quo is distinguished by its particular conception of the relation of 
freedom and necessity. This attachment is the price it had to pay for the 
truth of its knowledge. It is already given in the orientation of the 
subject of idealist philosophy. This subject is rational only insofar as it is 
entirely self-sufficient. All that is ‘other’ is alien and external to this 
subject and as such primarily suspect. For something to be true, it must 
be certain. For it to be certain, it must be posited by the subject as its 
own achievement. This holds equally for the fundamentum inconcussum of 
Descartes and the synthetic a priori judgments of Kant. Self-sufficiency 
and independence of all that is other and alien is the sole guarantee of 
the subject’s freedom. What is not dependent on any other person or 
thing, what possesses itself, is free. Having excludes the other. Relating 
to the other in such a way that the subject really reaches and is united 
with it (or him) counts as loss and dependence. When Hegel ascribed to 
reason, as authentic reality, movement that ‘remains within itself’, he 
could invoke Aristotle. From the beginning, philosophy was sure that 
the highest mode of being was being-within-itself (Beisichselbstsein). 
This identity in the determination of authentic reality points to a 
deeper identity, property. Something is authentic when it is self-reliant, 
can preserve itself, and is not dependent on anything else. For idealism 
this sort of being is attained when the subject has the world so that it 
cannot be deprived of it, that it disposes of it omnipresently, and that it 
appropriates it to the extent that in all otherness the subject is only with 
itself. However, the freedom attained by Descartes’ ego cogito, Leibniz’s 
monad, Kant’s transcendental ego, Fichte’s subject of original activity, 
and Hegel’s world-spirit is not the freedom of pleasurable possession 
with which the Aristotelian God moved in his own happiness. It is 
rather the freedom of interminable, arduous labor. In the form that it 
assumed as authentic Being in modern philosophy, reason has to 
produce itself and its reality continuously in recalcitrant material. It 
exists only in this process. What reason is to accomplish is neither more 
nor less than the constitution of the world for the ego. Reason is 
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supposed to create the universality and community in which the rational 
subject participates with other rational subjects. It is the basis of the 
possibility that, beyond the encounter of merely self-sufficient monads, 
a common life develops in a common world. But even this achievement 
does not lead beyond what already exists. It changes nothing. For the 
constitution of the world has always been effected prior to the actual 
action of the individual; thus he can never take his most authentic 
achievement into his own hands. The same characteristic agitation, 
which fears really taking what is and making something else out of it, 
prevails in all aspects of this rationalism. Development is proclaimed, 
but true development is “not a transformation, or becoming something 
else”.4 For at its conclusion it arrives at nothing that did not already 
exist ‘in itself’ at the beginning. The absence of concrete development 
appeared to this philosophy as the greatest benefit. Precisely at its 
maturest stage, the inner statics of all its apparently so dynamic concepts 
become manifest. 
Undoubtedly all these characteristics make idealist rationalism a 
bourgeois philosophy. And yet, merely on account of the single concept 
of reason, it is more than ideology, and in devoting oneself to it one 
does more than struggle against ideology. The concept of ideology has 
meaning only when oriented to the interest of theory in the 
transformation of the social structure. Neither a sociological nor a 
philosophical but rather a political concept, it considers a doctrine in 
relation not to the social conditions of its truth or to an absolute truth 
but rather to the interest of transformation.5 Countless philosophical 
doctrines are mere ideology and, as illusions about socially relevant 
factors, readily integrate themselves into the general apparatus of 
domination. Idealist rationalism does not belong to this class, precisely 
to the extent that it is really idealistic. The conception of the domination 
of Being by reason is, after all, not only a postulate of idealism. With a 
sure instinct, the authoritarian state has fought classical idealism. 
Rationalism saw into important features of bourgeois society: the 
abstract ego, abstract reason, abstract freedom. To that extent it is 
correct consciousness. Pure reason was conceived as reason 
‘independent’ of all experience. The empirical world appears to make 
reason dependent; it manifests itself to reason with the character of 
‘foreignness’ (Fremdartigkeit).6 Limiting reason to ‘pure’ theoretical and 
practical achievement implies an avowal of bad facticity – but also 
concern with the right of the individual, with that in him which is more 
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than ‘economic man’, with what is left out of universal social exchange. 
Idealism tries to keep at least thought in a state of purity. It plays the 
peculiar double role of opposing both the true materialism of critical 
social theory and the false materialism of bourgeois practice. In idealism 
the individual protests the world by making both himself and the world 
free and rational in the realm of thought. This philosophy is in an 
essential sense individualistic. However, it comprehends the individual’s 
uniqueness in terms of his self-sufficiency and ‘property’; all attempts to 
use the subject, construed in this sense, as the basis for constructing an 
intersubjective world have a dubious character. The alter ego always 
could be linked to the ego only in an abstract manner: it remained a 
problem of pure knowledge or pure ethics. Idealism’s purity, too, is 
equivocal. To be sure, the highest truths of theoretical and of practical 
reason were to be pure and not based on facticity. But this purity could 
be saved only on the condition that facticity be left in impurity; the 
individual is surrendered to its untruth. Nevertheless, concern for the 
individual long kept idealism from giving its blessing to the sacrifice of 
the individual to the service of false collectives. 
Rationalism’s protest and critique remain idealistic and do not 
extend to the material conditions of existence. Hegel termed 
philosophy’s abiding in the world of thought an ‘essential 
determination’. Although philosophy reconciles antitheses in reason, it 
provides a “reconciliation not in reality, but in the world of ideas”.7 The 
materialist protest and materialist critique originated in the struggle of 
oppressed groups for better living conditions and remain permanently 
associated with the actual process of this struggle. Western philosophy 
had established reason as authentic reality. In the bourgeois epoch the 
reality of reason became the task that the free individual was to fulfill. 
The subject was the locus of reason and the source of the process by 
which objectivity was to become rational. The material conditions of 
life, however, allotted freedom to reason only in pure thought and pure 
will. But a social situation has come about in which the realization of 
reason no longer needs to be restricted to pure thought and will. If 
reason means shaping life according to men’s free decision on the basis 
of their knowledge, then the demand for reason henceforth means the 
creation of a social organization in which individuals can collectively 
regulate their lives in accordance with their needs. With the realization 
of reason in such a society, philosophy would disappear. It was the task 
of social theory to demonstrate this possibility and lay the foundation 
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for a transformation of the economic structure. By so doing, it could 
provide theoretical leadership for those strata which, by virtue of their 
historical situation, were to bring about the change. The interest of 
philosophy, concern with man, had found its new form in the interest 
of critical social theory. There is no philosophy alongside and outside 
this theory. For the philosophical construction of reason is replaced by 
the creation of a rational society. The philosophical ideals of a better 
world and of true Being are incorporated into the practical aim of 
struggling mankind, where they take on a human form. 
What, however, if the development outlined by the theory does not 
occur? What if the forces that were to bring about the transformation 
are suppressed and appear to be defeated? Little as the theory’s truth is 
thereby contradicted, it nevertheless appears then in a new light which 
illuminates new aspects and elements of its object. The new situation 
gives a new import to many demands and indices of the theory, whose 
changed function accords it in a more intensive sense the character of 
‘critical theory’.8 Its critique is also directed at the avoidance of its full 
economic and political demands by many who invoke it. This situation 
compels theory anew to a sharper emphasis on its concern with the 
potentialities of man and with the individual’s freedom, happiness, and 
rights contained in all of its analyses. For the theory, these are 
exclusively potentialities of the concrete social situation. They become 
relevant only as economic and political questions and as such bear on 
human relations in the productive process, the distribution of the 
product of social labor, and men’s active participation in the economic 
and political administration of the whole. The more elements of the 
theory become reality – not only as the old order’s evolution confirms 
the theory’s predictions, but as the transition to the new order begins – 
the more urgent becomes the question of what the theory intended as 
its goal. For here, unlike in philosophical systems, human freedom is no 
phantom or arbitrary inwardness that leaves everything in the external 
world as it was. Rather, freedom here means a real potentiality, a social 
relationship on whose realization human destiny depends. At the given 
stage of development, the constructive character of a critical theory 
emerges anew. From the beginning it did more than simply register and 
systematize facts. Its impulse came from the force with which it spoke 
against the facts and confronted bad facticity with its better 
potentialities. Like philosophy, it opposes making reality into a criterion 
in the manner of complacent positivism. But unlike philosophy, it 
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always derives its goals only from present tendencies of the social 
process. Therefore it has no fear of the utopia that the new order is 
denounced as being. When truth cannot be realized within the 
established social order, it always appears to the latter as mere utopia. 
This transcendence speaks not against, but for, its truth. The utopian 
element was long the only progressive element in philosophy, as in the 
constructions of the best state and the highest pleasure, of perfect 
happiness and perpetual peace. The obstinacy that comes from adhering 
to truth against all appearances has given way in contemporary 
philosophy to whimsy and uninhibited opportunism. Critical theory 
preserves obstinacy as a genuine quality of philosophical thought. 
The current situation emphasizes this quality. The reverse suffered 
by the progressive forces took place at a stage where the economic 
conditions for transformation were present. The new social situation 
expressed in the authoritarian state could be easily comprehended and 
predicted by means of the concepts worked out by the theory. It was 
not the failure of economic concepts that provided the impetus behind 
the new emphasis of the theory’s claim that the transformation of 
economic conditions involves the transformation of the entirety of 
human existence. This claim is directed rather against a distorted 
interpretation and application of economics that is found in both 
practice and theoretical discussion. The discussion leads back to the 
question: In what way is the theory more than economics? From the 
beginning the critique of political economy established the difference by 
criticizing the entirety of social existence. In a society whose totality was 
determined by economic relations to the extent that the uncontrolled 
economy controlled all human relations, even the noneconomic was 
contained in the economy. It appears that, if and when this control is 
removed, the rational organization of society toward which critical 
theory is oriented is more than a new form of economic regulation. The 
difference lies in the decisive factor, precisely the one that makes the 
society rational – the subordination of the economy to the individuals’ 
needs. The transformation of society eliminates the original relation of 
substructure and superstructure. In a rational reality, the labor process 
should not determine the general existence of men; to the contrary, their 
needs should determine the labor process. Not that the labor process is 
regulated in accordance with a plan, but the interest determining the 
regulation becomes important: it is rational only if this interest is that of 
the freedom and happiness of the masses. Neglect of this element 
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despoils the theory of one of its essential characteristics. It eradicates 
from the image of liberated mankind the idea of happiness that was to 
distinguish it from all previous mankind. Without freedom and 
happiness in the social relations of men, even the greatest increase of 
production and the abolition of private property in the means of 
production remain infected with the old injustice. 
Critical theory has, of course, distinguished between various phases 
of realization and pointed out the unfreedoms and inequalities with 
which the new era inevitably will be burdened. Nevertheless, the 
transformed social existence must be determined by its ultimate goal 
even at its inception. In its concept of an ultimate goal, critical theory 
did not intend to replace the theological hereafter with a social one – 
with an ideal that appears in the new order as just another hereafter in 
virtue of its exclusive opposition to the beginning and its telescoping 
distance. By defending the endangered and victimized potentialities of 
man against cowardice and betrayal, critical theory is not to be 
supplemented by a philosophy. It only makes explicit what was always 
the foundation of its categories: the demand that through the abolition 
of previously existing material conditions of existence the totality of 
human relations be liberated. If critical theory, amidst today’s 
desperation, indicates that the reality it intends must comprise the 
freedom and happiness of individuals, it is only following the direction 
given by its economic concepts. They are constructive concepts, which 
comprehend not only the given reality but, simultaneously, its abolition 
and the new reality that is to follow. In the theoretical reconstruction of 
the social process, the critique of current conditions and the analysis of 
their tendencies necessarily include future-oriented components. The 
transformation toward which this process tends and the existence that 
liberated mankind is to create for itself determine at the outset the 
establishment and unfolding of the first economic categories. Theory 
can invoke no facts in confirmation of the theoretical elements that 
point toward future freedom. From the viewpoint of theory all that is 
already attained is given only as something threatened and in the 
process of disappearing; the given is a positive fact, an element of the 
coming society, only when it is taken into the theoretical construction as 
something to be transformed. This construction is neither a supplement 
to nor an extension of economics. It is economics itself insofar as it 
deals with contents that transcend the realm of established economic 
conditions. 
Negations 
108 
Unconditional adherence to its goal, which can be attained only in 
social struggle, lets theory continually confront the already attained with 
the not yet attained and newly threatened. The theory’s interest in great 
philosophy is part of the same context of opposition to the established 
order. But critical theory is not concerned with the realization of ideals 
brought into social struggles from outside. In these struggles it identifies 
on one side the cause of freedom and on the other the cause of 
suppression and barbarism. If the latter seems to win in reality, it might 
easily appear as though critical theory were holding up a philosophical 
idea against factual development and its scientific analysis. Traditional 
science was in fact more subject to the powers that be than was great 
philosophy. It was not in science but in philosophy that traditional 
theory developed concepts oriented to the potentialities of man lying 
beyond his factual status. At the end of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant 
cites the three questions in which ‘all the interest’ of human reason 
‘coalesces’: What can I know?; What should I do?; What may I hope?9 
And in the introduction to his lectures on logic, he adds a fourth 
question encompassing the first three: What is man?10 The answer to 
this question is conceived not as the description of human nature as it is 
actually found to be, but rather as the demonstration of what are found 
to be human potentialities. In the bourgeois period, philosophy 
distorted the meaning of both question and answers by equating human 
potentialities with those that are real within the established order. That 
is why they could be potentialities only of pure knowledge and pure will. 
The transformation of a given status is not, of course, the business 
of philosophy. The philosopher can only participate in social struggles 
insofar as he is not a professional philosopher. This ‘division of labor’, 
too, results from the modern separation of the mental from the material 
means of production, and philosophy cannot overcome it. The abstract 
character of philosophical work in the past and present is rooted in the 
social conditions of existence. Adhering to the abstractness of 
philosophy is more appropriate to circumstances and closer to truth 
than is the pseudophilosophical concreteness that condescends to social 
struggles. What is true in philosophical concepts was arrived at by 
abstracting from the concrete status of man and is true only in such 
abstraction. Reason, mind, morality, knowledge, and happiness are not 
only categories of bourgeois philosophy, but concerns of mankind. As 
such they must be preserved, if not derived anew. When critical theory 
examines the philosophical doctrines in which it was still possible to 
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speak of man, it deals first with the camouflage and misinterpretation 
that characterized the discussion of man in the bourgeois period. 
With this intention, several fundamental concepts of philosophy 
have been discussed in this journal [Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung]: truth 
and verification, rationalism and irrationalism, the role of logic, 
metaphysics and positivism, and the concept of essence. These were not 
merely analyzed sociologically, in order to correlate philosophical 
dogmas with social loci. Nor were specific philosophical contents 
‘resolved’ into social facts. To the extent that philosophy is more than 
ideology, every such attempt must come to nought. When critical theory 
comes to terms with philosophy, it is interested in the truth content of 
philosophical concepts and problems. It presupposes that they really 
contain truth. The enterprise of the sociology of knowledge, to the 
contrary, is occupied only with the untruths, not the truths of previous 
philosophy. To be sure, even the highest philosophical categories are 
connected with social facts, even if only with the most general fact that 
the struggle of man with nature has not been undertaken by mankind as 
a free subject but instead has taken place only in class society. This fact 
comes to expression in many ‘ontological differences’ established by 
philosophy. Its traces can perhaps be found even in the very forms of 
conceptual thought: for example, in the determination of logic as 
essentially the logic of predication, or judgments about given objects of 
which predicates are variously asserted or denied. It was dialectical logic 
that first pointed out the shortcomings of this interpretation of 
judgment: the ‘contingency’ of predication and the ‘externality’ of the 
process of judgment, which let the subject of judgment appear ‘outside’ 
as self-subsistent and the predicate ‘inside’ as though in our heads.11 
Moreover, it is certainly true that many philosophical concepts are mere 
‘foggy ideas’ arising out of the domination of existence by an 
uncontrolled economy and, accordingly, are to be explained precisely by 
the material conditions of life. 
But in its historical forms philosophy also contains insights into 
human and objective conditions whose truth points beyond previous 
society and thus cannot he completely reduced to it. Here belong not 
only the contents dealt with under such concepts as reason, mind, 
freedom, morality, universality, and essence, but also important 
achievements of epistemology, psychology, and logic. Their truth 
content, which surmounts their social conditioning, presupposes not an 
eternal consciousness that transcendentally constitutes the individual 
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consciousness of historical subjects but only those particular historical 
subjects whose consciousness expresses itself in critical theory. It is only 
with and for this consciousness that the ‘surpassing’ content becomes 
visible in its real truth. The truth that it recognizes in philosophy is not 
reducible to existing social conditions. This would be the case only in a 
form of existence where consciousness is no longer separated from 
being, enabling the rationality of thought to proceed from the rationality 
of social existence. Until then truth that is more than the truth of what 
is can be attained and intended only in opposition to established social 
relations. To this negative condition, at least, it is subject. 
In the past, social relations concealed the meaning of truth. They 
formed a horizon of untruth that deprived the truth of its meaning. An 
example is the concept of universal consciousness, which preoccupied 
German Idealism. It contains the problem of the relation of the subject 
to the totality of society: How can universality as community 
(Allgemeinheit) become the subject without abolishing individuality? The 
understanding that more than an epistemological or metaphysical 
problem is at issue here can be gained and evaluated only outside the 
limits of bourgeois thought. The philosophical solutions met with by 
the problem are to be found in the history of philosophy. No 
sociological analysis is necessary in order to understand Kant’s theory of 
transcendental synthesis. It embodies an epistemological truth. The 
interpretation given to the Kantian position by critical theory12 does not 
affect the internal philosophical difficulty. By connecting the problem of 
the universality of knowledge with that of society as a universal subject, 
it does not purport to provide a better philosophical solution. Critical 
theory means to show only the specific social conditions at the root of 
philosophy’s inability to pose the problem in a more comprehensive 
way, and to indicate that any other solution lay beyond that philosophy’s 
boundaries. The untruth inherent in all transcendental treatment of the 
problem thus comes into philosophy ‘from outside’: hence it can be 
overcome only outside philosophy. ‘Outside’ does not mean that social 
factors affect consciousness from without as though the latter existed 
independently. It refers rather to a division within the social whole. 
Consciousness is ‘externally’ conditioned by social existence to the very 
extent that in bourgeois society the social conditions of the individual 
are eternal to him and, as it were, overwhelm him from without. This 
externality made possible the abstract freedom of the thinking subject. 
Consequently, only its abolition would enable abstract freedom to 
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disappear as part of the general transformation of the relationship 
between social being and consciousness. 
If the theory’s fundamental conception of the relation of social 
existence to consciousness is to be followed, this ‘outside’ must be taken 
into consideration. In previous history there has been no pre-established 
harmony between correct thought and social being. In the bourgeois 
period, economic conditions determine philosophical thought insofar as 
it is the emancipated, self-reliant individual who thinks. In reality, he 
counts not in the concretion of his potentialities and needs but only in 
abstraction from his individuality, as the bearer of labor power, i.e. of 
useful functions in the process of the realization of capital. 
Correspondingly, he appears in philosophy only as an abstract subject, 
abstracted from his full humanity. If he pursues the idea of man, he 
must think in opposition to facticity. Wishing to conceive this idea in its 
philosophical purity and universality, he must abstract from the present 
state of affairs. This abstractness, this radical withdrawal from the given, 
at least clears a path along which the individual in bourgeois society can 
seek the truth and adhere to what is known. Beside concreteness and 
facticity, the thinking subject also leaves its misery ‘outside’. But it 
cannot escape from itself, for it has incorporated the monadic isolation 
of the bourgeois individual into its premises. The subject thinks within a 
horizon of untruth that bars the door to real emancipation. 
This horizon explains some of the characteristic features of 
bourgeois philosophy. One of them affects the idea of truth itself and 
would seem to relativize ‘sociologically’ all its truths from the start: the 
coupling of truth and certainty. As such, this connection goes all the 
way back to ancient philosophy. But only in the modern period has it 
taken on the typical form that truth must prove itself as the guaranteed 
property of the individual, and that this proof is considered established 
only if the individual can continually reproduce the truth as his own 
achievement. The process of knowledge is never terminated, because in 
every act of cognition the individual must once again re-enact the 
‘production of the world’ and the categorical organization of experience. 
However, the process never gets any further because the restriction of 
‘productive’ cognition to the transcendental sphere makes any new form 
of the world impossible. The constitution of the world occurs behind 
the backs of the individuals; yet it is their work. 
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The corresponding social factors are clear. The progressive aspects 
of this construction of the world, namely the foundation of knowledge 
on the autonomy of the individual and the idea of cognition as an act 
and task to be continually re-enacted, are made ineffective by the life 
process of bourgeois society. But does this sociological limitation affect 
the true content of the construction, the essential connection of 
knowledge, freedom, and practice? Bourgeois society’s domination 
reveals itself not only in the dependence of thought but also in the 
(abstract) independence of its contents. For this society determines 
consciousness such that the latter’s activity and contents survive in the 
dimension of abstract reason; abstractness saves its truth. What is true is 
so only to the extent that it is not the truth about social reality. And just 
because it is not the latter, because it transcends this reality, it can 
become a matter for critical theory. Sociology that is interested only in 
the dependent and limited nature of consciousness has nothing to do 
with truth. Its research, useful in many ways, falsifies the interest and 
the goal of critical theory. In any case, what was linked, in past 
knowledge, to specific social structures disappears with them. In 
contrast, critical theory concerns itself with preventing the loss of the 
truths which past knowledge labored to attain. 
This is not to assert the existence of eternal truths unfolding in 
changing historical forms of which they need only to be divested in 
order for their kernel of truth to be revealed. If reason, freedom, 
knowledge, and happiness really are transformed from abstract concepts 
into reality, then they will have as much and as little in common with 
their previous forms as the association of free men with competitive, 
commodity-producing society. Of course, to the identity of the basic 
social structure in previous history certainly corresponds an identity of 
certain universal truths, whose universal character is an essential 
component of their truth content. The struggle of authoritarian ideology 
against abstract universals has clearly exhibited this. That man is a 
rational being, that this being requires freedom, and that happiness is his 
highest good are all universal propositions whose progressive impetus 
derives precisely from their universality. Universality gives them an 
almost revolutionary character, for they claim that all, and not merely 
this or that particular person, should be rational, free, and happy. In a 
society whose reality gives the lie to all these universals, philosophy 
cannot make them concrete. Under such conditions, adherence to 
universality is more important than its philosophical destruction. 
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Critical theory’s interest in the liberation of mankind binds it to 
certain ancient truths. It is at one with philosophy in maintaining that 
man can be more than a manipulable subject in the production process 
of class society. To the extent that philosophy has nevertheless made its 
peace with man’s determination by economic conditions, it has allied 
itself with repression. That is the bad materialism that underlies the 
edifice of idealism: the consolation that in the material world everything 
is in order as it is. (Even when it has not been the personal conviction 
of the philosopher, this consolation has arisen almost automatically as 
part of the mode of thought of bourgeois idealism and constitutes its 
ultimate affinity with its time.) The other premise of this materialism is 
that the mind is not to make its demands in this world, but is to orient 
itself toward another realm that does not conflict with the material 
world. The materialism of bourgeois practice can quite easily come to 
terms with this attitude. The bad materialism of philosophy is overcome 
in the materialist theory of society. The latter opposes not only the 
production relations that gave rise to bad materialism, but every form of 
production that dominates man instead of being dominated by him: this 
idealism underlies its materialism. Its constructive concepts, too, have a 
residue of abstractness as long as the reality toward which they are 
directed is not yet given. Here, however, abstractness results not from 
avoiding the status quo, but from orientation toward the future status of 
man. It cannot be supplanted by another, correct theory of the 
established order (as idealist abstractness was replaced by the critique of 
political economy). It cannot be succeeded by a new theory, but only by 
rational reality itself. The abyss between rational and present reality 
cannot be bridged by conceptual thought. In order to retain what is not 
yet present as a goal in the present, phantasy is required. The essential 
connection of phantasy with philosophy is evident from the function 
attributed to it by philosophers, especially Aristotle and Kant, under the 
title of ‘imagination’. Owing to its unique capacity to ‘intuit’ an object 
though the latter be not present and to create something new out of 
given material of cognition, imagination denotes a considerable degree 
of independence from the given, of freedom amid a world of 
unfreedom. In surpassing what is present, it can anticipate the future. It 
is true that when Kant characterizes this ‘fundamental faculty of the 
human soul’ as the a priori basis of all knowledge,13 this restriction to 
the a priori diverts once again from the future to what is always past. 
Imagination succumbs to the general degradation of phantasy. To free it 
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for the construction of a more beautiful and happier world remains the 
prerogative of children and fools. True, in phantasy one can imagine 
anything. But critical theory does not envision an endless horizon of 
possibilities. 
The freedom of imagination disappears to the extent that real 
freedom becomes a real possibility. The limits of phantasy are thus no 
longer universal laws of essence (as the last bourgeois theory of 
knowledge that took seriously the meaning of phantasy so defined 
them14), but technical limits in the strictest sense. They are prescribed by 
the level of technological development. What critical theory is engaged 
in is not the depiction of a future world, although the response of 
phantasy to such a challenge would not perhaps be quite as absurd as 
we are led to believe. If phantasy were set free to answer, with precise 
reference to already existing technical material, the fundamental 
philosophical questions asked by Kant, all of sociology would be 
terrified at the utopian character of its answers. And yet the answers 
that phantasy could provide would be very close to the truth, certainly 
closer than those yielded by the rigorous conceptual analyses of 
philosophical anthropology. For it would determine what man is on the 
basis of what he really can be tomorrow. In replying to the question, 
‘What may I hope?’, it would point less to eternal bliss and inner 
freedom than to the already possible unfolding and fulfillment of needs 
and wants. In a situation where such a future is a real possibility, 
phantasy is an important instrument in the task of continually holding 
the goal up to view. Phantasy does not relate to the other cognitive 
faculties as illusion to truth (which in fact, when it plumes itself on 
being the only truth, can perceive the truth of the future only as 
illusion). Without phantasy, all philosophical knowledge remains in the 
grip of the present or the past and severed from the future, which is the 
only link between philosophy and the real history of mankind. 
Strong emphasis on the role of phantasy seems to contradict the 
rigorously scientific character that critical theory has always made a 
criterion of its concepts. This demand for scientific objectivity has 
brought materialist theory into unusual accord with idealist rationalism. 
While the latter could pursue its concern with man only in abstraction 
from given facts, it attempted to undo this abstractness by associating 
itself with science. Science never seriously called use-value into question. 
In their anxiety about scientific objectivity, the Neo-Kantians are at one 
with Kant, as is Husserl with Descartes. How science was applied, 
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whether its utility and productivity guaranteed its higher truth or were 
instead signs of general inhumanity – philosophy did not ask itself these 
questions. It was chiefly interested in the methodology of the sciences. 
The critical theory of society maintained primarily that the only task left 
for philosophy was elaborating the most general results of the sciences. 
It, too, took as its basis the viewpoint that science had sufficiently 
demonstrated its ability to serve the development of the productive 
forces and to open up new potentialities of a richer existence. But while 
the alliance between idealist philosophy and science was burdened from 
the beginning with sins engendered by the dependence of the sciences 
on established relations of domination, the critical theory of society 
presupposes the disengagement of science from this order. Thus the 
fateful fetishism of science is avoided here in principle. But this does 
not dispense the theory from a constant critique of scientific aims and 
methods which takes into account every new social situation. Scientific 
objectivity as such is never a sufficient guarantee of truth, especially in a 
situation where the truth speaks as strongly against the facts and is as 
well hidden behind them as today. Scientific predictability does not 
coincide with the futuristic mode in which the truth exists. Even the 
development of the productive forces and the evolution of technology 
know no uninterrupted progression from the old to the new society. 
For here, too, man himself is to determine progress: not ‘socialist’ man, 
whose spiritual and moral regeneration is supposed to constitute the 
basis for planning the planners (a view that overlooks that ‘socialist’ 
planning presupposes the disappearance of the abstract separation both 
of the subject from his activity and of the subject as universal from each 
individual subject), but the association of those men who bring about 
the transformation. Since what is to become of science and technology 
depends on them, science and technology cannot serve a priori as a 
conceptual model for critical theory. 
Critical theory is, last but not least, critical of itself and of the social 
forces that make up its own basis. The philosophical element in the 
theory is a form of protest against the new ‘Economism’, which would 
isolate the economic struggle and separate the economic from the 
political sphere. At an early stage, this view was countered with the 
criticism that the determining factors are the given situation of the 
entire society, the interrelationships of the various social strata, and 
relations of political power. The transformation of the economic 
structure must so reshape the organization of the entire society that, 
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with the abolition of economic antagonisms between groups and 
individuals, the political sphere becomes to a great extent independent 
and determines the development of society. With the disappearance of 
the state, political relations would then become, in a hitherto unknown 
sense, general human relations: the organization of the administration of 
social wealth in the interest of liberated mankind. 
The materialist theory of society is originally a nineteenth-century 
theory. Representing its relation to rationalism as one of ‘inheritance’, it 
conceived this inheritance as it manifested itself in the nineteenth 
century. Much has changed since then. At that time the theory had 
comprehended, on the deepest level, the possibility of a coming 
barbarity, but the latter did not appear to be as imminent as the 
‘conservative’ abolition of what the nineteenth century represented: 
conservative of what the culture of bourgeois society, for all its poverty 
and injustice, had accomplished nonetheless for the development and 
happiness of the individual. What had already been achieved and what 
still remained to be done was clear enough. The entire impetus of the 
theory came from this interest in the individual, and it was not necessary 
to discuss it philosophically. The situation of inheritance has changed in 
the meantime. It is not a part of the nineteenth century, but 
authoritarian barbarity, that now separates the previous reality of reason 
from the form intended by theory. More and more, the culture that was 
to have been abolished recedes into the past. Overlaid by an actuality in 
which the complete sacrifice of the individual has become a pervasive 
and almost unquestioned fact of life, that culture has vanished to the 
point where studying and comprehending it is no longer a matter of 
spiteful pride, but of sorrow. Critical theory must concern itself to a 
hitherto unknown extent with the past – precisely insofar as it is 
concerned with the future. 
In a different form, the situation confronting the theory of society in 
the nineteenth century is being repeated today. Once again real 
conditions fall beneath the general level of history. Fettering the 
productive forces and keeping down the standard of life is characteristic 
of even the economically most developed countries. The reflection cast 
by the truth of the future in the philosophy of the past provides 
indications of factors that point beyond today’s anachronistic 
conditions. Thus critical theory is still linked to these truths. They 
appear in it as part of a process: that of bringing to consciousness 
potentialities that have emerged within the maturing historical situation. 
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They are preserved in the economic and political concepts of critical 
theory. 
 
 

  119 
5 
On Hedonism 
The idealist philosophy of the bourgeois era attempted to comprehend 
the universal, which was supposed to realize itself in and through 
isolated individuals, under the notion of reason. The individual appears 
as an ego isolated from and against others in its drives, thoughts, and 
interests. This isolating individuation is overcome and a common world 
constructed through the reduction of concrete individuality to the 
subject of mere thought, the rational ego. Operating among men who at 
first follow only their particular interests, the laws of reason eventually 
succeed in bringing about community. The universal validity of at least 
some forms of intuition and of thought can be securely established, and 
certain general maxims of conduct can be derived from the rationality 
of the person. Insofar as the individual partakes of universality only as a 
rational being and not with the empirical manifold of his needs, wants, 
and capacities, this idea of reason implicitly contains the sacrifice of the 
individual. His full development could not be admitted into the realm of 
reason. The gratification of his wants and capacities, his happiness, 
appears as an arbitrary and subjective element that cannot be brought 
into consonance with the universal validity of the highest principle of 
human action. 
For it is every man’s own special feeling of pleasure and pain that 
decides in what he is to place his happiness, and even in the same 
subject this will vary with the difference of his wants according as this 
feeling changes, and thus a law which is subjectively necessary (as a law of 
nature) is objectively a very contingent practical principle, which can and 
must be very different in different subjects, and therefore can never 
furnish a law …1 
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Happiness is of no matter, for happiness does not lead beyond the 
individual in all his contingency and imperfection. Hegel saw the history 
of humanity as burdened with this irredeemable misfortune. Individuals 
must be sacrificed for the sake of the universal, for there is no pre-
established harmony between the general and the particular interest, or 
between reason and happiness. The progress of reason realizes itself 
against the happiness of individuals. 
Happy is he who has adapted his existence to his particular character, 
will, and choice and thus enjoys himself in his existence. History is not 
the stage of happiness. In it, the periods of happiness are empty pages 
…2 
The universal follows its course in disregard of individuals, and history, 
when comprehended, appears as the monstrous Calvary of the spirit. 
Hegel fought against eudaemonism in the interest of historical 
progress. As such, the eudaemonistic principle of ‘making happiness 
and pleasure the highest good’ is not false, according to Hegel. Rather, 
the baseness of eudaemonism is that it transposes the fulfillment of 
desire and the happiness of individuals into a ‘vulgar world and reality’. 
In accordance with this eudaemonism, the individual is supposed to be 
reconciled to this common and base world. The individual should “trust 
in this world and yield himself to it and be able to devote himself to it 
without sin”.3 Eudaemonism sins against historical reason, according to 
Hegel, in that it lets the culmination of human existence be prescribed 
and tainted by bad empirical reality. 
Hegel’s critique of eudaemonism expresses insight into the required 
objectivity of happiness. If happiness is no more than the immediate 
gratification of particular interests, then eudaemonism contains an 
irrational principle that keeps men within whatever forms of life are 
given. Human happiness should be something other than personal 
contentment. Its own title points beyond mere subjectivity. 
Both ancient and bourgeois eudaemonism viewed happiness 
essentially as such a subjective condition. Insofar as men can and should 
attain happiness within the status prescribed them by the established 
social order, this doctrine contains a moment of resignation and 
approbation. Eudaemonism comes into contradiction with the principle 
of the critical autonomy of reason. 
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The contraposition of happiness and reason goes all the way back to 
ancient philosophy. The relegation of happiness to chance, to that 
which cannot be controlled and is not dominated, to the irrational 
power of conditions that are essentially external to the individual, so 
that happiness at most ‘supervenes’ on its aims and goals – this resigned 
relationship to happiness is contained in the Greek concept tyche.4 One 
is happy in the realm of ‘external goods’, which do not fall within the 
freedom of the individual, but rather are subject to the opaque 
contingency of the social order of life. True felicity, the fulfillment of 
individuals’ highest potentialities, thus cannot consist in what is 
commonly called happiness, but must be sought in the world of the soul 
and the mind. 
It is against this internalization of happiness, which accepts as 
inevitable the anarchy and unfreedom of the external conditions of 
existence, that the hedonistic trends of philosophy have protested. By 
identifying happiness with pleasure, they were demanding that man’s 
sensual and sensuous potentialities and needs, too, should find 
satisfaction – that in them, too, man should enjoy his existence without 
sinning against his essence, without guilt and shame. In the principle of 
hedonism, in an abstract and undeveloped form, the demand for the 
freedom of the individual is extended into the realm of the material 
conditions of life. Insofar as the materialistic protest of hedonism 
preserves an otherwise proscribed element of human liberation, it is 
linked with the interest of critical theory. 
Two types of hedonism are commonly distinguished: the Cyrenaic 
and the Epicurean trends. The Cyrenaics’ point of departure is the 
thesis that the fulfillment of specific instincts and wants of the 
individual is associated with the feeling of pleasure. Happiness consists 
in having these individual pleasures as often as possible. 
Our end is particular pleasure, whereas happiness is the sum total of all 
individual pleasures, in which are included both past and future 
pleasures. Particular pleasure is desirable for its own sake, whereas 
happiness is desirable not for its own sake, but for the sake of particular 
pleasures.5 
What the individual instincts and wants may be makes no difference; 
their moral evaluation is not based upon their ‘nature’. They are a matter 
of custom, of social convention.6 Pleasure is all that matters. It is the 
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only happiness that the individual is allotted. “… pleasure does not 
differ from pleasure nor is one pleasure more pleasant than another.”7 
And now the materialist protest against internalization: 
… bodily pleasures are far better than mental pleasures, and bodily 
pains far worse than mental pains …8 
Even rebellion against sacrificing the individual to the hypostatized 
community is preserved: “It was reasonable … for the good man not to 
risk his life in the defence of his country, for he would never throw 
wisdom away to benefit the unwise”.9 
This hedonism fails to differentiate not only between individual 
pleasures but also between the individuals who enjoy them. They are to 
gratify themselves just as they are, and the world is to become an object 
of possible enjoyment just as it is. In its relegation of happiness to 
immediate abandon and immediate enjoyment, hedonism accords with 
circumstances located in the structure of antagonistic society itself; they 
become clear only in their developed form. 
In this form of society, the world as it is can become an object of 
enjoyment only when everything in it, men and things, is accepted as it 
appears. Its essence, that is, those potentialities which emerge as the 
highest on the basis of the attained level of the productive forces and of 
knowledge, is not present to the subject of enjoyment. For since the life 
process is not determined by the true interests of individuals creating, in 
solidarity, their existence through contending with nature, these 
potentialities are not realized in the decisive social relations. They can 
only appear to consciousness as lost, atrophied, and repressed. Any 
relationship to men and things going beyond their immediacy, any 
deeper understanding, would immediately come upon their essence, 
upon that which they could be and are not, and would then suffer from 
their appearance. Appearance becomes visible in the light of unrealized 
potentialities. Then it is no longer one beautiful moment among others 
so much as something evanescent which is lost and cannot be restored. 
Faults and blemishes of the objects of enjoyment are then burdened 
with the general ugliness and general unhappiness, whereas in 
immediacy they can even become a source of pleasure. Contingency in 
relations to men and things and the accompanying obstacles, losses, and 
renunciations become an expression of the anarchy and injustice of the 
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whole, of a society in which even the most personal relations are 
determined by the economic law of value. 
In this society, all human relationships transcending immediate 
encounter are not relations of happiness: especially not relationships in 
the labor process, which is regulated with regard not to the needs and 
capacities of individuals but rather to profit on capital and the 
production of commodities. Human relations are class relations, and 
their typical form is the free labor contract. This contractual character of 
human relationships has spread from the sphere of production to all of 
social life. Relationships function only in their reified form, mediated 
through the class distribution of the material output of the contractual 
partners. If this functional depersonalization were ever breached, not 
merely by that backslapping familiarity which only underscores the 
reciprocal functional distance separating men but rather by mutual 
concern and solidarity, it would be impossible for men to return to their 
normal social functions and positions. The contractual structure upon 
which this society is based would be broken. 
Contract, however, does not encompass all interpersonal relations. 
Society has released a whole dimension of relationships whose value is 
supposed to consist precisely in their not being determined by 
contractual achievements and contractual services. These are 
relationships in which individuals are in the relation of ‘persons’ to one 
another and in which they are supposed to realize their personality. 
Love, friendship, and companionship are such personal relations, to 
which Western culture has relegated man’s highest earthly happiness. 
But they cannot sustain happiness, precisely when they are what they are 
intended to be. If they are really to guarantee an essential and 
permanent community among individuals, they must be based on 
comprehending understanding of the other. They must contain 
uncompromising knowledge. To this knowledge the other reveals 
himself not merely in the uninterrupted immediacy of sensual 
appearance that can he desired and enjoyed as beautiful, through 
satisfaction with appearance, but rather in his essence, as he really is. His 
image will thus include ugliness, injustice, inconstancy, decay, and 
ephemerality not as subjective properties that could be overcome by 
understanding concern but rather as the effects of the intervention of 
social necessities into the personal sphere. These necessities actually 
constitute the instincts, wants, and interests of the person in this society. 
Accordingly the very essence of the person expresses itself in modes of 
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behavior to which the other (or the person himself) reacts with 
disappointment, concern, sympathy, anxiety, infidelity, jealousy, and 
sorrow. Culture has transfigured these feelings and given them tragic 
consecration. In fact, they subvert reification. In the behavior to which 
they are a response, the individual wants to release himself from a 
situation whose social law he has hitherto obeyed, whether marriage, 
occupation, or any other obligation in which he has accepted morality. 
He wants to follow his passions. In an order of unfreedom, however, 
passion is deeply disorderly and hence immoral. When not diverted 
toward generally desired goals, it leads to unhappiness. 
This is not the only way in which personal relations are linked to 
pain and unhappiness. The development of personality also means the 
development of knowledge: insight into the structures of the reality in 
which one lives. These structures being what they are, every step of 
cognition removes the individual from immediate abandonment to 
appearance and from ready acceptance of the ideology that conceals its 
essence. Thus knowledge destroys proffered happiness. If the individual 
really acts on his knowledge, he is led either to struggle against the status 
quo or to renunciation. Knowledge does not help him attain happiness, 
yet without it he reverts to reified relationships. This is an inescapable 
dilemma. Enjoyment and truth, happiness and the essential relations of 
individuals are disjunctions. 
By not concealing this dichotomy, consistent hedonism fulfilled a 
progressive function. It did not pretend that, in an anarchic society, 
happiness could be found in a developed, harmonic ‘personality’ based 
on the highest achievements of culture. Hedonism is useless as ideology 
and in no way admits of being employed to justify an order associated 
with the suppression of freedom and the sacrifice of the individual. For 
such a purpose it must first be morally internalized or revised in a 
utilitarian sense. Hedonism advocates happiness equally for all 
individuals. It does not hypostatize a community in which happiness is 
negated without regard to individuals. It is meaningful to speak of the 
progress of universal reason realizing itself in the face of the 
unhappiness of individuals, but general happiness apart from the 
happiness of individuals is a meaningless phrase. 
Hedonism is the opposite pole to the philosophy of reason. In 
abstract fashion, both movements of thought have preserved 
potentialities of existing society that point to a real human society. The 
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philosophy of reason has emphasized the development of the 
productive forces, the free rational shaping of the conditions of life, the 
domination of nature, and the critical autonomy of the associated 
individuals. Hedonism has stressed the comprehensive unfolding and 
fulfillment of individual wants and needs, emancipation from an 
inhuman labor process, and liberation of the world for the purposes of 
enjoyment. In society up to the present, the two doctrines have been 
incompatible, as are the principles that they represent. The idea of 
reason aims at universality, at a society in which the antagonistic 
interests of ‘empirical’ individuals are canceled. To this community, 
however, the real fulfillment of individuals and their happiness remains 
alien and external; they must be sacrificed. There is no harmony 
between the general and the particular interest, between reason and 
happiness. If the individual believes that both interests are in accord, he 
becomes the victim of a necessary and salutary illusion; reason outwits 
individuals. The true interest (of universality) reifies itself in opposition 
to the individuals and becomes a power that overwhelms them. 
Hedonism wants to preserve the development and gratification of 
the individual as a goal within an anarchic and impoverished reality. But 
the protest against the reified community and against the meaningless 
sacrifices which are made to it leads only deeper into isolation and 
opposition between individuals as long as the historical forces that 
could transform the established society into a true community have not 
matured and are not comprehended. For hedonism, happiness remains 
something exclusively subjective. The particular interest of the 
individual, just as it is, is affirmed as the true interest and is justified 
against every and all community. This is the limit of hedonism: its 
attachment to the individualism of competition. Its concept of 
happiness can be derived only by abstracting from all universality and 
community. Abstract happiness corresponds to the abstract freedom of 
the monadic individual. The concrete objectivity of happiness is a 
concept for which hedonism finds no evidence. 
This inevitable entanglement of even the most radical eudaemonism 
is a proper target of Hegel’s critique. For it reconciles particular 
happiness with general unhappiness. Hedonism is not untrue because 
the individual is supposed to seek and find his happiness in a world of 
injustice and of misery. To the contrary, the hedonistic principle as such 
rebels often enough against this order. If it were ever to take hold of the 
masses, they would scarcely tolerate unfreedom and would be made 
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completely unsuited for heroic domestication. The apologetic aspect of 
hedonism is located at a deeper level. It is to be found in hedonism’s 
abstract conception of the subjective side of happiness, in its inability to 
distinguish between true and false wants and interests and between true 
and false enjoyment. It accepts the wants and interests of individuals as 
simply given and as valuable in themselves. Yet these wants and 
interests themselves, and not merely their gratification, already contain 
the stunted growth, the repression, and the untruth with which men 
grow up in class society. The affirmation of the one already contains the 
affirmation of the other. 
The inability of hedonism to apply the category of truth to 
happiness, its fundamental relativism, is not a logical or epistemological 
fault of a philosophical system. It can be neither corrected within the 
system nor eliminated by a more comprehensive and better 
philosophical system. It originates in the form of social relations to 
which hedonism is linked, and all attempts to avoid it through 
immanent differentiation lead to new contradictions. 
The second type of hedonism, the Epicurean, represents such an 
attempt at immanent differentiation. The identification of the highest 
good with pleasure is retained, but a specific kind of pleasure is, as ‘true’ 
pleasure, opposed to all others. The undifferentiated gratification of 
whatever wants are given is all too often obviously followed by pain, 
whose magnitude is the basis for a differentiation of individual 
pleasures. There are wants and desires whose satisfaction is succeeded 
by pain that only serves to stimulate new desires, destroying man’s 
peace of mind and health. Therefore 
… we do not choose every pleasure whatsoever, but oft-times pass over 
many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. And oft-
times we consider pains superior to pleasures when submission to the 
pains for a long time brings us as a consequence a greater pleasure.10 
Reason, whose foresight makes possible a comparison of the values of 
momentary pleasure and later pain, becomes the adjudicator of pleasure. 
It may itself even become the highest pleasure. 
It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not 
sexual love, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies … which 
produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds 
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of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through 
which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul.11 
Reason grants man that moderate enjoyment which reduces risk and 
offers the prospect of permanently balanced health. The differentiating 
evaluation of pleasure ensues therefore with regard to the greatest 
possible security and permanence of pleasure. This method expresses 
fear of the insecurity and badness of the conditions of life, the 
invincible limitation of enjoyment. It is a negative hedonism. Its 
principle is less the pleasure to be striven for than the pain to he 
avoided. The truth against which pleasure is to be measured is only 
evasion of conflict with the established order: the socially permitted if 
not desired form of pleasure. The ‘sage’s’ tranquility is the goal: an idea 
in which the concept of pleasure as well as the concept of the sage are 
deprived of their meaning. Pleasure perishes, inasmuch as the cautious, 
measured, and withdrawn relationship of the individual to men and 
things resists their dominion over him precisely where this dominion 
brings real happiness: as enjoyable abandon. In the antagonistic ordering 
of existence, happiness is encountered as something withdrawn from 
the autonomy of the individual, something that can be neither achieved 
nor controlled by reason. The element of extraneousness, contingency, 
and gratuitousness is here an essential component of happiness. It is just 
in this externality, in this innocent, unburdened, harmonious 
conjunction of the individual with something in the world, that pleasure 
consists. In the historical situation of individuals up to the present, it is 
not what reason has achieved nor what the soul experiences that can be 
called happiness (for these are necessarily tainted with unhappiness). To 
the contrary, only ‘externalized’ pleasure, i.e. sensuality, can be called 
happiness. In reified social relationships, sensuality, and not reason, is 
the ‘organ’ of happiness. 
In the antithesis of reason and sensuality (or sensuousness), as it has 
been worked out in the development of philosophy, sensuality has 
increasingly acquired the character of a lower, baser human faculty, a 
realm lying on this side of true and false and of correct and incorrect, a 
region of dull, undiscriminating instincts. Only in epistemology has the 
connection between sensuousness and truth been preserved. Here the 
decisive aspect of sensuality has been retained: receptivity that is open 
and that opens itself (to experience). This quality contradicts sensuality’s 
allegedly dull instinctual character. Precisely through this receptivity, this 
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open abandon to objects (men and things), sensuality can become a 
source of happiness. For in it, in complete immediacy, the individual’s 
isolation is overcome. Objects can occur to him here without their 
essential mediation through the social life process and, consequently, 
without their unhappy side becoming constitutive of pleasure. In the 
process of knowledge, in reason, quite the reverse holds. Here the 
individual’s spontaneity necessarily comes up against the object as 
against something foreign. Reason must overcome the latter quality and 
comprehend the object in its essence, not only as it is presented and 
appears but as it has become. The method of reason has always been 
held to be the way of attaining clarity about the origin and principle of 
beings. This method implicitly referred to history. To be sure, history 
was understood not as real history but only transcendentally. 
Nevertheless, that process of comprehension worthy of the title of 
reason absorbed enough of the mutability, the insecurity, the conflicts, 
and suffering of reality to make the application of the term ‘pleasure’ 
appear false in this realm. When Plato and Aristotle connected reason 
with pleasure, they did not establish reason as one of (or the best of) the 
individual pleasures in the sense of the hedonists. Rather, reason 
appears as the highest human potentiality and therefore, necessarily, as 
the highest human pleasure. Here, in the fight against hedonism, the 
concept of pleasure is taken out of the sphere to which the hedonists 
had relegated it and held up in opposition to this entire sphere. 
The situation is different when, as in the case of Epicurus, reason is 
made a pleasure or pleasure is made reasonable within hedonism itself. 
This gives rise to that ideal of the satisfied sage in which both pleasure 
as well as reason have lost their meaning. The sage, then, would be the 
person whose reason and whose pleasure never go too far. They never 
are followed through to the end because, if they were, they would come 
upon knowledge that negates enjoyment. The sage’s reason would be so 
limited from the start that it would only be occupied with the 
calculation of risks and with the psychic technique of extracting the best 
from everything. Such reason has abdicated its claim to truth. It appears 
only as subjective cunning and private expertise, calmly acquiescing in 
the persistence of general unreason and enjoying not so much what is 
allotted or occurs to it as itself. 
Hedonism embodies a correct judgment about society. That the 
receptivity of sensuality and not the spontaneity of reason is the source 
of happiness results from antagonistic work relations. They are the real 
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form of the attained level of human reason. It is in them that the extent 
of possible freedom and possible happiness is decided. If this form is 
one in which the productive forces are disposed of in the interest of the 
smallest social groups, in which the majority of men are separated from 
the means of production, and in which labor is performed not in 
accordance with the capacities and needs of individuals but according to 
the requirements of the process of profitable production, then 
happiness cannot be general within it. Happiness is restricted to the 
sphere of consumption. Radical hedonism was formulated in the ancient 
world and draws a moral conclusion from the slave economy. Labor 
and happiness are essentially separated. They belong to different modes 
of existence. Some men are slaves in their essence, others are free men. 
In the modern epoch the principle of labor has become general. 
Everyone is supposed to work and everyone is supposed to be rewarded 
in accordance with his work. But since the distribution of social labor 
proceeds according to the opaque necessity of the capitalist law of 
value, no rational relation is established between production and 
consumption, between labor and enjoyment. Gratification occurs as a 
contingency that is to be accepted. Reason rules only behind the backs 
of individuals in the reproduction of the whole that takes place despite 
anarchy. For the individual in pursuit of his own interests, reason’s role 
is at most a personal calculation in choosing among given possibilities. 
And it is in this atrophied form that reason depreciated to the idea of 
the sage. If reason cannot be effective in the process of production as 
free communal decision about the state of human existence (within 
specific historical and natural conditions), then it can certainly not be 
effective in the process of consumption. 
The restriction of happiness to the sphere of consumption, which 
appears separated from the process of production, stabilizes the 
particularity and the subjectivity of happiness in a society in which 
rational unity of the process of production and consumption, of labor 
and enjoyment, has not been brought about. The rejection by idealistic 
ethics of hedonism just because of the latter’s essential particularity and 
subjectivity is founded upon a justified criticism: Does not happiness, 
with its immanent demand for increase and permanence, require that, 
within happiness itself, the isolation of individuals, the reification of 
human relations, and the contingency of gratification be done away 
with? Must not happiness become compatible with truth? On the other 
hand, none other than isolation, reification, and contingency have been 
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the dimensions of happiness in previous society. Hedonism, therefore, 
has been right precisely in its falsehood insofar as it has preserved the 
demand for happiness against every idealization of unhappiness. The 
truth of hedonism would be its abolition by and preservation in a new 
principle of social organization, not in a different philosophical 
principle. 
Philosophy has attempted in various ways to save the objectivity of 
happiness and to comprehend it under the category of truth and 
universality. Such attempts are to be found in ancient eudaemonism, in 
the Catholic philosophy of the Middle Ages, in humanism, and in the 
French Enlightenment. If inquiry into the possible objectivity of 
happiness is not extended to the structure of the social organization of 
humanity, its result is bound to run aground on social contradictions. 
Inasmuch, however, as the philosophical critique at least refers 
decisively to the historical problem at hand as a task of historical 
practice, we shall discuss in what follows the first and most important 
controversy with hedonism. 
Plato’s critique of hedonism (on two different levels in the Gorgias 
and Philebus) worked out for the first time the concept of true and false 
wants and true and false pleasure. Here truth and falsehood are 
categories that are supposed to be applicable to every individual 
pleasure. The critique takes its departure from the essential conjunction 
of pleasure and pain. Every pleasure is connected with pain, since 
pleasure is the removal and fulfillment of a want (lack, privation) that as 
such is felt as painful. Pleasure, therefore, cannot be ‘the good’ or 
happiness, because it contains its own opposite: unless it were possible 
to find an ‘unmixed’ pleasure, one essentially separated from pain. In 
the Philebus (51b ff.) what remains as unmixed, true pleasure is in the last 
analysis only pleasure in lines, sounds, and colors that are ‘beautiful in 
themselves’, in other words, enjoyment released from all painful desire 
and restricted to inorganic objects. This enjoyment is obviously too 
empty to be happiness. Designating inorganic entities as the object of 
pure pleasure shows decisively that in the given form of existential 
relations true pleasure is not only separated from the soul, which, as the 
seat of desire and longing, is necessarily also the source of pain, but is 
also separated from all essential personal relationships. Unmixed 
pleasure is to be had only in those things which are most removed from 
the social life process. The receptivity of open abandonment to the 
object of enjoyment, which Plato recognizes as the precondition of 
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pleasure, remains only in complete externality, in which all essential 
relations between man and man are silenced. Happiness is thus situated 
at the antipode of internalization and inwardness. 
Plato’s earlier solution of the problem of true pleasure takes another 
direction. In the Gorgias he proceeds directly to the question of the 
social order within which the individual is to fulfill himself. This order 
itself as the highest norm against which individual pleasures are to be 
measured is not a subject of discussion; it is accepted in its given form. 
Bad wants and bad pleasures are those which destroy the just order of 
the soul and which prevent the individual from attaining his true 
potentialities. It is the community, however, within which individuals 
live and through which alone “the heavens and the earth, gods and men 
are bound together” (508a) that decides these potentialities and thus the 
truth and falsehood of wants and pleasures. The concept of the order of 
the soul turns into that of the order of the community and the concept 
of the individually ‘just’ into that of justice (504). Whether the 
individuals enjoy the right pleasure depends on the right ordering of the 
polis. The generality of happiness is posed as a problem. Only those 
wants may be satisfied which make the individual a good citizen. They 
are true wants, and the pleasure associated with their gratification is true 
pleasure. The others are not to be fulfilled. It is the task of the 
statesman to look after the general interest and to bring the satisfaction 
of particular interests into accord with it. The possibility of such 
harmony, the authentic social question, is not pursued further in the 
Gorgias (although the critique of major Greek statesmen at least suggests 
social criticism). 
Inasmuch as true and false pleasure are contraposed, happiness is 
subjected to the criterion of truth. If human existence is to come in 
pleasure to its highest fulfillment, to felicity, then not every sensation of 
pleasure can in itself be happiness. Plato’s critique of hedonism traces 
the givens of wants and of pleasures back to the individuals who ‘have’ 
them. This conceptual regress is made necessary by the fact that both 
the sick and the healthy, the good and the bad, the crazy and the normal 
feel pleasure in like manner (at least with respect to the fact of 
pleasure).12 What is common to all of these cannot be the highest. There 
must be a truth of happiness on the basis of which the happiness of the 
individual can be judged. Pleasure must be susceptible to distinction 
according to truth and falsehood and to justice and injustice if (in case 
pleasure is happiness) the happiness of men is not to be inseparably 
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associated with unhappiness. The basis of such a distinction, however, 
cannot lie in the individual sensation of pleasure as such, for both the 
sick and the healthy and the bad and the good feel real pleasure. 
Nevertheless, just as an idea can be false even though it be a real idea, so 
too a pleasure can be false without the reality of the sensation of 
pleasure being denied (Philebus 36). This is more than a mere analogy. 
Here a cognitive function in the strictest sense is attributed to pleasure, 
for it reveals beings as objects of enjoyment. On the basis of its 
‘intentional’ character, pleasure is thus made accessible to the question 
of truth. A pleasure is untrue when the object that it intends is not ‘in 
itself’ pleasurable (according to the exposition of the Philebus, when it 
can only be encountered mixed with pain). But the question of truth 
does not regard only the object but also the subject of pleasure. This is 
made possible through Plato’s interpretation of pleasure as belonging 
not merely to sensuousness (aesthesis) alone but also to the psyche 
(Philebus 33f.). Psychic forces (such as desire, expectation, memory) are 
necessary for every sensation of pleasure, so that in pleasure the whole 
man is involved. With respect to the latter the question of truth arrives 
at the same point that had been reached in the Gorgias: that ‘good’ men 
have true pleasure and ‘bad’ men have false pleasure (Philebus 40b, c). 
The essential connection of the good of man with the truth of 
pleasure at which Plato’s discussion of hedonism arrives makes of 
pleasure a moral problem. For it is the concrete form of the 
‘community’ that ultimately decides on this connection. Pleasure is 
subject to the claim of society and enters the realm of duty – duty to 
oneself and to others. The truth of the particular interest and its 
gratification is determined by the truth of the general interest. The 
agreement of the two is not immediate. Rather, it is mediated through 
the subjection of the particular to the requirements of generality. Within 
a society that requires morality (as an objective, general code of ethics 
opposed to the subjective wants and interests of individuals) for its 
existence, an amoral attitude is intolerable, for the latter destroys the 
bases of communal order. The amoral man violates the law of a society 
that, even if in a bad form, guarantees the preservation of social life. He 
does so, furthermore, without linking himself to a better, true society. 
For he remains in the given, ‘corrupted’ structure of instincts and wants. 
Morality is the expression of the antagonism between the particular and 
the general interest. It is the code of those demands which are a matter 
of life and death for the society’s self-preservation.13 Insofar as 
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particular interests are not really incorporated into and fulfilled in the 
society, such demands appear to the individual as commands coming 
from outside himself. If left to itself, pleasure as the immediate 
gratification of the merely particular interest must come into conflict 
with the interest of the hypostatized social community. In contrast to 
the isolated individual, society represents what is historically right. It 
demands the repression of all pleasure that violates the decisive social 
taboo. It forbids the satisfaction of those wants which would shatter the 
foundations of the established order. 
The moralization of pleasure is called for by the existence of 
antagonistic society. It is the historical form in which this society unites 
the satisfaction of particular wants and instincts with the general 
interest, and it has had a progressive function in the development of the 
social labor process.14 The hedonistic protest of the individual who is 
isolated in his particular interest is amoral. The amoral, beyond-good-
and-evil attitude can be progressive only within a historical practice that 
leads beyond the already attained form of this process and fights for a 
new, true community against the established one. Only then does this 
attitude represent more than a merely particular interest. Isolated from 
the historical struggle for a better organization of the conditions of life, 
in which the individual has to engage himself in concrete social groups 
and tasks and thus gives up his amorality, amoral thought and action 
can, of course, escape from morality (if its subject is economically 
independent enough). But the ruling social law maintains its power over 
the amoral individual both in his wants and in the objects of their 
satisfaction. They originated under this law, and only the latter’s 
transformation could overcome morality. Amoral rebellion, however, 
stops short of this decisive sphere. It wants to avoid morality as well as 
its social basis within the given order. Dodging the latter’s 
contradictions, this amoral rebellion really remains beyond good and 
evil. It puts itself beyond the bounds of even that morality which links 
the established order with a more rational and happy society. 
The attempt to save the objectivity of happiness, expressed for the 
first time in Plato’s critique of hedonism, takes two directions in the 
advance toward an objective formulation of the concept of happiness. 
On the one hand, the gratification of the individual, his best possible 
existence, is measured against the ‘essence of man’ in such a way that 
the highest potentialities open to man in his historical situation take 
precedence in development and gratification over all others in which 
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man is not free but rather dependent on what is ‘external’. On the other 
hand, the essence of man can develop only within society, whose actual 
organization participates in determining the realization of those 
potentialities and therefore also determines happiness. In Platonic and 
Aristotelian ethics both aspects, the personal and the social, are still 
joined. In the ethics of the modern period, in the form in which they 
have become prevalent since the Reformation, society is to a great 
extent relieved of responsibility for human potentialities. The latter are 
supposed to subsist exclusively in the individual himself, in his 
autonomy. The unconditioned freedom of the person becomes the 
measure of the ‘highest good’. Since, however, this freedom is only 
abstract in the real world and coexists with social unfreedom and 
unhappiness, it becomes, in idealist ethics, programmatically separated 
from happiness. The latter increasingly takes on the character of 
irrational, bodily gratification, of mere enjoyment and therefore of 
inferiority: 
… reason can never be persuaded that the existence of a man who 
merely lives for enjoyment … has a worth in itself … Only through 
what he does without reference to enjoyment, in full freedom and 
independently of what nature can procure for him passively, does he 
give an absolute worth to his being, as the existence of a person; and 
happiness, with the whole abundance of its pleasures, is far from being 
an unconditioned good.15 
The duress of the disciplining process of modern society comes to 
expression: the happiness of the individual is at best a worthless 
accident of his life. In the determination of the highest good, happiness 
is completely subordinated to virtue. Happiness may be only the 
‘morally conditioned although necessary consequence’ of morality. A 
‘necessary connection’ between the ethics of conviction and happiness 
becomes possible only through the assumption of a “purely intellectual 
determining principle” of human action and of an “intelligible author of 
nature”.16 The harmony of virtue and happiness belongs to those 
beautiful relations for whose realization the world beyond is necessary. 
The unconditional manner, however, in which German idealism 
adhered to the principle of freedom as the condition of the highest 
good serves to emphasize more than ever the inner connection between 
happiness and freedom. The concrete form of human freedom 
determines the form of human happiness. Comprehension of the 
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connection between happiness and freedom was already expressed in 
the ancient critique of hedonism. Happiness, as the fulfillment of all 
potentialities of the individual, presupposes freedom: at root, it is 
freedom. Conceptual analysis reveals them to be ultimately identical. 
Because freedom does not reign in the material conditions of the 
external world, because there happiness and contingency are almost 
identical, and because on the other hand the individual’s freedom was 
maintained as a condition of the ‘highest good’, felicity could not be 
made to reside in the external world. This motive is at work in Platonic 
and Aristotelian ethics. In the moral critique of the bourgeois period, 
too, hedonism is rejected from the standpoint of the concept of 
Freedom. Kant rejected the principle of pleasure as something merely 
contingent which contradicted the autonomy of the person. And Fichte 
called pleasure essentially ‘involuntary’ since it presupposes an 
agreement of the ‘external world’ with the instincts and wants of the 
subject, whose realization does not fall within the range of the subject’s 
freedom. In the happiness of pleasure, the individual is thus ‘alienated 
from himself’.17 This position presupposes that the subject’s unfreedom 
in relation to the good things of the external world cannot be abolished 
and that the free person is therefore necessarily debased if his happiness 
is located in this relation. For the ancient critique the highest good was 
still supposed really to be the highest happiness. But now factual 
unfreedom is ontologized, and both freedom and happiness are so 
internalized that in the process happiness is excluded. The attempt to 
include happiness in the autonomous development of the person is 
abandoned, and a virtue is made out of the abstract freedom that 
accompanies social unfreedom. 
The gratification of instincts and wants falls into ill repute; in any 
case, it lies beneath the human sphere with which philosophy is to 
concern itself. Moral commands can be followed without one’s wants 
having been fulfilled to more than the physiological minimum; with this 
proposition, to be sure, a decisive achievement of modern society 
receives philosophical recognition. Man educated to internalization will 
not be easily induced, even under extreme wretchedness and injustice, 
to struggle against the established order. 
In the moral concept of the highest good an untruth of hedonism is 
supposed to be eliminated: the mere subjectivity of happiness. 
Happiness remains an ‘element’ of the highest good, but it stays subject 
to the universality of the moral law. This law is a law of reason: 
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happiness is linked to knowledge and taken out of the dimension of 
mere feeling. Real happiness presupposes knowledge of the truth: that 
men know what they can attain as the highest potential of their 
existence, that they know their true interest. Individuals can feel happy 
and yet not be happy, because they do not even know real happiness. 
How, though, is one to judge of the reality of happiness? What is the 
criterion of its truth? In the ancient critique of hedonism this question 
became the political question of the right organization of the polis. The 
Christian ethics of the Middle Ages saw the answer to it in divine 
justice. The rigoristic morality of the bourgeois period made freedom 
the criterion of truth. But this was defined as the abstract freedom of 
the rational being and, in contrast to it, happiness remained external and 
contingent. The moral interpretation of happiness, its subjection to a 
universal law of reason, tolerated both the essential isolation of the 
autonomous person and his actual limitation. 
Critical theory18 comes to the question of the truth and universality 
of happiness in the elucidation of the concepts with which it seeks to 
determine the rational form of society. One of these determinations 
circumscribing the association of free men contains the explicit demand 
that each individual share in the social product according to his needs. 
With the comprehensive development of individuals and of the 
productive forces, society can inscribe on its banner, ‘From each 
according to his abilities, to each according to his needs’. Here 
reappears the old hedonistic definition which seeks happiness in the 
comprehensive gratification of needs and wants. The needs and wants 
to be gratified should become the regulating principle of the labor 
process. But the wants of liberated men and the enjoyment of their 
satisfaction will have a different form from wants and satisfaction in a 
state of unfreedom, even if they are physiologically the same. In a social 
organization that opposes atomized individuals to one another in classes 
and leaves their particular freedom to the mechanism of an uncontrolled 
economic system, unfreedom is already operative in the needs and 
wants themselves: how much more so in enjoyment. The way want and 
enjoyment appear here, they do not even require general freedom. The 
development of the productive forces, the growing domination of 
nature, the extension and refinement of the production of commodities, 
money, and universal reification have created, along with new needs, 
new possibilities for enjoyment. But these given possibilities for 
enjoyment confront men who objectively, due to their economic status, 
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as well as subjectively, due to their education and disciplining, are largely 
incapable of enjoyment. From the discrepancy between what exist as 
objects of possible enjoyment and the way in which these objects are 
understood, taken, and used arises the question of the truth of the 
condition of happiness in this society. Acts intending enjoyment do not 
achieve the fulfillment of their own intention; even when they fulfill 
themselves, they remain untrue. 
Enjoyment is an attitude or mode of conduct toward things and 
human beings. The former, unless they have been made generally 
available by nature or by social regulation, are commodities accessible to 
corresponding purchasing power. For the great majority of humanity, 
only the very cheapest portion of these commodities is available. They 
become objects of enjoyment as commodities, and their origin is 
preserved within them – even enjoyment has a class character. The 
cheap is not as good as the dear. Precisely insofar as they lie outside the 
labor process, relations between men are essentially relations between 
members of the same class. For the majority, one’s partner in pleasure 
will also be one’s partner in the poverty of the same class. These 
conditions of life are a paltry showplace for happiness. The continual 
pressure under which the great masses must be kept for the 
reproduction of this society has only been augmented by the 
monopolistic accumulation of wealth. Any growth of enjoyment would 
endanger necessary discipline and make difficult the punctual and 
reliable coordination of the masses who keep the apparatus of the whole 
in operation. The economic regulation of enjoyment is supplemented by 
the police and the administration of justice. Pleasure wants essentially its 
own augmentation and refinement. The unfolding of the personality 
must not be merely spiritual. Industrial society has differentiated and 
intensified the objective world in such a manner that only an extremely 
differentiated and intensified sensuality can respond adequately to it. 
Modern technology contains all the means necessary to extract from 
things and bodies their mobility, beauty, and softness in order to bring 
them closer and make them available. Both the wants corresponding to 
these potentialities and the sensual organs through which they can be 
assimilated have been developed. What man can perceive, feel, and do 
in the midst of advanced civilization corresponds to the newly opened-
up wealth of the world. But only those groups with the greatest 
purchasing power can take advantage of the expanded capacities and 
their gratification. The development of sensuality is only one part of the 
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development of the productive forces: the need to fetter them is rooted 
in the antagonistic social system within which this development has 
taken place. There are many ways in which the ruled strata can be 
educated to diversion and substitute gratification. Here sports and a 
wide variety of permitted popular entertainment fulfill their historical 
function. In authoritarian states sadistic terror against enemies of the 
regime has found unforeseen modes of organized discharge. At the 
movies the common man can regularly participate in the glamour of the 
world of the stars and yet be aware at the same time that it is only a film 
and that there, too, there is splendor, bitterness, trouble, guilt, 
atonement, and the triumph of the good. The labor process, in which 
the laborer’s organs atrophy and are coarsened, guarantees that the 
sensuousness of the lower strata does not develop beyond the 
technically necessary minimum. What is allowed beyond this as 
immediate enjoyment is circumscribed by the penal code. 
It is not only the masses, however, in whom enjoyment cannot 
achieve the fulfillment of all subjective and objective potentialities, as it 
intends. Where the prevailing social relationship is the relation of men 
to one another as owners of commodities and where the value of every 
commodity is determined by the abstract labor time applied to it, 
enjoyment has no value in itself. For all that it is in this society, it is in 
separation from labor. In enjoyment the individual expends no labor 
power, nor does he reproduce labor power. He behaves as and 
acknowledges himself to be a private person. When value, the standard 
of the equity of exchange, is created only by abstract labor, then 
pleasure may not be a value. For if it were, social justice would be called 
into question. Indeed, it would reveal itself as striking injustice. The 
legitimation of pleasure as a value would, in fact, invert what is ‘all the 
news that’s fit to print’. 
For every modern man the value of a thing is the value of the labor that 
was necessary to produce it. Value is thus coated with the laborer’s 
sweat, which pastes up the flaming sword that separates culture from 
paradise. It is dangerous to associate conceptually pleasure and pain 
with value. For the question then arises whether those who produce 
values have more pleasure or more pain. And one could come upon the 
thought that value may be in inverse proportion to pleasure.19 
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The danger of this conceptual association was recognized as early as at 
the origins of bourgeois society. The worthlessness of mere pleasure 
was inculcated by all means into the consciousness of individuals. 
Nowhere does the connection between the devaluation of 
enjoyment and its social justification manifest itself as clearly as in the 
interpretation of sexual pleasure. The latter – pragmatically or morally – 
is rationalized and appears as a mere means to an end lying outside of 
itself, in the service of a smooth subordination of the individual to the 
established form of the labor process. As a hygienic value sexual 
pleasure is supposed to contribute to physical and mental health, which 
promotes the normal functioning of man within the given order. 
According to Spinoza, ‘sensual pleasure’ may only ‘be sought as means’, 
and above all as hygienic means. We may “indulge ourselves with 
pleasures only insofar as they are necessary for preserving health”.20 
Leibniz declares that “voluptuousness of the senses must be used, 
according to the rules of reason, as a nourishment, medication, or 
tonic”.21 Fichte brings sexuality into immediate conjunction with the 
renovation of the social labor process: 
The real station, the honor and worth of the human being, and quite 
particularly of man in his morally natural existence, consists without 
doubt in his capacity as original progenitor to produce out of himself 
new men, new commanders of nature: beyond his earthly existence and 
for all eternity to establish new masters of nature…. It would 
consequently be absolute dishonor, the abnegation of authentic human 
and manly honor, if the capacity bestowed for the exercise of that 
privilege were made into a means of sensual pleasure. What is above all 
of nature and intended to reproduce dominion over her would become 
secondary and subject to one of nature’s urges: pleasure…. [This 
absolute worthlessness is] lewdness – the use of the faculty of 
generation for mere pleasure, without intending its purpose or 
consciously willing it.22 
Only when sexual relations are placed under the express purpose of the 
production of new labor power for the process of the social domination 
of nature is their enjoyment worthy of a human being and sanctioned. 
Later representatives of idealist ethics turned away from such frankness. 
Hermann Cohen considers the mere procreation of men an ‘animalistic’ 
process and demands the purification of sexual pleasure by means of a 
truly ethical purpose. Only in love based on fidelity is sexual intercourse 
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raised to the sphere of morality, making ‘sexual love’ into a 
“characteristic of the pure will to the formation of ethical self-
consciousness”.23 In the authoritarian phase of the bourgeois order, the 
attachment of love to the form of marriage comes into open 
contradiction to the state’s need of a strong military and economic 
reserve army. The ‘experience of love’ is ‘not unconditionally bound to 
marriage’. But love should be “the presupposition and condition of 
marriage and of childbearing in marriage”. Not the begetting of children 
as such, but the procreation of industrious and useful children is 
decisive. “Racial hygiene, social anthropology, and other medical-
anthropological disciplines [give consideration] in a very meritorious 
way to valuable aspects even of human procreation.”24 
The unpurified, unrationalized release of sexual relationships would 
be the strongest release of enjoyment as such and the total devaluation 
of labor for its own sake. No human being could tolerate the tension 
between labor as valuable in itself and the freedom of enjoyment. The 
dreariness and injustice of work conditions would penetrate explosively 
the consciousness of individuals and make impossible their peaceful 
subordination to the social system of the bourgeois world. 
The function of labor within this society determines its attitude with 
respect to enjoyment. The latter may not be meaningful in itself or 
remain unrationalized. Instead it must receive its value from elsewhere. 
“Pleasure … and pain are withdrawn from any justification or 
motivation by the will to labor; rather, they provide this will with the 
stimulus to labor”, which would then be subsumed under the principle 
of the satisfaction of wants. “Hedonism is the limit of a self-justification 
of the will to labor”25 and contradicts the basic interest of the 
established order. The internalization and spiritualization by means of 
which enjoyment is refined to the level of culture, which helps 
reproduce the whole and thus proves its social value, is subject to this 
conviction. For the immediate producer the restriction of enjoyment 
operates immediately, without any moral mediation, through the 
working day, which leaves only a brief period of ‘leisure time’ for 
enjoyment and puts it in the service of relaxation and the recreation of 
energy or labor power. The usufructuaries of the labor process are 
affected by the same valuation. That their enjoyment consists of doing 
and having what actually produces no value, creates a kind of social guilt 
feeling that leads to a rationalization of enjoyment. As representation, 
relaxation, and display of the splendor of those who are on top and bear 
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the greatest responsibility, this enjoyment is discharged almost as a 
burden or duty. 
The creation of social guilt feeling is a decisive achievement of 
education. The prevailing law of value is mirrored in the continually 
renewed conviction that everyone, left completely to himself, must earn 
a living in the general competitive struggle, if only in order to be 
enabled to continue to earn it in the future, and that everyone is 
rewarded in proportion to the labor power he has expended. Happiness, 
however, cannot be earned in this fashion. The goal of labor is not 
supposed to be happiness, and its remuneration is not enjoyment but 
profit or wages, i.e. the possibility of working more in the future. For 
the perpetuation of this labor process, those instincts and wants which 
could undermine the normal relation of labor and enjoyment (as the 
extent of the absence of labor) and the institutions that secure it (such 
as the family or marriage) must be diverted or repressed. This diversion 
and repression is not always linked to cultural progress. Many instincts 
and wants first become false and destructive due to the false forms into 
which their satisfaction is channeled, while the attained level of 
objective development would permit their true gratification – true 
because they could fulfill themselves in their original intention of 
‘unmixed’ pleasure. Such are the repressed cruelty that leads to sadistic 
terror and the repressed self-abandon that leads to masochistic 
subjection. In their authentic intention as forms of the sexual instinct 
they can result in augmented pleasure not only for the subject but for 
the object as well. They are then no longer connected with 
destruction.26 But precisely the increased differentiation of pleasure is 
intolerable in a society that requires such wants to be gratified in a 
repressed form. Augmented pleasure would represent immediately 
increased liberation of the individual, for it would demand freedom in 
the choice of object, in the knowledge and in the realization of his 
potentialities, and freedom of time and of place. All these demands 
violate the law of life of the established society. The taboo on pleasure 
has been most stubbornly maintained due to the innermost connection 
of happiness and freedom. This taboo has extended far into the ranks of 
the historical opposition to the given order, distorting the problem and 
its solutions.27 
The designation of happiness as the condition of the comprehensive 
gratification of the individual’s needs and wants is abstract and incorrect 
as long as it accepts needs and wants as ultimate data in their present 
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form. For as such they are beyond neither good and evil nor true and 
false. As historical facts they are subject to questioning as to their ‘right’: 
Are they of such a sort that their gratification can fulfill the subjective 
and objective potentialities of individuals? For many forms of want 
characteristic of the prevailing human condition, this question would 
have to be answered in the negative in view of the already attained stage 
of social development. For the latter makes possible a truer happiness 
than that which men attain for themselves today. Pleasure in the 
abasement of another as well as self-abasement under a stronger will, 
pleasure in the manifold surrogates for sexuality, in meaningless 
sacrifices, in the heroism of war are false pleasures because the drives 
and needs that fulfill themselves in them make men less free, blinder, 
and more wretched than they have to be. They are the drives and needs 
of individuals who were raised in an antagonistic society. To the extent 
to which they do not completely disappear in a new form of social 
organization, modes of their gratification are conceivable in which the 
most extreme potentialities of men can really unfold happiness. This 
liberation of potentialities is a matter of social practice. What men, with 
their developed sensuous and psychic organs and the wealth created by 
their work, can undertake to attain the highest measure of happiness 
rests with this practice. Understood in this way, happiness can no longer 
or in any way be merely subjective: it enters the realm of men’s 
communal thought and action. 
Where society utilizes the developed productive forces only in 
fettered form, it is not just the gratifications but the very wants 
themselves that are falsified. Insofar as they extend beyond the 
subsistence minimum, they come to expression only in proportion to 
their effective demand. Class situation, especially the situation of the 
individual in the labor process, is active in them, for this situation has 
formed the (bodily and spiritual) organs and capacities of men and the 
horizon of their demands. Since these appear as wants only in their 
stunted form, with all their repressions, renunciations, adaptations, and 
rationalizations, they can normally be satisfied within the given social 
framework. Because they are themselves already unfree, the false 
happiness of their fulfillment is possible in unfreedom. 
In critical theory, the concept of happiness has been freed from any 
ties with bourgeois conformism and relativism. Instead, it has become a 
part of general, objective truth, valid for all individuals insofar as all 
their interests are preserved in it. Only in view of the historical 
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possibility of general freedom is it meaningful to designate as untrue 
even actual, really perceived happiness in the previous and present 
conditions of existence. It is the individual’s interest that expresses itself 
in his wants, and their gratification corresponds to this interest. That 
there is any happiness at all in a society governed by blind laws is a 
blessing. Through this happiness, the individual in this society can feel 
secure and protected from ultimate desperation. Rigoristic morality sins 
against the cheerless form in which humanity has survived. All 
hedonism is right in opposing it. Only today, at the highest stage of 
development of the established order, when the objective forces making 
for a higher order of humanity have become mature, and only in 
connection with the theory and practice linked to such a transformation, 
may the critique of the totality of the established order also take as its 
object the happiness that this order provides. It appears that individuals 
raised to be integrated into the antagonistic labor process cannot be 
judges of their own happiness. They have been prevented from 
knowing their true interest. Thus it is possible for them to designate 
their condition as happy and, without external compulsion, embrace the 
system that oppresses them. The results of modern plebiscites prove 
that men separated from possible truth can he brought to vote against 
themselves. As long as individuals see their interest only as getting along 
within the given order, such plebiscites pose no problems for the 
authoritarian apparatus. Terror merely supplements the delusions of the 
governed. Appeal to interest is untrue. 
In view of the possibility of a happier real state of humanity the 
interest of the individual is no longer an ultimate datum. There are true 
and false interests even with regard to the individual. His factual, 
immediate interest is not in itself his true interest. It is not as though the 
true interest were that which demanded, on the grounds of lesser risk 
and greater chance of enjoyment, the sacrifice of an immediate interest. 
Such calculation of happiness stays within the general framework of 
false interest and can at best facilitate the choice of the better false 
happiness. It cannot be in the true interest of the individual to want his 
own and others’ vitiation – not even in the true interest of those whose 
power can only be maintained at the cost of such vitiation. At the 
attained level of development power can no longer enjoy the world 
which it dominates. For if it were to cease working and continually 
renewing the bloody and destructive process of its mere reproduction, it 
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would be instantly lost. Even the powers that be have something to 
gain. 
That the true interest of individuals is the interest of freedom, that 
true individual freedom can coexist with real general freedom and, 
indeed, is possible only in conjunction with it, that happiness ultimately 
consists in freedom – these are not propositions of philosophical 
anthropology about the nature of man but descriptions of a historical 
situation which humanity has achieved for itself in the struggle with 
nature. The individuals whose happiness is at stake in making good use 
of this situation have grown up in the school of capitalism. To the high 
intensification and differentiation of their abilities and of their world 
corresponds the social shackling of this development. Insofar as 
unfreedom is already present in wants and not just in their gratification, 
they must be the first to be liberated – not through an act of education 
or of the moral renewal of man but through an economic and political 
process encompassing the disposal over the means of production by the 
community, the reorientation of the productive process toward the 
needs and wants of the whole society, the shortening of the working 
day, and the active participation of the individuals in the administration 
of the whole. When all present subjective and objective potentialities of 
development have been unbound, the needs and wants themselves will 
change. Those based on the social compulsion of repression, on 
injustice, and on filth and poverty would necessarily disappear. There 
may still be the sick, the insane, and the criminal. The realm of necessity 
persists; struggle with nature and even among men continues. Thus the 
reproduction of the whole will continue to be associated with privations 
for the individual. Particular interest will not coincide immediately with 
true interest. The difference between particular and true interest, 
nevertheless, is something other than the difference between particular 
interest and a hypostatized general interest that suppresses the 
individuals. In his relation to an authentic general interest, the individual 
would relate to truth; the demands and decisions of the whole would 
then preserve the individual interest and eventually promote his 
happiness. If the true interest, furthermore, must be represented by a 
general law forbidding specific wants and gratifications, such a law will 
no longer be a front for the particular interest of groups that maintain 
their power against the general interest through usurpation. Rather, it 
will express the rational decision of free individuals. Having come of 
age, men themselves will have to confront and deal with their wants. 
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Their responsibility will be infinitely greater, because they will no longer 
have the false pleasure of masochistic security in the strong protection 
of a heteronomous power. The internal, real union of duty and 
happiness (and not a union effected in the world beyond), which idealist 
ethics had doubted, is possible only in freedom. This was Kant’s 
intention when he founded the concept of duty on the autonomy of the 
person. Through its limitation to the freedom of the pure will, 
autonomy limits itself in favor of a social order that it could only admit 
in an abstract form. 
If individuals, having attained majority, reject particular wants or a 
particular pleasure as bad, this would occur on the basis of the 
autonomous recognition of their true interest: the preservation of 
general freedom. Consequently it would occur in the interest of 
happiness itself, which can only exist in general freedom as the 
fulfillment of all developed potentialities. It was the ancient desideratum 
of hedonism to join in thought both happiness and truth. The problem 
was insoluble. For as long as an anarchic, unfree society determined the 
truth, the latter could only manifest itself either in the particular interest 
of the isolated individual or in the necessities of the hypostatized 
general interest, the society. In the first case its form (generality) was 
lost; in the second, its content (particularity). The truth to which the 
liberated individual relates in happiness is both general and particular. 
The subject is no longer isolated in its interest against others. His life 
can be happy beyond the contingency of the moment, because his 
conditions of existence are no longer determined by a labor process 
which creates wealth only through the perpetuation of poverty and 
privation. Instead they are regulated through the rational self-
administration of the whole in which the subject participates actively. 
The individual can relate to others as equals and to the world as his 
world, no longer alienated from him. Mutual understanding will no 
longer be permeated by unhappiness, since insight and passion will no 
longer come into conflict with a reified form of human relationship. 
General happiness presupposes knowledge of the true interest: that 
the social life-process be administered in a manner which brings into 
harmony the freedom of individuals and the preservation of the whole 
on the basis of given objective historical and natural conditions. With 
the development of social antagonisms the connection of happiness 
with knowledge was obscured. The abstract reason of isolated 
individuals is certainly powerless over a happiness abandoned to 
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contingency. But this very social development has also brought forth 
the forces which can once again bring about that connection. For the 
immediate producers, isolating individuation has already been abolished 
extensively within unfreedom: the individual has no property to 
preserve that can only be enjoyed at the expense of others. His interest 
drives him not to competition or into interest groups based in turn 
upon competition but rather to militant solidarity. The first goal of 
struggle is only a particular social group’s interest in better, more 
humane conditions of life. But this particular interest cannot be pursued 
without bettering and making more humane the conditions of life of the 
whole and liberating the entire society. In the monopolistic phase of 
bourgeois society, when the preservation of the general interest on the 
part of the groups fighting for transformation is obvious enough, the 
efforts of the beneficiaries of the Establishment are directed toward 
splitting that solidarity. Bureaucratization, increase of wage differentials, 
and immediate corruption of the workers are intended to root 
contradictions even among these strata. Their true interest requires not 
piecemeal change but the reconstruction of the productive process. 
When this has been achieved, general reason can no longer outwit the 
particular interest behind the backs of the individuals. To the contrary, 
the particular interest becomes the active and cognitive force of the 
process through which generality, embodied in the community, is 
advanced. Only at this point in society is “the truth of particular 
satisfactions … the general satisfaction that, as happiness, the thinking 
will sets itself as goal”.28  
Hegel pointed out that general progress comes about in history only 
through particular interests, for only particular interest can stir the 
individual to the passion of historical struggle. “The particular interest 
of passion is therefore inseparable from the activity of the universal; for 
it is from the particular and determinate and from its negation, that the 
universal results.”29 When this inseparability rests on the cunning of 
reason, it entails the unhappiness of individuals. In the passion with 
which they pursue their particular interests, they wear themselves out 
and are destroyed. Hegel called it a ‘horrible comfort’ that “historical 
men have not been what is called happy”.30 If no higher form of 
historical reason is possible than the antagonistic organization of 
humanity, then this horror cannot be thought away. It is true, of course, 
that men intend not happiness but, in each case, specific ends whose 
fulfillment then brings happiness. In the specific goals which are aimed 
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at in solitary struggle for a rational society, happiness is no longer 
merely an attendant contingency. It is built into the very structure of the 
new order of the conditions of existence that have been demanded. 
Happiness ceases to be a mere subjective state of feeling when general 
concern for the potentialities of individuals is effective at the level of the 
liberated needs and wants of the subjects. 
For Hegel, then, the struggle for the higher generality, or form of 
society, of the future becomes in the present the cause of particular 
individuals and groups, and this constitutes the tragic situation of world-
historical persons. They attack social conditions in which – even if badly 
– the life of the whole reproduces itself. They fight against a concrete 
form of reason without empirical proof of the practicability of the 
future form which they represent. They offend against that which, 
within limits at least, has proven true. Their rationality necessarily 
operates in a particular, irrational, explosive form, and their critique of 
decadence and anarchy appears anarchic and destructive. Individuals 
who hold so fast to the Idea31 that it permeates their existence are 
unyielding and stubborn. Common sense cannot distinguish between 
them and criminals, and in fact in the given order they are criminals like 
Socrates in Athens.32 Universality and reason have become their own 
passion. The formalistic conformist, for whom one want is just as valid 
as another, knows of them as selfish characters who are dangerous. He 
sees how the critique of the appearance of freedom in the present and 
the knowledge of the future reality of freedom already constitute their 
happiness, because in them the blunt separation of here and there, today 
and tomorrow, the exclusive, defensive ego-feeling of bourgeois 
existence is overcome – but he cannot understand it. Whatever he may 
say, they are to him exalted, at best religious. For of themselves, thinks 
the conformist, people have only their own advantage in mind. Their 
paradoxical situation is apparent only to few. 
Just as the attainable form of happiness can only be realized through 
the particular interest of only those social strata whose liberation leads 
not to the domination of particular interests over the community but to 
the general liberation of humanity, the same holds for the correct 
knowledge required by this form. This interest requires its ideology as a 
veil over the structure of truth in order to justify itself as a general 
interest. This interest, by its very nature, implies thinking to the end all 
realizable potentialities (which in the bourgeois period found their social 
limit in the danger of a material transformation of the whole) and 
Negations 
148 
keeping to the goal of their realization. The loss of correct knowledge 
would entail the loss of happiness as well, for the compulsion and 
necessity of an uncontrollable situation would once again win its 
contingent power over men. Freedom of knowledge is a part of real 
freedom, which can only exist together with common decision and 
action on the basis of what is known to be true. The essential role of 
truth for the happiness of individuals makes the characterization of 
happiness as pleasure and enjoyment appear insufficient. When 
knowledge of truth is no longer linked to knowledge of guilt, poverty, 
and injustice, it is no longer forced to remain external to a happiness 
ceded to immediate, sensual relationships. Even the most personal 
human relations can be opened to happiness in a really guiltless 
knowledge. Perhaps they would thereby become, in fact, that free 
community in life of which idealist morality had expected the highest 
unfolding of individuality. Knowledge will no longer disturb pleasure. 
Perhaps it can even become pleasure, which the ancient idea of nous had 
dared to see as the highest determination of knowledge. The bogey of 
the unchained voluptuary who would abandon himself only to his 
sensual wants is rooted in the separation of intellectual from material 
productive forces and the separation of the labor process from the 
process of consumption. Overcoming this separation belongs to the 
preconditions of freedom. The development of material wants must go 
together with the development of psychic and mental wants. The 
organization of technology, science, and art changes with their changed 
utilization and changed content. When they are no longer under the 
compulsion of a system of production based on the unhappiness of the 
majority, and of the pressures of rationalization, internalization, and 
sublimation, then mind and spirit can only mean an augmentation of 
happiness. Hedonism is both abolished and preserved in critical theory 
and practice. If freedom prevails in the spiritual and mental side of life, 
i.e. in culture, and if culture is no longer subject to the compulsion of 
internalization, then it becomes meaningless to restrict happiness to 
sensual pleasure. 
The reality of happiness is the reality of freedom as the self-
determination of liberated humanity in its common struggle with nature. 
“The truth of particular satisfactions is the general [allgemeine] satisfaction 
that, as happiness, the thinking will sets itself as goal.” But this 
happiness is at first “generality of content only as representation, as 
abstraction, only as something that should be”. Its truth is “the universal 
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[allgemeine] determinacy of the will in itself, i.e. its own self-
determination: freedom”.33 For idealism, freedom was also reason: “the 
substance of” and “that alone which is true of spirit”.34 In their 
completed form both, happiness and reason, coincide. Hegel did not 
believe that the realization of this form by bringing about a new form of 
the social organization of humanity could become the task of historical 
practice. Under the title of the ‘ideal’, however, he represented 
happiness as a ‘stage of world development’ that is simultaneously one 
of reason and freedom: as the abolition of the antithesis, characteristic 
of the bourgeois stage of development, between individuals isolated in 
their particular interests, on the one hand, and the hypostatized general 
interest as the state that perpetuates itself through the sacrifice of 
individuals, on the other. 
In the ideal … particular individuality is supposed to remain precisely in 
undissolved harmony with the substantial; and insofar as the ideal 
partakes of the freedom and independence of subjectivity, to that extent 
the surrounding world of conditions and developmental structures may 
not possess any essential objectivity belonging to itself quite apart from 
the subjective and the individual. For the ideal individual should be self-
contained. The objective world should still be part of what is 
incontestably his and not move or develop by itself, detached from the 
individuality of subjects. Otherwise the subject becomes merely 
subordinate to a world that is complete in itself.35 
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Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of 
Max Weber 
Industrialization and capitalism become problematic in Max Weber’s 
work in two respects: as the historical fate of the West, and as the 
contemporary fate of the Germany created by Bismarck. As the fate of 
the West, they are the decisive realizations of that Western rationality, 
that idea of reason, which Weber traces in its open and veiled, 
progressive and repressive, manifestations. As the fate of modern 
Germany, these manifestations determine for him the politics of the 
Reich, primarily as the historical task of the German bourgeoisie – in 
the transformation of the conservative-feudal state, then in 
democratization, finally in the struggle against revolution and socialism. 
It is essentially the idea of a fateful connection between 
industrialization, capitalism, and national self-preservation that 
motivates Max Weber’s passionate and – let us be frank – spiteful fight 
against the socialist efforts of 1918. According to him, socialism 
contradicts the idea of occidental reason, as well as that of the national 
state; hence it is a world-historical error, if not a world-historical crime. 
(We might ask what Max Weber would have said had he lived to see 
that it is not the West, but the East, which, in the name of socialism, has 
developed modern occidental rationality in its extreme form.) Whatever 
capitalism may do to man, it must, according to Weber, first and before 
all evaluation, be understood as necessary reason. 
Philosophical, sociological-historical, and political motives are 
fundamentally connected in Weber’s analysis of industrial capitalism. 
His theory of the intrinsic value-freedom, or ethical neutrality, of 
science reveals itself as that which it is in practice: an attempt to make 
science ‘free’ to accept obligatory valuations that are imposed on it from 
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the outside. This function of Weber’s theory of knowledge has been 
clear ever since his inaugural address at Freiburg in 1895, which with 
ruthless frankness subordinates value-free economics to the claims of 
national power politics. Sometime later (at the meeting of the Verein für 
Sozialpolitik in 1909) he himself made it as explicit as possible: 
The reason why I argue on every occasion so sharply and even, perhaps, 
pedantically against the fusion of Is and Ought is not because I 
underestimate Ought questions, but, on the contrary, because I cannot 
stand it when problems of world-moving importance, of the greatest 
intellectual and spiritual bearing, in a certain sense the highest problems 
that can move a human breast are transformed here into questions of 
technical-economic ‘productivity’ and are made into the topic of 
discussion of a technical discipline, such as economics is.1 
But the Ought that is thus taken out of science (a mere ‘technical 
discipline’) is thereby simultaneously protected from science and 
shielded from scientific criticism: the “value of that ideal itself can never 
be derived”2 from the material of scientific work itself. 
It is precisely Max Weber’s analysis of industrial capitalism, 
however, which shows that the concept of scientific neutrality, or, 
better, impotence, vis-à-vis the Ought, cannot be maintained: pure 
value-free philosophical-sociological concept formation becomes, 
through its own process, value criticism. Inversely, the pure value-free 
scientific concepts reveal the valuation that is contained in them: they 
become the critique of the given, in the light of what the given does to 
men (and things). The Ought shows itself in the Is: the indefatigable 
effort of conceptual thinking makes it appear. In Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft, that work of Max Weber which is most free from values and 
where the method of formal definitions, classifications, and typologies 
celebrates true orgies, formalism attains the incisiveness of content. This 
authentic concretion is the result of Weber’s mastery of an immense 
material, of scholarship that seems unimaginable today, of knowledge 
that can afford to abstract because it can distinguish the essential from 
the inessential and reality from appearance. With its abstract concepts, 
formal theory reaches the goal at which a positivistic, pseudoempirical 
sociology hostile to theory aims in vain: the real definition of reality. 
The concept of industrial capitalism thus becomes concrete in the 
formal theory of rationality and of domination which are the two 
fundamental themes of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. 
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Let us try first to present the connection between capitalism, 
rationality, and domination in the work of Max Weber. In its most 
general form this connection may be formulated as follows: the 
specifically Western idea of reason realizes itself in a system of material 
and intellectual culture (economy, technology, ‘conduct of life’, science, 
art) that develops to the full in industrial capitalism, and this system 
tends toward a specific type of domination which becomes the fate of 
the contemporary period: total bureaucracy. The comprehensive and 
basic concept is the idea of reason as Western rationality. We begin with 
this concept. 
For Weber, there is a rationality that has come into effect only in the 
West, that has formed (or has at least helped form) capitalism, and that 
has decided our foreseeable future. The effort to determine this 
rationality in its many (and often contradictory) manifestations occupies 
a large part of Weber’s work. The ‘spirit of capitalism’, as described in 
the first volume of his collected essays in the sociology of religion, is 
one of these manifestations; the preface to this work points out 
programmatically that the rationality formulated and acted on in 
capitalism fundamentally distinguishes Western industrialization from all 
other forms of economy and technology. 
Let us first list the elements that are characteristic of Max Weber’s 
concept of reason. (1) There is the progressive mathematization of 
experience and knowledge, a mathematization which, starting from the 
natural sciences and their extraordinary successes, extends to the other 
sciences and to the ‘conduct of life’ itself (universal quantification). (2) 
There is the insistence on the necessity of rational experiments and 
rational proofs in the organization of science as well as in the conduct 
of life. (3) There is the result of this organization which is decisive for 
Weber, namely, the genesis and solidification of a universal, technically 
trained organization of officials that becomes the “absolutely inescapable 
condition of our entire existence”.3 With this last characteristic, the 
transition from theoretical to practical reason, to the historical form of 
reason is effected. The consciousness of its specific historicity was 
contained in the beginning in Weber’s conception of reason, with, or 
precisely due to, its abstractness. However, we shall see that it is not 
sustained in the entire course of his analysis and miscarries at the 
decisive point. In his sociology, formal rationality turns into capitalist 
rationality. Thus it appears as the methodical taming of the irrational 
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‘acquisitive drive’, the taming that finds its typical expression in 
‘innerworldly asceticism’. 
In this ‘taming’, occidental reason becomes the economic reason of 
capitalism, that is, the striving for ever renewed gain within the 
continuous, rational, capitalist enterprise. Rationality thus becomes the 
condition of profitability, which in turn is oriented toward systematic, 
methodical calculation, ‘capital accounting’.4 
The basis of this rationality is abstraction which, at once theoretical 
and practical, the work of both scientific and social organization, 
determines the capitalist period: through the reduction of quality to 
quantity. As universal functionalization (which finds its economic 
expression in exchange value), it becomes the precondition of calculable 
efficiency – of universal efficiency, insofar as functionalization makes 
possible the domination of all particular cases and relations (through 
their reduction to quantities and exchange values). Abstract reason 
becomes concrete in the calculable and calculated domination of nature 
and man. The reason envisaged by Weber thus is revealed as technical 
reason, as the production and transformation of material (things and 
men) through the methodical-scientific apparatus. This apparatus has 
been built with the aim of calculable efficiency; its rationality organizes 
and controls things and men, factory and bureaucracy, work and leisure. 
But to what purpose does it control them? Up to this point, Weber’s 
concept of reason has been ‘formal’, that is, has been defined as 
quantifying abstraction from all particulars, an abstraction that rendered 
possible the universally calculable efficiency of the capitalist apparatus. 
But now the limits of formal reason emerge: neither the specific 
purpose of the scientific-technical construction nor its material (its 
subjects and its objects) can be deduced from the concept of reason; 
they explode from the start this formal, ‘value-free’ concept. 
In capitalist rationality, as analyzed by Weber, these elements that 
are prior and ‘external’ to reason and that thus materially delimit it 
appear in two historical facts: (1) provision for human needs – the aim 
of economic activity – is carried out in the framework of private enterprise 
and its calculable chances of gain, that is, within the framework of the 
profit of the individual entrepreneur or enterprise; (2) consequently, the 
existence of those whose needs are to be satisfied depends on the profit 
opportunities of the capitalist enterprise. This dependence is embodied, 
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in its extreme form, in the ‘free’ labor that is at the disposal of the 
entrepreneur. 
In terms of Weber’s conception, these facts are pregiven to formal 
reason from the outside, but as historical facts, they limit the general 
validity of the concept itself. According to Weber, the focal reality of 
capitalist rationality is the private enterprise; the entrepreneur is a free 
person, responsible by and to himself for his calculations and their risks. 
In this function, he is bourgeois, and the bourgeois conduct of life finds 
its representative expression in innerworldly asceticism. Is this 
conception still valid today? Is the bourgeoisie, in which Weber saw the 
bearer of industrial development, still its bearer in the late capitalist 
phase? Is late capitalist rationality still that which derives from 
innerworldly asceticism? I think the answer to these questions must be 
in the negative. In the development of capitalistic rationality itself, the 
forms ascribed to it by Weber have disintegrated and become obsolete, 
and their disintegration makes the rationality of capitalistic 
industrialization appear in a very different light: in the light of its 
irrationality. To mention only one aspect: ‘innerworldly asceticism’ is no 
longer a motivating force in late capitalism; it has become a fetter that 
serves the maintenance of the system. Keynes denounced it as such, and 
it is a danger to the ‘affluent society’ wherever it could hinder the 
production and consumption of superfluous goods. To be sure, even 
late capitalism is built on ‘renunciation’: the struggle for existence and 
the exploitation of labor must be intensified more and more if increased 
accumulation is to be possible. ‘Planned obsolescence’, methodical 
irrationality, becomes a social necessity. But this is no longer the 
conduct of life of the bourgeoisie as the class that develops the 
productive forces. It is rather the stigma of productive destruction 
under total administration. And the capital accounting of mathematized 
profitability and efficiency celebrates its greatest triumphs in the 
calculation of kill and overkill, of the risk of our own annihilation 
compared with that of the annihilation of the enemy. 
In the unfolding of capitalist rationality, irrationality becomes reason: 
reason as frantic development of productivity, conquest of nature, 
enlargement of the mass of goods (and their accessibility for broad 
strata of the population); irrational because higher productivity, 
domination of nature, and social wealth become destructive forces. This 
destruction is not only figurative, as in the betrayal of so-called higher 
cultural values, but literal: the struggle for existence intensifies both 
Negations 
156 
within national states and internationally, and pent-up aggression is 
discharged in the legitimation of medieval cruelty (torture) and in the 
scientifically organized destruction of men. Did Max Weber foretell this 
development? The answer is No if the accent is placed on ‘tell’. But this 
development is implied in his conceptual scheme – implied at such a 
deep level that it appears as inexorable, final, and thereby, in turn (in the 
bad sense), rational. 
In the course of Weber’s analysis, the value-free concept of capitalist 
rationality becomes a critical concept – critical in the sense not only of 
‘pure science’, but also of an evaluative, goal-positing critique of 
reification. 
But then the critique stops, accepts the allegedly inexorable, and 
turns into apologetics – worse, into the denunciation of the possible 
alternative, that is, of a qualitatively different historical rationality. With 
clairvoyance, Weber himself recognized the limit of his conceptual 
scheme. He defined himself as a ‘bourgeois’ and identified his work 
with the historical mission of the bourgeoisie; in the name of this 
alleged mission, he accepted the alliance of representative strata of the 
German bourgeoisie with the organizers of reaction and repression. For 
political adversaries on the radical left, he recommended the lunatic 
asylum, the zoo, and the revolver shot. He raged against the intellectuals 
who had sacrificed their lives for the revolution.5 The personal serves us 
here only as illustration of the conceptual; it serves to show how the 
concept of reason itself, in its critical content, remains ultimately tied to 
its origin: ‘reason’ remains bourgeois reason, and, indeed, only one part of 
the latter, viz. capitalist technical reason. 
Let us try now to reconstruct the inner development of the 
Weberian concept of capitalist reason. The Freiburg inaugural address 
envisions capitalist industrialization wholly as a form of power politics, 
that is, as imperialism. Only the development of large-scale industry can 
guarantee the independence of the nation in the ever more intense 
international competitive struggle. Imperialist power politics requires 
intensive and extensive industrialization, and vice versa. The economy 
must serve the raison d’état of the national state and must work with the 
latter’s means. Such means are colonization and military power, means 
for the realization of the extrascientific aims and values to which value-
free economics must subordinate itself. As historical reason, the reason 
of state demands rule by that class which is capable of carrying out 
Industrialization and Capitalism in Max Weber 
157 
industrialization and thus effecting the growth of the nation, i.e. rule by 
the bourgeoisie. It is dangerous when an “economically declining class is 
in power”6 as the Junkers in Germany). Under the pressure of 
extrascientific, political valuation, economic science thus becomes, with 
Weber, the political-sociological critique of the state erected by 
Bismarck. And this critique anticipates the future in an unheard-of way: 
in Germany, the historically appointed class, the bourgeoisie, is 
‘immature’; in its weakness it longs for a new Caesar who would do the 
deed for it.7 
The coming to power of the bourgeois class meant, at that time, the 
democratization of the still prebourgeois state. But, owing to its political 
immaturity, the German bourgeoisie can neither realize nor hinder this 
democratization and calls for caesarism. Democracy, the political form 
corresponding to capitalist industrialization, threatens to change into 
plebiscitary dictatorship; bourgeois reason conjures up irrational 
charisma. This dialectic of bourgeois democracy if not of bourgeois 
reason continued to trouble Weber, and is incisively expressed in 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. We shall return to it. Here it should be 
observed that Weber, more correctly than most contemporary socialists, 
also foresaw the later development of the other class that underlies 
capitalism, the proletariat, and therewith repeated almost unchanged 
what Bismarck had said as early as 1865. “The danger does not lie with 
the masses”,8 Weber declared in his 1895 inaugural address. It is not the 
ruled classes who will hinder imperialistic politics, let alone cause it to 
fail. It is rather ‘the ruling and rising classes’ who represent this threat to 
the nation’s chances for survival in international competition. 
The conservative character of the masses, the caesaristic tendencies 
of the ruling classes: these changes of late capitalism Max Weber did 
foresee. He did not, as Marxist theory does, root them in the structure 
of capitalism itself. ‘Political immaturity’ is a poor category as long as it 
does not define the factors behind the fact – in this case the 
impossibility for capitalist production of preserving the free market 
through free competition. Capitalist production itself runs up against its 
limits in the democratic institutions of the market society. Domination 
is concentrated in and above the bureaucracy, as the necessary apex of 
regimentation. What appeared as political immaturity within the context 
of liberalistic capitalism becomes, in organized capitalism, political 
maturity. 
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And the harmlessness of the ruled classes? Even while Weber was 
still living, they were, for a historical instant, ready to cause imperialistic 
politics to fail. After that, however, the political maturity of the 
bourgeoisie and the intellectual efficiency of capitalist productivity took 
things in hand and confirmed Weber’s prediction. 
Let us now look at his concept of capitalism where (apparently) it is 
removed from the concrete context of imperialistic power politics and 
developed in its value-free scientific purity: in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. 
Here capitalism, as a form of ‘rational economic acquisition’, is defined 
in the first instance as a ‘particular form of monetary calculation’: 
Capital accounting is the valuation and calculation of profit 
opportunities and … proceeds by means of comparing the respective 
monetary values of total (fixed and liquid) assets at the beginning and 
end of a single profit-oriented undertaking or, in the case of a 
continuous profit-making enterprise, of comparing the initial and final 
balance sheets for an accounting period.9 
The effort – one is tempted to say the provocative effort – to define 
capitalism in a purely scientific manner and to abstract from everything 
human and historical shows forth even in the forbidding syntax (at least 
in German). What is at issue here is business and nothing else. In 
contrast to this attitude, Weber’s emphasis on the next page seems 
almost shocking: “Capital accounting in its formally most rational mode 
thus presupposes the struggle of man with man.”10 What capital accounting 
does to men finds sharper expression in its abstract definition than in 
the latter’s concretion: inhumanity is included in the rationality of the 
initial and final balance sheets. 
The ‘formally most rational’ mode of capital accounting is the one 
into which man and his ‘purposes’ enter only as variables in the 
calculation of the chances of gain and profit. In this formal rationality, 
mathematization is carried to the point of the calculus with the real 
negation of life itself; at the extreme, risk of death from hunger, it becomes 
a motive for economic activity on the part of those who have nothing: 
… decisive as [an] element of the motivation of economic activity under 
the conditions of a market economy [is] normally … for those without 
property … the fact that they run the risk, both for themselves and their 
personal dependents, such as children, wives, sometimes parents, whose 
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maintenance the individual typically takes over, of going without any 
provision …11 
Again and again, Weber defines formal rationality in contrast to a material 
(substantive) rationality, in which the economic maintenance of men is 
considered “from the point of view of certain valuational postulates (of 
whatever kind)”.12 
Formal rationality is thus in conflict not only with ‘traditional’ value 
orientations and goals, but also with revolutionary ones. As an example, 
Max Weber mentions the antinomy between formal rationality on the 
one hand and, on the other, of attempts to abolish the separation of 
powers (“soviet republic, government by a convention or committee of 
public safety”13) of attempts, in other words, to change radically the 
existing form of domination. But is the formal rationality that finds 
expression in a capitalist economy really so formal? Here, once more, is 
its definition: 
The term ‘formal rationality of economic action’ will be used to 
designate the extent of quantitative calculation or accounting which is 
technically possible and which is actually applied. A system of economic 
activity will be called ‘formally’ rational according to the degree in which 
the provision for needs, which is essential to every rational economy, is 
capable of being expressed in numerical, calculable terms, and is so 
expressed.14 
According to this definition, a totally planned economy, that is, a 
noncapitalist economy, would evidently be more rational, in the sense of 
formal rationality, than the capitalist economy. For the latter sets itself 
the limits of calculability in the particular interest of the private 
enterprise and in the ‘freedom’ (however regimented) of the market. If 
Weber declares such a planned economy retrogressive or even 
realistically impossible, he does so in the first place for a technological 
reason: in modern industrial society, the separation of the workers from 
the means of production has become a technical necessity requiring the 
individual and private direction and control of the means of production, 
that is, the authority of the personally responsible entrepreneur in the 
enterprise. The highly material, historical fact of the private-capitalist 
enterprise thus becomes (in Weber’s sense) a formal structural element of 
capitalism and of rational economic activity itself. 
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But the rational social function of individual control of production 
that is based on the separation of labor from the means of production 
goes beyond this. For Max Weber, it is the guarantor of technically and 
economically necessary organizational discipline, which then becomes the 
model of the entire discipline required by modern industrial society. 
Even socialism, according to Weber, has its origin in factory discipline: 
“From this life situation, from the discipline of the factory, was modern 
socialism born.”15 
The ‘subjection to work discipline’ characteristic of free enterprise is 
thus, on the one hand, the rationality of a personal hierarchy, but on the 
other hand, the rational domination of things over man, that is, ‘of the 
means over the end (the satisfaction of needs)’. In these words, Weber 
quotes a socialist thesis.16 He does not contest it but believes that not 
even a socialist society will change the fundamental fact of the worker’s 
separation from the means of production, because this separation is 
simply the form of technical progress, of industrialization. Even 
socialism remains subject to its rationality, for otherwise it cannot 
remain faithful to its own promise of the general satisfaction of needs 
and the pacification of the struggle for existence. The control of man by 
things can be deprived of its irrationality only through the rational 
control of man by man. The question, therefore, is for socialism, too: 
“who, then, is supposed to take over and direct this new economy?”17 
Industrialization is thus seen as the fate of the modern world, and 
the fateful question for both capitalist and socialist industrialization is 
only this: What is the most rational form of dominating industrialization 
and hence society? (‘Most rational’ is still used in the sense of that formal 
rationality which is determined only by the calculable and regulated 
functioning of its own system.) But this formal rationality seems to have 
changed imperceptibly in the course of the logical development of 
Weber’s analysis. In becoming a question of domination, of control, this 
rationality subordinates itself, by virtue of its own inner dynamic, to 
another, namely, to the rationality of domination. Precisely insofar as 
this formal rationality does not go beyond its own structure and has 
nothing but its own system as the norm of its calculations and 
calculating actions, it is as a whole dependent, determined ‘from the 
outside’ by something other than itself; in this fashion reason becomes, 
in Weber’s own definition, ‘material’. 
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Industrialization as ‘fate’, domination as ‘fate’ – Max Weber’s 
concept of ‘fate’ shows in exemplary fashion the material content of his 
formal analysis. ‘Fate’ is the law of an economy and society which are 
largely independent of individuals, and violation of this law would mean 
self-destruction. But society is not ‘nature’. Who decrees the fate? 
Industrialization is a phase in the development of men’s capacities and 
needs, a phase in their struggle with nature and with themselves. This 
development can proceed in very different forms and with very 
different aims; not only the forms of control but also those of 
technology and hence of needs and of their satisfactions are in no way 
‘fatal’, but rather become such only when they are socially sanctioned, that 
is, as the result of material, economic, and psychological coercion. 
Weber’s concept of fate is construed ‘after the fact’ of such coercion: he 
generalizes the blindness of a society which reproduces itself behind the 
back of the individuals, of a society in which the law of domination 
appears as objective technological law. However, in fact, this law is 
neither ‘fatal’ nor ‘formal’. The context of Weber’s analysis is the 
historical context in which economic reason became the reason of 
domination – domination at almost any price. This fate has become a fate 
and inasmuch as it has become a fate it can also be abolished. Any 
scientific analysis that is not committed to this possibility is pledged, not 
to reason, but to the reason of established domination. For there is no 
structure that has not been posited or made and is not as such dependent. 
In the continuum of history, in which all economic action takes place, 
all economic reason is always the reason of domination, which 
historically and socially determines economic action. Capitalism, no 
matter how mathematized and ‘scientific’, remains the mathematized, 
technological domination of men; and socialism, no matter how scientific 
and technological, is the construction or demolition of domination. 
If in Weber’s work the formal analysis of capitalism thus becomes 
the analysis of forms of domination, this is not due to a discontinuity in 
concept or method; their purity itself shows itself impure. And this is 
so, not because Max Weber was a bad or inconsistent sociologist, but 
because he knew his subject matter: Truth becomes critique and 
accusation, and accusation becomes the function of true science. If he 
subjected the science of economics to politics as early as in the inaugural 
address, this tour de force shows itself, in the light of the whole of 
Weber’s work, as the inner logic of his method. Your science must 
remain ‘pure’; only thus can you remain faithful to the truth. But this 
Negations 
162 
truth forces you to recognize what determines the objects of your 
science ‘from the outside’. Over this you have no power. Your freedom 
from value judgments is as necessary as it is mere appearance. For 
neutrality is real only when it has the power of resisting interference. 
Otherwise it becomes the victim, as well as the aid, of every power that 
wants to use it. 
The formal rationality of capitalism comes up against its internal 
limit in two places: in the fact of private enterprise, or the private 
entrepreneur as the actual subject of the calculated nature of economic 
activity; and in the fact of the worker’s separation from the means of 
production, of free labor. 
These two facts belong, for Max Weber, to the specific rationality of 
capitalism;18 they are technological necessities. For him, they thus are 
the basis for domination as an integral element of capitalist (and even of 
economic) rationality in modern industrial society. If this is so, then 
domination itself must be demonstrated as the form of modern 
economic rationality; and this is what Weber tries to do in his analysis of 
bureaucracy. 
Bureaucratic control is inseparable from increasing industrialization; 
it extends the maximally intensified efficiency of industrial organization 
to society as a whole. It is the formally most rational form of control, 
thanks to its “precision, steadfastness, discipline, rigor, and 
dependability, in short calculability for both the bead [of the 
organization] and for those having to do with it …”;19 and it is all this 
because it is ‘domination by virtue of knowledge’, ascertainable, 
calculable, calculating knowledge, specialized knowledge. Properly 
speaking, it is the apparatus that dominates, for the control of this 
apparatus, based on specialized knowledge, is such only if it is fully 
adjusted to its technical demands and potentialities. For this reason, 
domination of the apparatus is “possible for the layman only within 
limits: in the long run, the technically trained permanent official is 
usually superior to the layman as a [government] minister”.20 
Again Weber stresses that any ‘rational socialism’ ‘would simply 
have to take over and would intensify’ bureaucratic administration since 
this administration is nothing but purely objective domination, demanded 
by the objective circumstances themselves, and equally valid for the 
most varied political, cultural, and moral aims and institutions. And the 
objective circumstances themselves are the given, ever more 
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productively and efficiently developing, ever more precisely calculable 
apparatus. 
The specialized scientific administration of the apparatus as formally 
rational domination: this is the reification of reason, reification as 
reason, the apotheosis of reification. But the apotheosis turns into its 
negation, is bound to turn into its negation. For the apparatus, which 
dictates its own objective administration, is itself instrument, means – 
and there is no such thing as a means ‘as such’. Even the most 
productive, most reified apparatus is a means to an end outside itself. As 
far as the economic apparatus of capitalism is concerned, it is not 
enough to say that this end is the satisfaction of needs. Such a concept 
is too general, too abstract, in the bad sense of the word. For, as Max 
Weber himself realized, the satisfaction of needs is far more the by-
product than the end of capitalist economic activity. Human needs are 
necessary and ‘formally rational’ as long as living human beings are still 
required as consumers (as producers they already are partly 
unnecessary), and already much is sold to warehouses – stockpiling for 
annihilation and a subhuman subterranean life. But if the bureaucratic 
administration of the capitalist apparatus, with all its rationality, remains 
a means, and thus dependent, then it has, as rationality, its own limit. 
The bureaucracy subjects itself to an extra- and suprabureaucratic power 
– to an ‘unbusinesslike’ power. And if rationality is embodied in 
administration, and only in administration, then this legislative power 
must be irrational. The Weberian conception of reason ends in irrational 
charisma. 
Among all of Weber’s concepts, that of charisma is perhaps the 
most questionable. Even as a term it contains the bias that gives every 
kind of successful, allegedly personal domination an almost religious 
consecration. The concept itself is under discussion here only insofar as 
it can illuminate the dialectic of rationality and irrationality in modern 
society. Charismatic domination appears as a phase in a twofold process 
of development. On the one hand, charisma tends to turn into the 
solidified domination of interests and their bureaucratic organization; on 
the other hand, bureaucratic organization tends to submit to a 
charismatic leader. 
In the chapter ‘Transformation of Charisma’ Max Weber describes 
how pure charismatic domination tends to transform itself into a 
‘permanent possession’; in this process “it is given over to the 
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conditions of everyday life and to the powers that dominate it, above all 
to economic interests”.21 What begins as the charisma of the single 
individual and his personal following ends in domination by a 
bureaucratic apparatus that has acquired rights and functions and in 
which the charismatically dominated individuals become regular, tax-
paying, dutiful ‘subjects’. 
 
But this rational administration of masses and things cannot do without 
the irrational charismatic leader. For the administration would tend, 
precisely to the degree to which it is really rational, to the abolition of 
domination (and to the administration of things). Yet the administrative 
apparatus has always been built on the basis of domination and has 
been established to maintain and strengthen domination. To the 
democratization required by rational administration thus corresponds a 
parallel limitation and manipulation of democratization. Domination as 
the privilege of particular interests and self-determination as an 
expression of the general interest are brought into forced unity. This 
violent and simultaneously formally rational, i.e. technically efficient, 
solution of the contradiction has its classical manifestation in 
plebiscitary democracy,22 in which the masses periodically depose their 
leaders and determine their policies – under previously established 
conditions well controlled by the leaders. For Max Weber, universal 
suffrage thus is not only the result of domination but also its instrument 
in the period of its technical perfection. Plebiscitary democracy is the 
political expression of irrationality-become-reason. 
In what way does this dialectic of reason (that is, of formal reason) 
show forth in the development of capitalism? The latter’s profane 
power resists the idea of charisma, and Weber is rather timid when it 
comes to the application of this term to contemporary industrial society, 
even though his attitude and even his language during World War I and 
against the revolution often came very close to succumbing to 
charismatic illusions. But the actual trend is clearly exhibited by his 
analysis: the formal reason of the technically perfect administrative 
apparatus is subordinated to the irrational. Max Weber’s analysis of 
bureaucracy breaks through the ideological camouflage. Far ahead of his 
time, he showed the illusory character of modern mass democracy with 
its pretended equalization and adjustment of class conflicts. The 
bureaucratic administration of industrial capitalism is indeed a ‘leveling’, 
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but what is decisive here is exclusively the leveling of the dominated vis-à-vis 
the ruling, bureaucratically organized group, which may actually, and 
often even formally, occupy a wholly autocratic position.23 He stresses 
again and again that precisely the technically perfect administrative 
apparatus, by virtue of its formal rationality, is a “means of power of the 
very first rank for him who has the bureaucratic apparatus at his 
disposal”. 
The dependence of the material fate of the mass on the continuous, 
correct functioning of the increasingly bureaucratically organized 
private-capitalist organizations increases continuously, and the thought 
of the possibility of their elimination thus becomes ever more utopian.24 
Total dependence on the functioning of an omnipresent apparatus 
becomes the ‘basis of all order’ so that the apparatus itself is no longer 
questioned. “Trained orientation toward obedient subjection to those 
orders” becomes the cement of a subjugation of which people are no 
longer conscious because the order to which they subordinate 
themselves is itself so terrifyingly rational; that is, because it administers 
too efficiently and puts at one’s calculable disposal the world of goods 
and performances of which the single individual no longer has an 
overview or a comprehension. Max Weber did not live long enough to 
see how mature capitalism, in the efficiency of its reason, makes even 
the planned annihilation of millions of human beings and the planned 
destruction of human labor the fountainhead of a bigger and better 
prosperity, how even sheer insanity becomes the basis, not only of the 
continuation of life, but of the more comfortable life. He did not live to 
see the ‘affluent society’, in the face of inhuman misery and methodical 
cruelty outside its borders, squander its unimaginable technical, material, 
and intellectual power and abuse its power for the purposes of 
permanent mobilization. Even before the unfolding of the power of this 
reason he called attention to the danger present in the submission of the 
rational bureaucratic administrative apparatus, by virtue of its own 
rationality, to an irrational supreme authority. 
In the first place, in the framework of Weber’s conceptual scheme, it 
is almost self-evident that the administration of industrial society 
requires outside and superior direction: “Every administration requires 
some kind of domination, since, for its direction, some commanding 
powers must always be placed in someone’s hands”.25 The capitalist 
entrepreneur is ‘in the material sense’ as little of a trained official as the 
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monarch at the head of the empire. No specialized qualities are required 
of him: “Bureaucratic domination thus inevitably has at its apex an 
element that is at least not purely bureaucratic”.26 ‘Inevitably’, because 
the value-free rationality of administration is dependent upon values and 
goals that come to it from the outside. In his inaugural address, Weber 
had defined the power politics of the nation-state as giving economics 
its values and goals. Capitalism was therewith defined as imperialism. 
In Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft some characteristics of the imperialistic 
economy are called by their names and summed up in the concept of 
‘politically oriented capitalism’. Weber then states: “It is clear from the 
start that those politically oriented events that offer these (political) 
possibilities for gain are economically irrational when viewed from the 
point of view of orientation toward market chances…”.27 As irrational, 
they can be replaced by others. Control of the capitalistic economy not 
only requires no specialized qualification, it is also to a great degree 
fungible. 
Capitalism, with all its rationality (or rather just because of its 
specific rationality), thus terminates in an irrational, ‘accidental’ head – 
not only in the economy, but also in the control of the bureaucratic 
administration itself, in governmental administration. (It is difficult not 
to think here of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right where the state of civil society, 
the rational state, culminates in the ‘accidental’ person of the monarch 
who is determined only by the contingency of birth: in Hegel as in 
Weber, the analysis of bourgeois reason reveals the latter’s limits: 
bourgeois reason negates itself in its consummation.) 
Let us look back briefly at the stages in the development of Weber’s 
concepts (and of their objects). Western capitalism originated under the 
specific social, political, and economic conditions of the waning Middle 
Ages and of the Reformation. It developed its ‘spirit’ in that formal 
rationality that realized itself in the psychological as well as the 
economic orientation and action of the originators (but not the objects!) 
of the process of capital. Industrialization has been carried out under 
this formal reason: technical progress and progressive satisfaction of 
needs, whatever needs they may be. We have seen that this formal 
rationality develops on the basis of two very material historical facts, 
which maintain themselves in its progress and which (according to Max 
Weber) are conditions of capitalism, namely (1) the private enterprise and 
(2) ‘free labor’, the existence of a class that ‘economically’, “under the 
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compulsion of the lash of hunger”, is forced to sell its services.28 As 
productive forces, these material conditions enter into formal reason. 
Capitalism expands in the competitive struggle of unequal (but formally 
free) powers: the struggle for existence of persons, nation-states, and 
international alliances. 
For Max Weber, the contemporary phase of capitalism is dominated 
by national power politics: capitalism is imperialism. But its 
administration remains formally rational, i.e. bureaucratic domination. It 
administers the control of men by things; rational, ‘value-free’ 
technology is the separation of man from the means of production and 
his subordination to technical efficiency and necessity – all this within 
the framework of private enterprise. The machine is the determining 
factor, but the “lifeless machine is congealed spirit (Geist). Only by being 
this has it the power to force men into its service…”.29 Yet because it is 
‘congealed spirit’, it also is domination of man by man; thus this 
technical reason reproduces enslavement. Subordination to technology 
becomes subordination to domination as such; formal technical 
rationality turns into material political rationality (or is it the other way 
around, inasmuch as technical reason was from the beginning the 
control of ‘free’ labor by private enterprise?). Under the compulsion of 
reason, the fate is fulfilled that Weber foresaw with remarkable clarity in 
one of his most telling passages: 
Joined to the dead machine, [bureaucratic organization] is at work to 
erect the shell of that future bondage to which one day men will 
perhaps be forced to submit in impotence, as once the fellahs in the 
ancient Egyptian state – if a purely, technically good, that is, rational 
bureaucratic administration and maintenance is the last and only value which is to 
decide on the manner in which their affairs are directed.30 
But it is precisely here, at this most decisive point, where Weber’s 
analysis becomes self-criticism, that one can see how much this analysis 
has fallen prey to the identification of technical reason with bourgeois 
capitalist reason. This identification prevents him from seeing that not 
‘pure’, formal, technical reason but the reason of domination erects the 
‘shell of bondage’, and that the consummation of technical reason can 
well become the instrument for the liberation of man. Put differently: 
Max Weber’s analysis of capitalism was not sufficiently value-free, 
inasmuch as it took into its ‘pure’ definitions of formal rationality 
valuations peculiar to capitalism. On this basis, the contradiction 
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developed between formal and material (or substantive) rationality, 
whose obverse is the ‘neutrality’ of technical reason vis-à-vis all outside 
material valuations. This neutrality, in turn, made it possible for Weber 
to accept the (reified) interest of the nation and its political power as the 
values that determine technical reason. 
The very concept of technical reason is perhaps ideological. Not 
only the application of technology but technology itself is domination 
(of nature and men) – methodical, scientific, calculated, calculating 
control. Specific purposes and interests of domination are not foisted 
upon technology ‘subsequently’ and from the outside; they enter the 
very construction of the technical apparatus. Technology is always a 
historical-social project: in it is projected what a society and its ruling 
interests intend to do with men and things. Such a ‘purpose’ of 
domination is ‘substantive’ and to this extent belongs to the very form 
of technical reason. 
Weber abstracted from this ineluctable social material. We have 
emphasized the right to this abstraction in the analysis of capitalist 
reason: abstraction becomes critical of this reason insofar as it shows the 
degree to which capitalist rationality itself abstracts from man, to whose 
needs it is ‘indifferent’, and in this indifference becomes ever more 
productive and efficient, calculating and methodical, thus erecting the 
‘shell of bondage’, furnishing it (quite luxuriously), and universalizing it. 
Weber’s abstractness is so saturated with his material that it pronounces 
rational judgment on the rational exchange society. In the course of its 
development, however, this society tends to abolish its own material 
prerequisites: the private entrepreneur is no longer the subject of 
economic rationality, answering only to himself, and ‘free labor’ is no 
longer the enslavement enforced by the threatening ‘lash of hunger’. 
The exchange society, where everything proceeds so freely and 
rationally, comes under the control of economic and political 
monopolies. The market and its liberties, whose ideological character 
Max Weber demonstrated often enough, is now subjected to frightfully 
efficient regulation, in which the general interest is markedly shaped by 
the ruling particular interests. Reification is abolished, but in a very 
deceptive manner. The separation from the means of production, in 
which Weber rightly saw a technical necessity, turns into the subjection 
of the whole to its calculating managers. The formal rationality of 
capitalism celebrates its triumph in electronic computers, which 
calculate everything, no matter what the purpose, and which are put to 
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use as mighty instruments of political manipulation, reliably calculating 
the chances of profit and loss, including the chance of the annihilation 
of the whole, with the consent of the likewise calculated and obedient 
population. Mass democracy becomes plebiscitary even within the 
economy and the sciences: the masses themselves elect their leaders into 
the shell of bondage. 
But if technical reason thus reveals itself as political reason, it does 
so only because from the beginning it was this technical reason and this 
political reason, that is, limited in the specific interest of domination. As 
political reason, technical reason is historical. If separation from the 
means of production is a technical necessity, the bondage that it 
organizes is not. On the basis of its own achievements, that is, of 
productive and calculable mechanization, this separation contains the 
potentiality of a qualitatively different rationality, in which separation 
from the means of production becomes the separation of man from the 
socially necessary labor that de-purposiveness would be no longer 
‘antinomical’; nor would administer automated production, formal and 
substantive purposiveness would be no longer ‘antinomical’; nor would 
formal reason prevail indifferently among and over men. For, as 
‘congealed spirit’, the machine is not neutral; technical reason is the social 
reason ruling a given society and can be changed in its very structure. As 
technical reason, it can become the technique of liberation. 
For Max Weber this possibility was utopian. Today it looks as if he 
was right. But if contemporary industrial society defeats and triumphs 
over its own potentialities, then this triumph is no longer that of Max 
Weber’s bourgeois reason. It is difficult to see reason at all in the ever 
more solid ‘shell of bondage’ which is being constructed. Or is there 
perhaps already in Max Weber’s concept of reason the irony that 
understands but disavows? Does he by any chance mean to say: And 
this you call ‘reason’? 
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Love Mystified: A Critique of Norman O. 
Brown1 
… sie hätte singen nicht reden sollen diese neue Seele 
– Stefan George, ‘Nietzsche’ 
For here is the ‘new soul’, prophet of the new man – radical break with 
the past and with the present which is still the rule of the past. And this 
past is the archetypal one, in the individual as well as in the history of 
the species: the primal crime and the primal scene. Psychoanalysis in its 
most extreme and most advanced concepts guides Brown’s 
interpretation of the history of men and of the human condition. Brown 
likes to quote Adorno: “In psychoanalysis, only the exaggerations are 
true”. For only the exaggerations can shatter the normal complacency of 
common sense and scientific sense and their comforting limitations and 
illusions. Only the exaggerations can (perhaps), with the violence of a 
shock, elucidate the horror of the whole, the depth of the deception, 
and the incommunicable promise of a future which can come into being 
(can come into thought) only as the total annihilation of the past and 
present. Apocalypse and Pentecost: destruction of everything and the 
redemption of everything: final liberation of the repressed content – 
abolition of the reality principle, nay, abolition of reality. For what we 
call reality Brown calls illusion, lie, dream. We are asleep, and being 
asleep is being dead; we still live in the womb or return into the womb; 
our genital sexuality is regression to the state before birth; and we are 
still under the spell of the primal scene: we reenact the father whom we 
have introjected; our sex life is his, not ours, and our pleasure remains 
vicarious. Thus if all our life is dream and illusion, then the awakening 
to real life is the end of our life: death and resurrection in one. The way 
out of the womb, out of the dream cave is to die in order to be reborn. 
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Liberation is transubstantiation; resurrection of the body, but the 
body is “raised a spiritual or symbolic body” (p. 191). “The revolution, 
the revelation, the apocalypse, is vision; which pronounces a last 
judgment; and brings about the end” (p. 232). The cave and the womb, 
Plato and Freud, revolution and revelation, Man and Christ: the grand 
union and communion of opposites, the overcoming of all division 
between male and female, self and outside world, thine and mine, body 
and spirit – this ultimate reconciliation of opposites, does it convey the 
image of liberation? Or is it again the past that asserts its power over the 
image of the future, the old in new clothes? The attempt to answer this 
question involves heavy responsibility, for Norman Brown has carried 
the burden of radical thought to the farthest point: the point where 
sanity must appear as madness, where concepts must turn into fantasies, 
and the truth must become ridiculous. Once again, the tragedy of man 
as comedy, as the play of Satyre. Norman Brown’s book moves along 
the limits of communication; he is on the search for a new language, 
which can break through the falsifying, stultifying, repressive universe of 
ordinary and academic discourse (‘senatorial and senile’). In its best 
parts, this book is a poem and a song, of the beauty which is “nichts als 
des Schrecklichen Anfang, den wir noch grade ertragen…”.2 The form of the 
sentence, the proposition which freezes the content is abandoned; the 
words, freed from the enchaining form, recapture their explosive 
meaning, a hidden truth. 
The normal flux of ordinary and academic discourse is also broken – 
the argument is developed in relatively self-sufficient fragments, short 
paragraphs, aphorisms; their inner connection, the flow of the argument 
is of a musical rather than conceptual order: variations on a theme, 
progress through repetition, dissonance as element of structural 
harmony and development. The right of the imagination as cognitive 
power is thus restored: released from its senatorial and senile garb, 
thought becomes play, jeu interdit, the scandal; the esprit de sérieux gives 
way to the gaya sciencia, drunkenness and laughter. Hegel, the most 
serious of all serious philosophers, knew it well: 
The true is thus the bacchanalian whirl in which no member is not 
drunken; and because each, as soon as it detaches itself, dissolves 
immediately – the whirl is just as much transparent and simple repose.3 
But then comes the hangover; the imagination falters, and the new 
language looks for support in the old. Support in quotations and 
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references, which are to demonstrate or at least to illustrate the points 
made; support in returning to the primordial, elemental, subrational; to 
the infantile stages in the development of the individual and of the 
species. Psychoanalysis changes its direction and function: the latent 
content, the unconscious and its prehistory, serve not only as powers to 
be recognized, comprehended, conquered, but also (and increasingly so 
in the unfolding of the argument) as normative values, as ends. The 
grand leap into the realm of freedom and light is thus arrested and 
becomes a leap backward, into darkness. 
 
* 
 
Norman Brown’s demonstrations and illustrations have yet another and 
very different significance. A large bulk of his reference is to Holy 
Script, to Christ and his gospel. A few examples may show how central 
these references are: 
The conclusion of the whole matter is, break down the boundaries, the 
walls. Down with defense mechanisms, character-armor; disarmament. 
Ephesians 11, 14 … (p. 149). 
The real world … is the world where thoughts are omnipotent, where 
no distinction is drawn between wish and deed. As in the New 
Testament … (p. 151). 
The solution to the problem of identity is, get lost. Or as it says in the 
New Testament … (p. 161). 
The solution to the problem of war in the Eucharist, with 
transubstantiation … (p. 173). 
But the unconscious is the true psychic reality; and the unconscious is 
the Holy Spirit … (p. 195). 
Real life is life after death, or resurrection. Colossians 111, 3 … (p. 207). 
Fulfillment gathers up the past into the present in the form of a 
recapitulation: that in the dispensation of times there might be a 
recapitulation of all things in Christ … (p. 207).  
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Then cometh the end, when he shall have put down all rule and all 
authority and power. Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world. I 
Corinthians XV, 24 … (p. 243). 
Now Brown takes great pains to state again and again that the religious 
symbolism is to be interpreted symbolically, in the other direction, as it 
were. Sexual potency is restored at Pentecost; speech resexualized (p. 
251); knowledge made carnal, copulation of subject and object (p. 249); 
and the spirit is phallic (p. 224) – merger of Christ and Dionysus. But 
the one stays with the other, and the new emphasis does not suffice to 
reverse the established direction: sexualization of the spirit is also 
spiritualization of sexuality, and sexuality itself becomes symbolic: 
“everything is symbolic, including the sexual act” (p. 181). Behind the 
veil of Brown’s sexualized language, desexualization prevails. The 
orgasm provides only ‘vicarious gratification’ (p. 129). Brown’s 
consistent attempt to convey, against overwhelming odds, the new 
nonrepressive interpretation of the old repressive symbols cannot undo 
the association of the spirit with the Spirit, the resurrection of the body 
with the Resurrection. Brown’s images of fulfillment suggest total 
sublimation which drains the unsublimated dimension. Liberation in 
Nirvana: I like to believe that Norman Brown was aware of this goal of 
his voyage, and that he communicated his awareness to the reader: his 
first chapter is headed ‘Liberty’ and his last, ‘Nothing’. 
Before examining the reasons for this failure, I shall review briefly 
the radical origin and intent of Brown’s analysis prior to their 
mystification. 
 
* 
 
The truth of the human condition is hidden, repressed – not by a 
conspiracy of some sort, but by the actual course of history. The first 
aim, therefore, is the critical destruction of history, and of the manner in 
which history is written and understood. The facts stand for other facts 
in the depth of the individual and collective unconscious, and the 
repressed prehistory of mankind continues to make the history of man. 
The established facts are symbolic facts, derivatives and distortions of 
the latent content, which is the unexpurgated drama of sexuality. 
Consequently, history must be explained symbolically. All literal 
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interpretation of history is falsification; the “modern historical 
consciousness is Protestant literalism” which offends against the spirit, 
kills the spirit. Thus it becomes an ‘operation with ghosts’ 
(Geisteswissenschaft) (pp. 198ff.). “We must rise from history to mystery” 
(p. 214) – here is the first mystification in Brown’s analysis: the ‘mystery’ 
is initially that of the primal crime and the ambivalent penitence for it; 
but then the mystery becomes that of the resurrection and redemption, 
transubstantiation, the Eucharist. The radical destruction of history 
terminates in the religious tale, in which history is, not aufgehoben, but 
simply negated, abolished. The beginning of Brown’s book contained a 
very different promise: the refusal to accept any mystification, and the 
resolution to call things by their name, their real name, instead of 
canceling all names in the impossible unity and union of everything. 
In line with this promise, Brown begins with the symbolic 
interpretation of politics: 
In order to know the reality of politics we have to believe the myth, to 
believe what we were told as children. Roman history is the story of the 
brothers Romulus and Remus, the sons of the she-wolf; leaders of 
gangs of juvenile delinquents …; who achieved the rape of the Sabine 
women; and whose festival is the Lupercalia; at which youth naked 
except for girdles made from the skin of victims ran wild through the 
city; … a season fit for killing. Julius Caesar, Act I (p. 15). 
And Brown continues, summing up the initial exposition: “Politics 
made out of delinquency. All brothers are brothers in crime; all equal as 
sinners” after the killing of the father, whom they restored in 
themselves and whom they continue to obey, the killing of each other. 
Myth or reality? Fictitious past, or factual history that is still with us? 
The stuff out of which history is made – the stuff of greatness and 
progress: Brown quotes Livy: 
To expand the population, Romulus followed the model of other 
founders of cities: he opened an asylum for fugitives. The mob that 
came in was the first step to the city’s future greatness. 
The City of Man – ‘a sanctuary’ providing ‘immunity for a multitude of 
criminals’ (Augustine). Here is the latent content in the notion of the 
social contract: 
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The social contract establishes corporate virtue as an asylum for 
individual sin, making a moral society out of immoral men; men whose 
natural inclination, according to Hobbes and Freud, is murder (p. 16). 
The foundation of the state is itself a crime, the primal crime, for the 
state is formed by the fraternity (here, Brown sides with Plato and 
Sparta as against Aristotle and Athens), and it is the common crime that 
creates common solidarity – political, national solidarity. And after the 
primal crime, the endless struggle among the brothers – the ‘quarrel 
over the paternal inheritance’: the original unity of the body politic now 
is divided into a multitude of segments, ‘moieties’; each acquiring 
private property, a self, group or individual self, fighting. Law only 
organizes this fight: “the Rule of Law is the Rule of Force”; and, as the 
classical myths tell us, right and wrong can be decided only “by an 
appeal to heaven, that is, by war and violence” (p. 18). The division 
stays with us: history is fratricide after the parricide. “Political parties are 
conspiracies to usurp the power of the father” (p. 29); behind politics is 
the ritual of murder and sacrifice: 
The comic wearing of the Indian mask, in the Boston Tea Party, or 
Tammany’s Wigwam, is the lighter side of a game, a ritual, the darker 
side of which is fraternal genocide (p. 30). 
Brown then traces the development of the latent content in the 
historical step from absolute monarchy to representative government, 
from Hobbes to Locke. A step within the same continuum of fraud. 
The illusion in liberty and equality: 
Locke allows no man the status of father, and makes all men sons of the 
Heavenly Father…. Sonship and brotherhood are espoused against 
fatherhood: but without a father there can be no sons or brothers. 
Locke’s sons, like Freud’s cannot free themselves from father 
psychology … (pp. 4-5). 
The father survives in the superego, and in the many new political 
leaders, now freely elected. The autonomous individual, the ‘person’ – 
this cherished achievement of bourgeois society is a fraud, Hobbes’s 
‘artificial Person’. In reality, a person is never himself but always 
another: he wears a mask, he is possessed by another, represented by 
another, and representing another. And in all disguises, the other is 
always the father (p. 98). In theory and in practice, it is always the 
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Oedipus Complex: as in the Apocalypse, “pump, power, and politics is 
discovered to be sex” (p. 75) – perverted sex, sado-masochistic sex, 
striving for impossible satisfaction. For the desired object is the 
‘combined object’: frozen image of the primal scene – a “male female 
(vaginal father) or a female male (phallic mother)”, “stuck together in 
eternal coitus, eternal lust, and eternal punishment” (pp. 70, 71). And 
this “could go on forever; there is eternal recurrence”. 
It must go on until we have overcome the Fall, which is the division of 
the original and total unity. The solution, the end of the drama of 
history is the restoration of original and total unity: unity of male and 
female, father and mother, subject and object, body and soul – abolition 
of the self, of mine and thine, abolition of the reality principle, of all 
boundaries…. 
 
* 
 
Perhaps only the most extreme imagery can elucidate the depth 
dimension of history, the web of pleasure and terror, truth and 
deception in eternal recurrence. But the imagery is not enough; it must 
become saturated with its reality: symbolism must recapture that which 
it symbolizes. The king must be shown not only as father but as king, 
that is to say, as master and lord; war and competition and 
communication must be shown not only as copulation but as war and 
business and speech. Unless the analysis takes the road of return from 
the symbolic to the literal, from the illusion to the reality of the illusion, 
it remains ideological, replacing one mystification by another. 
Brown’s concept of illusion (sleep, dream) covers, undifferentiated, the 
latent and the overt content of history, or, it de-realizes reality. To him, 
the political kingdoms are ‘shadows’, political power is a fraud: the 
emperor has no new clothes, he has no clothes at all. But unfortunately, 
he does: they are visible and tangible; they make history. In terms of the 
latent content, the kingdoms of the earth may be shadows: but 
unfortunately, they move real men and things, they kill, they persist and 
prevail in the sunlight as well as in the dark of night. The king may be 
an erected penis, and his relation to the community may be intercourse; 
but unfortunately, it is also something very different and less pleasant 
and more real. Brown skips the mediations which transform the latent 
into the overt content, sex into politics, the subrational into the rational. 
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Thus he is stuck with the time-honored quandary of psychoanalysis: the 
airplane is a penis symbol, but it also gets you in a couple of hours from 
Berlin to Vienna. 
The ‘lower depths’, the ‘underworld’ of the Unconscious moves the 
history of mankind without dissolving its reality, its rationality. The 
roots of repression are and remain real roots; consequently, their 
eradication remains a real and rational job. What is to be abolished is 
not the reality principle; not everything, but such particular things as 
business, politics, exploitation, poverty. Short of this recapture of reality 
and reason, Brown’s purpose is defeated, and the critical destruction of 
history, the discovery of its latent and real content, turns into the 
mystification of the latent and real content. True, in the language which 
reveals the stuff out of which history is made, the established history of 
the Establishment, from Romulus and Remus to the Founding Fathers 
and their representative government, today appears as crime, deception, 
lie, illusion; we are asleep, we are dreaming, we are dead if we 
experience this as reality, as life, freedom, fulfillment. But this illusion is 
itself a historical fact and factor, and its negation, if any, is a historical, 
definitive negation: historical goal of historical practice. Outside and 
beyond the historical continuum, the solution is nothing (as Brown’s 
last chapter indicates), and that means: it is not. And within the 
historical universe (the only one that, in any meaningful sense, can ever 
be the universe of Freedom and fulfillment), there are divisions and 
boundaries that are real and will continue to exist even in the advent of 
freedom and fulfillment, because all pleasure and all happiness and all 
humanity originate and live in and with these divisions and boundaries. 
Such are the division into the sexes, the difference between male and 
female, between the penis and the vagina, between you and me, even 
between mine and thine, and they are, or can be, most enjoyable and 
most gratifying divisions; their abolition would be not only illusion but 
nightmare – the acme of repression. To be sure, this gratification is 
transitory, momentary, and partial, but this does not make it ‘vicarious’ 
– on the contrary! To be sure, alle Lust will Ewigkeit, but this eternity can 
only be that of the ever returning moments of joy, of the ever-returning 
solution of tension. Tension can be made nonaggressive, 
nondestructive, but it can never be eliminated, because (Freud knew it 
well) its elimination would be death – not in any symbolic but in a very 
real sense. And we still want to live, within our boundaries and 
divisions, which we want to make our own instead of leaving their 
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determination to our fathers and leaders and representatives. For there 
is such a thing as the Self, the Person – it does not yet exist but it must 
be attained, fought for against all those who are preventing its 
emergence and who substitute for it an illusory self, namely, the subject 
of voluntary servitude in production and consumption, the subject of 
free enterprise and free election of masters. There is even such a thing 
as property which is a factor and ingredient of true freedom (Marx knew 
it well): that which is properly mine because I am different from you 
and can be with and for you only in this difference – boundaries to be 
enjoyed by you and by me. And there are ‘others’, strangers who must 
remain strangers, must not enter my domain or yours because there is 
no pre-established harmony, and their otherness is not based on any 
economic position, social status, racial or national heritage but on their 
own self and own body with its own drives, pleasures, sorrows. 
Here is the central fallacy, the mystification in Brown’s vision. He 
obliterates the decisive difference between real and artificial, natural and 
political, fulfilling and repressive boundaries and divisions. Does the 
well-trained classicist not recognize the liberating truth in the concepts 
of telos and mesotes? Fulfillment becomes meaningless if everything is 
one, and one is everything. The sinister images of ‘burning’ and 
‘sacrifice’ recur in Brown’s vision: “The true sacrifice is total, a making 
holy of the whole” (p. 174); “Love is all fire; and so heaven and hell are 
the same place. As in Augustine …” (p. 179); “The true body is the 
body burnt up, the spiritual body” (p. 183); “The reality adumbrated in 
all sacrifice, in animal sacrifice, is human sacrifice, the sacrifice of the 
human body, as an eternal truth” (p. 228). No symbolism can repulse 
the repressive connotation: one cannot love in fire – unless one is a 
Christian or Buddhist martyr. Acme of sublimation: the unsublimated 
realizations of Eros are burnt up, sacrificed – they evaporate. For Eros 
lives in the division and boundary between subject and object, man and 
nature; and precisely in its polymorphous-perverse manifestations, in its 
liberation from the ‘despotism of genital organization’, the sexual 
instincts transform the object and the environment – without ever 
annihilating the object and the environment together with the subject. 
 
* 
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Brown’s logic is consistent: if the Fall was the division of the original 
unity which was total unity, then the redemption can only be the 
restoration of total unity: 
Fusion: the distinction between inner self and outside world, between 
subject and object, overcome (p. 253). 
But such fusion would be the end of human life, in its instinctual as well 
as rational, unsublimated as well as sublimated, expressions. The unity 
of subject and object is a hallmark of absolute idealism; however, even 
Hegel retained the tension between the two, the distinction. Brown goes 
beyond the Absolute Idea: “Fusion, mystical, participation” (p. 254). 
But mystical participation is not made less mystical if it is ‘freely’ 
consummated, and magic does not become less magical if it is 
‘conscious magic’. 
The last sentence of the last chapter: “Everything is only a 
metaphor; there is only poetry”. To understand the reality of politics is 
to believe in the myth. We still don’t believe in it; we don’t understand; 
we are prisoners in the cave. “Turning and turning in the animal belly, 
the mineral belly, the belly of time. To find the way out: the poem” (p. 
56). This is one of Brown’s most advanced formulations: a vision of the 
truth. But poetry is made in history and makes history; and the poem 
which is ‘the way out’ will be (if ever) written and sung and heard here 
on our earth. Brown had such a poem in mind, and he started to write 
it, but it became adumbrated by the ancient ghosts, by the symbols of 
sacrifice, death, transubstantiation. The concluding reference in his 
book contains the sentence: 
Then the body of the Enlightened One becomes luminous in 
appearance, convincing and inspiring by its mere presence, while every 
word and every gesture, and even his silence, communicate the 
overwhelming reality of the Dharma. 
This does not work, and no new symbolic interpretation can remove the 
impact of the many centuries of deception and exploitation which has 
defined the connotation of these words. To be sure, the sinister spell 
can be broken: by the power of the poet and singer, even before the 
historical, the real break with deception and exploitation has occurred. 
But the poet and singer can give to such words a new and revolutionary 
connotation only if his speech and song subvert the established meaning 
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not merely symbolically but also literally, that is to say, if he cancels this 
meaning by translating the impossible into the possible, the mystical 
absurd into the real absurd, the metaphysical utopia into the historical 
utopia, the second into the first coming, redemption into liberation. 
Brown moves in the opposite direction. He begins with tearing the 
ideological veil; the “history of mankind goes from the natural cave to 
the artificial cave, from the underground cave to the aboveground 
underground” (p. 39). In such sentences, the symbolism names the 
reality as that which it is and thereby invokes revolution: 
The revolution is from below, the lower classes, the underworld, the 
damned, the disreputable, the despised and rejected. Freud’s 
revolutionary motto in The Interpretation of Dreams: Flectere si nequeo 
Superos, Acherunta movebo. If I cannot bend the higher powers, I will stir 
up the lower depths. Freud’s discovery: the universal underworld (p. 
241). 
But then, the very next paragraph opens with the statement: “Darkness 
at noon. A progressive darkening of the everyday world of common 
sense”. Of common sense only? Or has the darkness also descended on 
the ‘way out’ which Brown has opened? The equating sequence: 
revolution = revelation = redemption = resurrection strikes not only at 
common sense but at sense. True, it is not merely common sense that is 
false; thus it may be an indispensable, rational task to reduce words to 
non-sense, “to transcend the antinomy of sense and nonsense, silence 
and speech” (p. 258). However, this task, if it should help us to find ‘the 
way out’, is a political task: the silence is not that of the Tibetan or any 
other monastery, nor of Zen, nor of mystical communion – it is the 
silence which precedes action, the liberating action, and it is broken by 
action. The rest is not silence but complacency, or despair, or escape. 
And when and where such action is barred, the task of reducing words 
to non-sense is the critique of the established language as the language 
of the Establishment which makes sense out of non-sense: the non-
sense of its preservation and reproduction as its sole raison d’être. 
Brown’s ‘way out’ leaves the Establishment behind – that is, the way 
out is indeed mystical, mystification. The symbolic interpretation works 
both ways: it reveals the latent, the real content of reality, and it 
symbolizes the real content: it mystifies the possibilities of liberation. 
Revolution, freedom, fulfilment become in turn symbolic – symbolic 
goals and events. Symbolic of what? The answer remains, must remain, 
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shrouded in mystery, because Brown envisions an Absolute, a Totality, a 
Whole which swallows up all parts and divisions, all tensions and all 
needs, that is to say, all life. For such a totality does not exist in any 
sense or non-sense, and should not even be the vision of the free 
imagination because it is the negation of all freedom, and of all 
happiness (at least human happiness). To be sure, in dialectical logic, the 
whole is the truth, but a whole in which all parts and divisions have 
their place and stage. The relations between them, their specific 
function, the different levels and modes of reality, its inner development 
must be demonstrated and defined – only then, in the unending and 
subverting stream of mediations, appears the true as the bacchanalian 
whirl: sober drunkenness of the whole: Reason as Freedom. Critical, not 
absolute vision; a new rationality, not the simple negation of rationality. 
 
* 
 
In the beginning may have been the Uroboros: male and female, father 
and mother, mother and child, ego-id and outside world in one. But the 
Uroboros has busted a long time ago; the distinctions and divisions are 
our reality – real with all its symbols. In the light of its own possibilities, 
it may well be called a cave, and our life in it dream or death. Its horror 
has come to penetrate every part of it, every word and every vision. The 
way out may well be the subversion of this entire reality, but this 
subversion, in order to be real, must itself be real, look in the face of 
this reality, and not turn the head. Brown affirms the proposition on the 
need for changing the world instead of interpreting it. If there is one 
proposition which should not be understood symbolically, it is this one. 
And yet, in the development of Brown’s argument, both the latent and 
the overt content of this proposition are being sublimated and 
mystified, and his vision of total change, of the final union at the end of 
history remains under the spell of the primordial Uroboros, the unity 
that is prior to all history. 
The way out is also a way back: regression at a higher level, 
regression sanctified, liberated. Is it again a case of The God That 
Failed: from politics to a new Communion, from Liberty to Nothing? 
(When will we realize that there was no god that failed because there 
was no god, and that the failure was ours, and theirs?) Anyhow, his song 
of fulfillment ends in silence, not in the sensuous, audible, living silence 
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at the end of the Lied von der Erde, but the silence under the cross, after 
the crucifixion; not the eternity of Alle Lust will Ewigkeit (the ‘ewig’ which 
is the last word in the Lied von der Erde), but the eternity which is not of 
this world, the eternity of Nirvana in which all joy and all sorrow are 
fulfilled – annihilated. 
We like to have a different idea of Love’s Body, and we like to believe 
that Brown himself has a different idea: 
To pass from the temple to the body is to perceive the body as the new 
temple, the true temple. The house is a woman, and the woman is a 
house, or palace…. The land is a woman, the virgin land; and the 
woman is a land, my America, my Newfoundland (p. 225). 
This is it. The woman, the land is here on earth, to be found here on 
earth, living and dying, female for male, distinguished, particular, 
tension to be renewed, Romeo’s and Don Juan’s, self and another, yours 
or mine, fulfillment in alienation. No Eucharist, no crucifixion, no 
resurrection, no mysticism. To find this woman, to free this land: hic 
Rhodus, hic salta! And don’t jump into Nothing. Waking up from sleep, 
finding the way out of the cave is work within the cave; slow, painful 
work with and against the prisoners in the cave. Everywhere, even in 
your own land which is not yet found, not yet free, there are those who 
do this work, who risk their lives for it – they fight the real fight, the 
political fight. You have revealed the latent, the true content of politics 
– you know that the political fight is the fight for the whole: not the 
mystical whole, but the very unmystical, antagonistic whole of our life 
and that of our children – the only life that is. 
 
* 
 
Among the many sentences in Brown’s book which I like best is the 
opening of the Preface: “At least in the life of the mind, ventures should 
be carried through to the end”. He has not done so; this is not the end. 
He has reached a point of return; on a new way, return to the earth. Bon 
voyage! 
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A Reply to Herbert Marcuse 
By Norman O. Brown 
 
My friend Marcuse and I: Romulus and Remus quarreling; which of 
them is the real ‘revolutionary’. 
He will not see the recurrence in revolution. Revolution is not a slate 
wiped clean, but a revolving cycle (Love’s Body, p. 204). Even newness is 
renewal. As it was in the beginning. The idea of progress is in question; 
the reality of Marx cannot hide the reality of Nietzsche. The thing is to 
change the world; but it is also true that everything remains always the 
same. The assignment then is (to put it simply) the simultaneous 
affirmation and rejection of what is; not in a system, as in Hegel, but in 
an instant, as in poetry. 
There is eternal recurrence; there are ‘eternal objects’ (Whitehead); 
archetypes. This is a hard lesson. There is a sense in which war cannot 
be abolished (Love’s Body, p. 182). Or, there is an eternal object of which 
literal war is a false image, or inadequate idea. The thing to be abolished 
is literalism; the worship of false images; idolatry. Allen Ginsberg saw it 
just the way it is: Moloch. A false idol fed with real victims. This is no 
joke. (Nor is fire; Heraclitean fire.) 
Idolatry is fetishism, mystification; demystification would be an end 
to idolatry. But an end to idolatry is not so easy (Love’s Body, p. 114). It is 
not the abolition of the temple, but the discovery of the true temple: 
Love’s body. Karl Barth saw religion as idolatry; Karl Marx saw religion 
as the heart of a heartless world. The Sacred Heart. The thing is not to 
excise the heart but to put it where it belongs. The real atheism is to 
become divine. In a dialectical view, atheism becomes theurgy, god-
making; demystification becomes the discovery of a new mystery; and 
everything remains the same. 
There is another sense in which mystification must be affirmed. We 
have to surpass the Enlightenment notion that in the life of the species 
or of the individual there is a definitive change-over from darkness to 
light. Light is always light in darkness; that is what the unconscious is all 
about (Love’s Body, p. 216). Nor can the light become a current, always 
turned on, in ordinary prosaic language. Truth is always in poetic form; 
not literal but symbolic; hiding, or veiled; light in darkness. Yes, 
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mysterious. Literalism is idolatry of words; the alternative to idolatry is 
mystery. And literalism reifies, makes out of everything things, these 
tables and chairs, commodities. The alternative to reification is 
mystification (Love’s Body, p. 234). The world is actually not a collection 
of commodities; 
When silence 
Blooms in the house, all the paraphernalia of our existence 
Shed the twitterings of value and reappear as heraldic devices. 
– Robert Duncan 
Heraldic devices: airplanes as penis symbols rather than ‘modern 
conveniences’. One of the eternal verities is the human body as the 
measure of all things, including technology. The businessman does not 
have the last word; the real meaning of technology is its hidden relation 
to the human body; a symbolical or mystical relation. 
 
* 
 
With the whole world still in the bourgeois stage of competitive 
development and war, the thing to remember about Mars is that he was 
able to look beyond this world to another possible world, of union, 
communion, communism. What needs to be reiterated is not 
reassurance to the bourgeois that he will be able to carry his little old 
Self, Person, and Property into that world, but that the kingdom of 
heaven on earth is possible; and that other world, the negation of this 
jungle, cannot possibly be anything except Communitas. A higher form 
of chaos; instead of confusion, fusion (Love’s Body, pp. 248, 253). 
And, after Freud, we have to add that there is also a sexual 
revolution; which is not to be found in the bourgeois cycle of repression 
and promiscuity, but in a transformation of the human body, an 
abolition of genital organization. Indeed, Love’s Body shows that genital 
organization is the same thing as Self, Person, Property; and, therefore, 
the abolition of genital organization, foretold by Marcuse in Eros and 
Civilization, turns out to mean what Marcuse calls the impossible unity 
and union of everything. 
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Yes, indeed, there was a God that failed; that mortal God, the great 
Leviathan; or Moloch; discovered to be not only mortal but also dead, 
an idol. From literalism to symbolism; the lesson of my life. The next 
generation needs to be told that the real fight is not the political fight, 
but to put an end to politics. From politics to metapolitics. 
From politics to poetry. Legislation is not politics, nor philosophy, 
but poetry. Poetry, art, is not an epiphenomenal reflection of some 
other (political, economic) realm which is the ‘real thing’; nor a still 
contemplation of something else which is the ‘real action’; nor a 
sublimation of something else which is the ‘real’, carnal ‘act’. Poetry, art, 
imagination, the creator spirit is life itself; the real revolutionary power 
to change the world; and to change the human body. To change the 
human body: here is the crisis, hic Rhodus, hic salta; which, as Hegel said, 
is to be translated ‘here is the Rose, here begin to dance’. To begin to 
dance; who can tell the dancer from the dance; it is the impossible unity 
and union of everything. 
From politics to life. And therefore revolution as creation; 
resurrection; renaissance instead of progress. To perceive in all human 
culture the hidden reality of the human body. This is to discover as 
Freud did, the Holy Communion as the basis of community; the 
Eucharist; the cannibalism, the hidden eating; one of the forms of which 
is war – making children pass through the fire unto Moloch. Go to the 
end of the road and that is what you will find. And so the God is not 
Freud’s God Logos, abstract or disembodied Reason, but the Human 
Form Divine. And the language is the language not of reason but of 
love. Reason is power; powerful arguments; power politics; Realpolitik; 
reality-principle. Love comes empty-handed (Love’s Body, p. 237); the 
eternal proletariat; like Cordelia, bringing Nothing. 
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Aggressiveness in Advanced Industrial 
Societies 
I propose to consider here the strains and stresses in the so-called 
‘affluent society’, a phrase which has (rightly or wrongly) been coined to 
describe contemporary American society. Its main characteristics are: (1) 
an abundant industrial and technical capacity which is to a great extent 
spent in the production and distribution of luxury goods, gadgets, waste, 
planned obsolescence, military or semimilitary equipment – in short, in 
what economists and sociologists used to call ‘unproductive’ goods and 
services; (2) a rising standard of living, which also extends to previously 
underprivileged parts of the population; (3) a high degree of 
concentration of economic and political power, combined with a high 
degree of organization and government intervention in the economy; (4) 
scientific and pseudoscientific investigation, control, and manipulation 
of private and group behavior, both at work and at leisure (including the 
behavior of the psyche, the soul, the unconscious, and the 
subconscious) for commercial and political purposes. All these 
tendencies are interrelated: they make up the syndrome which expresses 
the normal functioning of the ‘affluent society’. To demonstrate this 
interrelation is not my task here; I take its existence as the sociological 
basis for the thesis which I want to submit, namely, that the strains and 
stresses suffered by the individual in the affluent society are grounded in 
the normal functioning of this society (and of the individual!) rather 
than in its disturbances and diseases. 
‘Normal functioning’: I think the definition presents no difficulties 
for the doctor. The organism functions normally if it functions, without 
disturbance, in accord with the biological and physiological makeup of 
the human body. The human faculties and capabilities are certainly very 
Negations 
188 
different among the members of the species, and the species itself has 
changed greatly in the course of its history but these changes have 
occurred on a biological and physiological basis which has remained 
largely constant. To be sure, the physician, in making his diagnosis and 
in proposing treatment, will take into account the patient’s environment, 
upbringing, and occupation; these factors may limit the extent to which 
normal functioning can be defined and achieved, or they may even 
make this achievement impossible, but as criterion and goal, normality 
remains a clear and meaningful concept. As such, it is identical with 
‘health’, and the various deviations from it are to various degrees of 
‘disease’. 
The situation of the psychiatrist seems to be quite different. At first 
glance, normality seems to be defined along the same lines the physician 
uses. The normal functioning of the mind (psyche, psyche-soma) is that 
which enables the individual to perform, to function in accord with his 
position as child, adolescent, parent, as a single person or married, in 
accord with his job, profession, status. But this definition contains 
factors of an entirely new dimension, namely, that of society, and 
society is a factor of normality in a far more essential sense than that of 
external influence, so much so that ‘normal’ seems to be a social and 
institutional rather than individual condition. It is probably easy to agree 
on what is the normal functioning of the digestive tract, the lungs, and 
the heart, but what is the normal functioning of the mind in 
lovemaking, in other interpersonal relations, at work and at leisure, at a 
meeting of a board of directors, on the golf course, in the slums, in 
prison, in the army? While the normal functioning of the digestive tract 
or the lung is likely to be the same in the case of a healthy corporation 
executive and of a healthy laborer, this does not hold true of their 
minds. In fact, the one would be very abnormal if he regularly thought, 
felt, and operated like the other. And what is ‘normal’ lovemaking, a 
‘normal’ family, a ‘normal’ occupation? 
The psychiatrist might proceed like the general physician and direct 
therapy to making the patient function within his family, in his job or 
environment, while trying to influence and even change the 
environmental factors as much as this is in his power. The limits will 
soon make themselves felt, for example, if the mental strains and 
stresses of the patient are caused, not merely by certain bad conditions 
in his job, in his neighborhood, in his social status, but by the very nature 
of the job, the neighborhood, the status itself – in their normal 
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condition. Then making him normal for this condition would mean 
normalizing the strains and stresses, or to put it more brutally: making 
him capable of being sick, of living his sickness as health, without his 
noticing that he is sick precisely when he sees himself and is seen as 
healthy and normal. This would be the case if his work is, by its very 
nature, ‘deadening’, stupefying, wasteful (even though the job pays well 
and is ‘socially’ necessary), or if the person belongs to a minority group 
which is underprivileged in the established society, traditionally poor 
and occupied mainly in menial and ‘dirty’ physical labor. But this would 
also be the case (in very different forms) on the other side of the fence 
among the tycoons of business and politics, where efficient and 
profitable performance requires (and reproduces) the qualities of smart 
ruthlessness, moral indifference, and persistent aggressiveness. In such 
cases, ‘normal’ functioning would be tantamount to a distortion and 
mutilation of a human being – no matter how modestly one may define 
the human qualities of a human being. Erich Fromm wrote The Sane 
Society; it deals, not with the established, but with a future, society, the 
implication being that the established society is not sane but insane. Is 
not the individual who functions normally, adequately, and healthily as a 
citizen of a sick society – is not such an individual himself sick? And 
would not a sick society require an antagonistic concept of mental 
health, a meta-concept designating (and preserving) mental qualities 
which are tabooed, arrested, or distorted by the ‘sanity’ prevalent in the 
sick society? (For example, mental health equals the ability to live as a 
dissenter, to live a nonadjusted life.) 
As a tentative definition of ‘sick society’ we can say that a society is 
sick when its basic institutions and relations, its structure, are such that 
they do not permit the use of the available material and intellectual 
resources for the optimal development and satisfaction of individual 
needs. The larger the discrepancy between the potential and the actual 
human conditions, the greater the social need for what I term ‘surplus-
repression’, that is, repression necessitated not by the growth and 
preservation of civilization but by the vested interest in maintaining an 
established society. Such surplus-repression introduces (over and above, 
or rather underneath, the social conflicts) new strains and stresses in the 
individuals. Usually handled by the normal working of the social 
process, which assures adjustment and submission (fear of loss of job or 
status, ostracism, and so forth, no special enforcement policies with 
respect to the mind are required. But in contemporary affluent society, 
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the discrepancy between the established modes of existence and the real 
possibilities of human freedom is so great that, in order to prevent an 
explosion, society has to insure a more effective mental coordination of 
individuals: in its unconscious as well as conscious dimensions, the 
psyche is opened up and subjected to systematic manipulation and 
control. 
When I speak of the surplus-repression ‘required’ for the 
maintenance of a society, or of the need for systematic manipulation 
and control, I do not refer to individually experienced social needs and 
consciously inaugurated policies: they may be thus experienced and 
inaugurated or they may not. I rather speak of tendencies, forces which 
can be identified by an analysis of the existing society and which assert 
themselves even if the policy makers are not aware of them. They 
express the requirements of the established apparatus of production, 
distribution, and consumption – economic, technical, political, mental 
requirements which have to be fulfilled in order to assure the continued 
functioning of the apparatus on which the population depends, and the 
continuing function of the social relationships derived from the 
organization of the apparatus. These objective tendencies become 
manifest in the trend of the economy, in technological change, in the 
domestic and foreign policy of a nation or group of nations, and they 
generate common, supraindividual needs and goals in the different 
social classes, pressure groups, and parties. Under the normal conditions 
of social cohesion, the objective tendencies override or absorb 
individual interests and goals without exploding the society; however, 
the particular interest is not simply determined by the universal: the 
former has its own range of freedom, and contributes, in accordance 
with its social position, to the shaping of the general interest – but short 
of a revolution, the particular needs and goals will remain defined by the 
predominant objective tendencies. Marx believed that they assert 
themselves ‘behind the back’ of the individuals; in the advanced 
societies of today, this is true only with strong qualifications. Social 
engineering, scientific management of enterprise and human relations, 
and manipulation of instinctual needs are practiced on the policy-
making level and testify to the degree of awareness within the general 
blindness. 
As for the systematic manipulation and control of the psyche in the 
advanced industrial society, manipulation and control for what, and by 
whom? Over and above all particular manipulation in the interest of 
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certain businesses, policies, lobbies – the general objective purpose is to 
reconcile the individual with the mode of existence which his society 
imposes on him. Because of the high degree of surplus-repression 
involved in such reconciliation, it is necessary to achieve a libidinal 
cathexis of the merchandise the individual has to buy (or sell), the 
services he has to use (or perform), the fun he has to enjoy, the status 
symbols he has to carry – necessary, because the existence of the society 
depends on their uninterrupted production and consumption. In other 
words, social needs must become individual needs, instinctual needs. 
And to the degree to which the productivity of this society requires 
mass production and mass consumption, these needs must be 
standardized, coordinated, generalized. Certainly, these controls are not 
a conspiracy, they are not centralized in any agency or group of agencies 
(although the trend toward centralization is gaining momentum); they 
are rather diffused throughout the society, exercised by the neighbors, 
the community, the peer groups, mass media, corporations, and 
(perhaps least) by the government. But they are exercised with the help 
of, in fact rendered possible by, science, by the social and behavioral 
sciences, and especially by sociology and psychology. As industrial 
sociology and psychology, or, more euphemistically, as ‘science of 
human relations’, these scientific efforts have become an indispensable 
tool in the hands of the powers that be. 
These brief remarks are suggestive of the depth of society’s 
ingression into the psyche, the extent to which mental health, normality, 
is not that of the individual but of his society. Such a harmony between 
the individual and society would be highly desirable if the society 
offered the individual the conditions for his development as a human 
being in accord with the available possibilities of freedom, peace, and 
happiness (that is in accord with the possible liberation of his life 
instincts), but it is highly destructive to the individual if these conditions 
do not prevail. Where they do not prevail, the healthy and normal 
individual is a human being equipped with all the qualities which enable 
him to get along with others in his society, and these very same qualities 
are the marks of repression, the marks of a mutilated human being, who 
collaborates in his own repression, in the containment of potential 
individual and social freedom, in the release of aggression. And this 
situation cannot be solved within the framework of individual 
psychology and therapy, nor within the framework of any psychology – 
a solution can be envisaged only on the political level: in the struggle 
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against society. To be sure, therapy could demonstrate this situation and 
prepare the mental ground for such a struggle – but then psychiatry 
would be a subversive undertaking. 
The question now is whether the strains in contemporary American 
society, in the affluent society, suggest the prevalence of conditions 
essentially negative to individual development in the sense just 
discussed. Or, to formulate the question in terms more indicative of the 
approach I propose to take: Do these strains vitiate the very possibility 
of ‘healthy’ individual development – healthy defined in terms of 
optimal development of one’s intellectual and emotional faculties? The 
question calls for an affirmative answer, that is, this society vitiates 
individual developments, if the prevailing strains are related to the very 
structure of this society and if they activate in its members instinctual 
needs and satisfactions which set the individuals against themselves so 
that they reproduce and intensify their own repression. 
At first glance, the strains in our society seem to be those 
characteristic of any society which develops under the impact of great 
technological changes: they initiate new modes of work and of leisure 
and thereby affect all social relationships, and bring about a thorough 
transvaluation of values. Since physical labor tends to become 
increasingly unnecessary and even wasteful, since the work of salaried 
employees too becomes increasingly ‘automatic’ and that of the 
politicians and administrators increasingly questionable, the traditional 
content of the struggle for existence appears more meaningless and 
without substance the more it appears as unnecessary necessity. But the 
future alternative, namely, the possible abolition of (alienated) labor 
seems equally meaningless, nay, frightening. And indeed, if one 
envisages this alternative as the progress and development of the 
established system, then the dislocation of the content of life to free time 
suggests the shape of a nightmare: massive self-realization, fun, sport in 
a steadily shrinking space. 
But the threat of the ‘bogey of automation’ is itself ideology. On the 
one hand it serves the perpetuation and reproduction of technically 
obsolete and unnecessary jobs and occupations (unemployment as 
normal condition, even if comfortable, seems worse than stupefying 
routine work); on the other hand it justifies and promotes the education 
and training of the managers and organization men of leisure time, that 
is to say, it serves to prolong and enlarge control and manipulation. 
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The real danger for the established system is not the abolition of 
labor but the possibility of nonalienated labor as the basis of the 
reproduction of society. Not that people are no longer compelled to 
work, but that they might be compelled to work for a very different life 
and in very different relations, that they might be given very different 
goals and values, that they might have to live with a very different 
morality – this is the ‘definite negation’ of the established system, the 
liberating alternative. For example, socially necessary labor might be 
organized for such efforts as the rebuilding of cities and towns, the 
relocation of the places of work (so that people learn again how to 
walk), the construction of industries which produce goods without 
built-in obsolescence, without profitable waste and poor quality, and the 
subjection of the environment to the vital aesthetic needs of the 
organism. To be sure, to translate this possibility into reality would 
mean to eliminate the power of the dominant interests which, by their 
very function in the society, are opposed to a development that would 
reduce private enterprise to a minor role, that would do away with the 
market economy, and with the policy of military preparedness, 
expansion, and intervention – in other words: a development that would 
reverse the entire prevailing trend. There is little evidence for such a 
development. In the meantime, and with the new and terribly effective 
and total means provided by technical progress, the population is 
physically and mentally mobilized against this eventuality: they must 
continue the struggle for existence in painful, costly, and obsolete 
forms. 
This is the real contradiction which translates itself from the social 
structure into the mental structure of the individuals. There, it activates 
and aggravates destructive tendencies which, in a hardly sublimated 
mode, are made socially useful in the behavior of the individuals, on the 
private as well as political level – in the behavior of the nation as a 
whole. Destructive energy becomes socially useful aggressive energy, 
and the aggressive behavior impels growth – growth of economic, 
political, and technical power. Just as in the contemporary scientific 
enterprise, so in the economic enterprise and in that of the nation as a 
whole, constructive and destructive achievements, work for life and 
work for death, procreating and killing are inextricably united. To 
restrict the exploitation of nuclear energy would mean to restrict its 
peaceful as well as military potential; the amelioration and protection of 
life appear as by-products of the scientific work on the annihilation of 
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life; to restrict procreation would also mean to restrict potential 
manpower and the number of potential customers and clients. Now the 
(more or less sublimated) transformation of destructive into socially 
useful aggressive (and thereby constructive) energy is, according to 
Freud (on whose instinct-theory I base my interpretation) a normal and 
indispensable process. It is part of the same dynamic by which libido, 
erotic energy, is sublimated and made socially useful; the two opposite 
impulses are forced together and, united in this twofold transformation, 
they become the mental and organic vehicles of civilization. But no 
matter how close and effective their union, their respective quality 
remains unchanged and contrary: aggression activates destruction which 
‘aims’ at death, while libido seeks the preservation, protection, and 
amelioration of life. Therefore, it is only as long as destruction works in 
the service of Eros that it serves civilization and the individual; if 
aggression becomes stronger than its erotic counterpart, the trend is 
reversed. Moreover, in the Freudian conception, destructive energy 
cannot become stronger without reducing erotic energy: the balance 
between the two primary impulses is a quantitative one; the instinctual 
dynamic is mechanistic, distributing an available quantum of energy 
between the two antagonists. 
I have briefly restated Freud’s conception inasmuch as I shall use it 
to discuss the depth and character of the strains prevalent in American 
society. I suggest that the strains derive from the basic contradiction 
between the capabilities of this society, which could produce essentially 
new forms of freedom amounting to a subversion of the established 
institutions on the one hand, and the repressive use of these capabilities 
on the other. The contradiction explodes – and is at the same time 
‘resolved’, ‘contained’ – in the ubiquitous aggression prevalent in this 
society. Its most conspicuous (but by no means isolated) manifestation 
is the military mobilization and its effect on the mental behavior of the 
individuals, but within the context of the basic contradiction, 
aggressiveness is fed by many sources. The following seem to be 
foremost: 
(1) The dehumanization of the process of production and consumption. 
Technical progress is identical with the increasing elimination of 
personal initiative, inclination, taste, and need from the provision of 
goods and services. This tendency is liberating if the available resources 
and techniques are used for freeing the individual from labor and 
recreation which are required for the reproduction of the established 
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institutions but are parasitic, wasteful, and dehumanizing in terms of the 
existing technical and intellectual capabilities. The same tendency often 
gratifies hostility. 
(2) The conditions of crowding, noise, and overtness characteristic of mass society. 
As René Dubos has said, the need for “quiet, privacy, independence, 
initiative, and some open space” are not “frills or luxuries but constitute 
real biological necessities”. Their lack injures the instinctual structure 
itself. Freud has emphasized the ‘asocial’ character of Eros – the mass 
society achieves an ‘oversocialization’ to which the individual reacts 
“with all sorts of frustrations, repressions, aggressions, and fears which 
soon develop into genuine neuroses”. 
I mentioned, as the most conspicuous social mobilization of 
aggressiveness, the militarization of the affluent society. This 
mobilization goes far beyond the actual draft of manpower and the 
buildup of the armament industry: its truly totalitarian aspects show 
forth in the daily mass media which feed ‘public opinion’. The 
brutalization of language and image, the presentation of killing, burning, 
and poisoning and torture inflicted upon the victims of neocolonial 
slaughter is made in a common-sensible, factual, sometimes humorous 
style which integrates these horrors with the pranks of juvenile 
delinquents, football contests, accidents, stock market reports, and the 
weatherman. This is no longer the ‘classical’ heroizing of killing in the 
national interest, but rather its reduction to the level of natural events 
and contingencies of daily life. 
The consequence is a ‘psychological habituation of war’ which is 
administered to a people protected from the actuality of war, a people 
who, by virtue of this habituation, easily familiarizes itself with the ‘kill 
rate’ as it is already familiar with other ‘rates’ (such as those of business 
or traffic or unemployment). The people are conditioned to live “with 
the hazards, the brutalities, and the mounting casualties of the war in 
Vietnam, just as one learns gradually to live with the everyday hazards 
and casualties of smoking, of smog, or of traffic”.1 The photos which 
appear in the daily newspapers and in magazines with mass circulation, 
often in nice and glossy color, show rows of prisoners laid out or stood 
up for ‘interrogation’, little children dragged through the dust behind 
armored cars, mutilated women. They are nothing new (‘such things 
happen in a war’), but it is the setting that makes the difference: their 
appearance in the regular program, in togetherness with the 
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commercials, sports, local politics, and reports on the social set. And the 
brutality of power is further normalized by its extension to the beloved 
automobile: the manufacturers sell a Thunderbird, Fury, Tempest, and 
the oil industry puts ‘a tiger in your tank’. 
However, the administered language is rigidly discriminating: a 
specific vocabulary of hate, resentment, and defamation is reserved for 
opposition to the aggressive policies and for the enemy. The pattern 
constantly repeats itself. Thus, when students demonstrate against the 
war, it is a ‘mob’ swelled by ‘bearded advocates of sexual freedom’, by 
unwashed juveniles, and by ‘hoodlums and street urchins’ who ‘tramp’ 
the streets, while the counterdemonstrations consist of citizens who 
gather. In Vietnam, ‘typical criminal communist violence’ is perpetrated 
against American ‘strategic operations’. The Reds have the impertinence 
to launch ‘a sneak attack’ (presumably they are supposed to announce it 
beforehand and to deploy in the open); they are ‘evading a death trap’ 
(presumably they should have stayed in). The Vietcong attack American 
barracks ‘in the dead of night’ and kill American boys (presumably, 
Americans only attack in broad daylight, don’t disturb the sleep of the 
enemy, and don’t kill Vietnamese boys). The massacre of hundreds of 
thousands of communists (in Indonesia) is called ‘impressive’ – a 
comparable ‘killing rate’ suffered by the other side would hardly have 
been honored with such an adjective. To the Chinese, the presence of 
American troops in East Asia is a threat to their ‘ideology’, while 
presumably the presence of Chinese troops in Central or South America 
would be a real, and not only ideological, threat to the United States. 
The loaded language proceeds according to the Orwellian recipe of 
the identity of opposites: in the mouth of the enemy, peace means war, 
and defense is attack, while on the righteous side, escalation is restraint, 
and saturation bombing prepares for peace. Organized in this 
discriminatory fashion, language designates a priori the enemy as evil in 
his entirety and in all his actions and intentions. 
Such mobilization of aggressiveness cannot be explained by the 
magnitude of the communist threat: the image of the ostensible enemy 
is inflated out of all proportion to reality. What is at stake is rather the 
continued stability and growth of a system which is threatened by its 
own irrationality – by the narrow base on which its prosperity rests, by 
the dehumanization which its wasteful and parasitic affluence demands. 
The senseless war is itself part of this irrationality and thus of the 
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essence of the system. What may have been a minor involvement at the 
beginning, almost an accident, a contingency of foreign policy, has 
become a test case for the productivity, competitiveness, and prestige of 
the whole. The billions of dollars spent for the war effort are a political 
as well as economic stimulus (or cure): a big way of absorbing part of 
the economic surplus, and of keeping the people in line. Defeat in 
Vietnam may well be the signal for other wars of liberation closer to 
home – and perhaps even for rebellion at home. 
To be sure, the social utilization of aggressiveness belongs to the 
historical structure of civilization and has been a powerful vehicle of 
progress. However, here too, there is a stage where quantity may turn 
into quality and subvert the normal balance between the two primary 
instincts in favor of destruction. I mentioned the ‘bogey man’ of 
automation. In fact the real spectre for the affluent society is the 
possible reduction of labor to a level where the human organism need 
no longer function as an instrument of labor. The mere quantitative 
decline in needed human labor power militates against the maintenance 
of the capitalist mode of production (as of all other exploitative modes 
of production). The system reacts by stepping up the production of 
goods and services which either do not enlarge individual consumption 
at all, or enlarge it with luxuries – luxuries in the face of persistent 
poverty, but luxuries which are necessities for occupying a labor force 
sufficient to reproduce the established economic and political 
institutions. To the degree to which this sort of work appears as 
superfluous, senseless, and unnecessary while necessary for earning a 
living, frustration is built into the very productivity of this society, and 
aggressiveness is activated. And to the degree to which the society in its 
very structure becomes aggressive, the mental structure of its citizens 
adjusts itself: the individual becomes at one and the same time more 
aggressive and more pliable and submissive, for he submits to a society 
which, by virtue of its affluence and power, satisfies his deepest (and 
otherwise greatly repressed) instinctual needs. And these instinctual 
needs apparently find their libidinal reflection in the representatives of 
the people. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee of the 
United States Senate, Senator Russell of Georgia, was struck by this fact. 
He is quoted as saying: 
There is something about preparing for destruction that causes men to 
be more careless in spending money than they would be if they were 
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building for constructive purposes. Why that is, I do not know; but I 
have observed, over a period of almost thirty years in the Senate, that 
there is something about buying arms with which to kill, to destroy, to 
wipe out cities, and to obliterate great transportation systems which 
causes men not to reckon the dollar cost as closely as they do when they 
think about proper housing and the care of the health of human 
beings.2 
I have argued elsewhere the question of how one can possibly gauge 
and historically compare the aggression prevalent in a specific society; 
instead of restating the case, I want now to focus on different aspects, 
on the specific forms in which aggression today is released and satisfied. 
The most telling one, and the one which distinguishes the new from 
the traditional forms, is what I call technological aggression and satisfaction. 
The phenomenon is quickly described: the act of aggression is physically 
carried out by a mechanism with a high degree of automatism, of far 
greater power than the individual human being who sets it in motion, 
keeps it in motion, and determines its end or target. The most extreme 
case is the rocket or missile; the most ordinary example the automobile. 
This means that the energy, the power activated and consummated is 
the mechanical, electrical, or nuclear energy of ‘things’ rather than the 
instinctual energy of a human being. Aggression is, as it were, 
transferred from a subject to an object, or is at least ‘mediated’ by an 
object, and the target is destroyed by a thing rather than by a person. 
This change in the relation between human and material energy, and 
between the physical and mental part of aggression (man becomes the 
subject and agent of aggression by virtue of his mental rather than 
physical faculties) must also affect the mental dynamic. I submit a 
hypothesis which is suggested by the inner logic of the process: with the 
‘delegation’ of destruction to a more or less automated thing or group 
and system of things, the instinctual satisfaction of the human person is 
‘interrupted’, reduced, frustrated, ‘supersublimated’. And such 
frustration makes for repetition and escalation: increasing violence, 
speed, enlarged scope. At the same time, personal responsibility, 
conscience, and the sense of guilt is weakened, or rather diffused, 
displaced from the actual context in which the aggression was 
committed (i.e. bombing raids), and relocated in a more or less 
innocuous context (impoliteness, sexual inadequacy, etc.). In this 
reaction too, the effect is a considerable weakening of the sense of guilt, 
and the defense (hatred, resentment) is also redirected from the real 
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responsible subject (the commanding officer, the government) to a 
substitute person: not I as a (morally and physically) acting person did it, 
but the thing, the machine. The machine: the word suggests that an 
apparatus consisting of human beings may be substituted for the 
mechanical apparatus: the bureaucracy, the administration, the party, or 
organization is the responsible agent: I, the individual person, was only 
the instrumentality. And an instrument cannot, in any moral sense, be 
responsible or be in a state of guilt. In this way, another barrier against 
aggression, which civilization had erected in a long and violent process 
of discipline is removed. And the expansion of advanced capitalism 
becomes involved in a fateful psychical dialectic which enters into and 
propels its economic and political dynamic: the more powerful and 
‘technological’ aggression becomes, the less is it apt to satisfy and pacify 
the primary impulse, and the more it tends toward repetition and 
escalation. 
To be sure, the use of instruments of aggression is as old as 
civilization itself, but there is a decisive difference between technological 
aggression and the more primitive forms. The latter were not only 
quantitatively different (weaker): they required activation and engagement 
of the body to a much higher degree than the automated or 
semiautomated instruments of aggression. The knife, the ‘blunt 
instrument’, even the revolver are far more ‘part’ of the individual who 
uses them and they associate him more closely with his target. 
Moreover, and most important, their use, unless effectively sublimated 
and in the service of the life instincts (as in the case of the surgeon, 
household, etc.), is criminal – individual crime – and as such subject to 
severe punishment. In contrast, technological aggression is not a crime. 
The speeding driver of an automobile or motor boat is not called a 
murderer even if he is one; and certainly the missile-firing engineers are 
not. 
Technological aggression releases a mental dynamic which 
aggravates the destructive, antierotic tendencies of the puritan complex. 
The new modes of aggression destroy without getting one’s hands dirty, 
one’s body soiled, one’s mind incriminated. The killer remains clean, 
physically as well as mentally. The purity of his deadly work obtains 
added sanction if it is directed against the national enemy in the national 
interest. 
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The (anonymous) lead article in Les Temps Modernes (January 1966) 
links the war in Vietnam with the puritan tradition in the United States. 
The image of the enemy is that of dirt in its most repulsive forms; the 
unclean jungle is his natural habitat, disembowelment and beheading are 
his natural ways of action. Consequently, the burning of his refuge, 
defoliation, and the poisoning of his foodstuff are not only strategic but 
also moral operations: removing of contagious dirt, clearing the way for 
the order of political hygiene and righteousness. And the mass purging 
of the good conscience from all rational inhibitions leads to the atrophy 
of the last rebellion of sanity against the madhouse: no satire, no 
ridicule attends the moralists who organize and defend the crime. Thus 
one of them can, without becoming a laughingstock, publicly praise as 
the ‘greatest performance in our nation’s history’, the indeed historical 
achievement of the richest, most powerful, and most advanced country 
of the world unleashing the destructive force of its technical superiority 
on one of the poorest, weakest, and most helpless countries of the 
world. 
The decline of responsibility and guilt, their absorption by the 
omnipotent technical and political apparatus also tends to invalidate 
other values which were to restrain and sublimate aggression. While the 
militarization of society remains the most conspicuous and destructive 
manifestation of this tendency, its less ostensible effects in the cultural 
dimension should not be minimized. One of these effects is the 
disintegration of the value of truth. The media enjoy a large dispensation 
from the commitment to truth, and in a very special way. The point is 
not that the media lie (‘lie’ presupposes commitment to truth), they 
rather mingle truth and half-truth with omission, factual reporting with 
commentary and evaluation, information with publicity and propaganda 
– all this made into an overwhelming whole through editorializing. The 
editorially unpleasant truths (and how many of the most decisive truths 
are not unpleasant?) retreat between the lines, or hide, or mingle 
harmoniously with nonsense, fun, and so-called human interest stories. 
And the consumer is readily inclined to take all this for granted – he 
buys it even if he knows better. Now the commitment to the truth has 
always been precarious, hedged with strong qualifications, suspended, or 
suppressed – it is only in the context of the general and democratic 
activation of aggressiveness that the devaluation of truth assumes 
special significance. For truth is a value in the strict sense inasmuch as it 
serves the protection and amelioration of life, as a guide in man’s 
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struggle with nature and with himself, with his own weakness and his 
own destructiveness. In this function, truth is indeed a matter of the 
sublimated life instincts, Eros, of intelligence becoming responsible and 
autonomous, striving to liberate life from dependence on unmastered 
and repressive forces. And with respect to this protective and liberating 
function of truth, its devaluation removes another effective barrier 
against destruction. 
The encroachment of aggression on the domain of the life instincts 
also devalues the aesthetic dimension. In Eros and Civilization I have tried 
to show the erotic component in this dimension. Nonfunctional, that is 
to say, not committed to the functioning of a repressive society, the 
aesthetic values have been strong protectors of Eros in civilization. 
Nature is part of this dimension. Eros seeks, in polymorphous forms, its 
own sensuous world of fulfillment, its own ‘natural’ environment. But 
only in a protected world – protected from daily business, from noise, 
crowds, waste, only thus can it satisfy the biological need for happiness. 
The aggressive business practices which turn ever more spaces of 
protective nature into a medium of commercial fulfillment and fun thus 
do not merely offend beauty – they repress biological necessities. 
Once we agree to discuss the hypothesis that, in advanced industrial 
society surplus-aggression is released in quite unsuspected and ‘normal’ 
behavior, we may see it even in areas which are far removed from the 
more familiar manifestations of aggression, for instance the style of 
publicity and information practiced by the mass media. Characteristic is 
the permanent repetition: the same commercial with the same text or 
picture broadcast or televised again and again; the same phrases and 
clichés poured out by the purveyors and makers of information again 
and again; the same programs and platforms professed by the politicians 
again and again. Freud arrived at his concept of the death instinct in the 
context of his analysis of the ‘repetition compulsion’: he associated with 
it the striving for a state of complete inertia, absence of tension, return 
to the womb, annihilation. Hitler knew well the extreme function of 
repetition: the biggest lie, often enough repeated, will be acted upon and 
accepted as truth. Even in its less extreme use, constant repetition, 
imposed upon more or less captive audiences, may be destructive: 
destroying mental autonomy, freedom of thought, responsibility and 
conducive to inertia, submission, rejection of change. The established 
society, the master of repetition, becomes the great womb for its 
citizens. To be sure, this road to inertia and this reduction of tension is 
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one of high and not very satisfactory sublimation: it does not lead to an 
instinctual nirvana of satisfaction. However, it may well reduce the 
stress of intelligence, the pain and tension which accompany 
autonomous mental activity – thus it may be an effective aggression 
against the mind in its socially disturbing, critical functions. 
These are highly speculative hypotheses on the socially and mentally 
fateful character of aggression in our society. Aggression is (in most 
cases) socially useful destructiveness – and yet fateful because of its self-
propelling character and scope. In this respect too, it is badly sublimated 
and not very satisfying. If Freud’s theory is correct, and the destructive 
impulse strives for the annihilation of the individual’s own life no matter 
how long the ‘detour’ via other lives and targets, then we may indeed 
speak of a suicidal tendency on a truly social scale, and the national and 
international play with total destruction may well have found a firm 
basis in the instinctual structure of individuals. 
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Notes 
Foreword 
1. Translator’s note: ‘Bedürfnis’ means ‘need’ or ‘want’. I have often rendered it by 
‘want’, which, while denoting an objective condition of lack, has taken on 
the connotation, derived from recent usage of ‘to want’, of subjective and 
conscious desire. 
2. The last time in Europe. Today the historical heritage of this struggle is to 
be found in those nations which defend their freedom in uncompromising 
struggle against the neo-colonial powers. 
3. Translator’s note: ‘Herrschaft’, from ‘Herr’ (lord), means ‘lordship’, i.e. generally 
‘domination’, from ‘dominus’ (lord), and thus by extension ‘authority’, 
‘control’, even, mirabile dictu, ‘imperative coordination’. I have used 
‘domination’ except where English usage seemed to make ‘authority’ or 
‘control’ advisable. 
4. Translator’s note: ‘Möglichkeit’ means both potentiality and possibility (both 
derived from ‘posse’ [to be able]). I have usually used ‘potentiality’ except in 
the contexts ‘real possibility’ and ‘formal possibility’. 
5. Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Berlin, 1953), 
p. 593. 
6. Ibid., pp. 599-600. 
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1 The struggle against liberalism in the totalitarian view of the 
state 
1. Translator’s note: In common parlance, ‘Volk’ means ‘people’ or ‘nation’, and 
in such contexts I have so translated it. In National Socialist ideology and its 
precursors, it means an organic, racial community. In this usage I have in 
principle rendered it as ‘folk’, and the derived adjective ‘völkisch’ as 
‘folkish’. To the extent, however, that the meaning attached to the English 
words ‘nation’ and ‘people’ by chauvinists does not differ as much from that 
of ‘Volk’ as one would imagine on seeing ‘folk’, I have used ‘nation’ or 
‘people’ when the German text seemed to be of chauvinistic, rather than 
explicitly racist or natural-organic, import. 
2. Ernst Krieck, Nationalpolitische Erziehung, 14th-16th impression (1933), p. 68. 
3. In the following we shall use the expression ‘heroic-folkish realism’ to 
designate the entirety of the view of history and society adapted by the total-
authoritarian state. Also, in speaking of the ‘totalitarian view of the state’, we 
do not mean the doctrine of the state taken in its strictest sense, but the 
‘weltanschauung’ appropriated by this state. Recent developments reflect 
attempts being made to split up the concept of the total state and 
differentiate it according to distinct modes of totalization. So, to mention 
only the most characteristic terms, Germany is spoken of as a total ‘folkish’, 
‘authoritarian’, or ‘leadership’ state. See Köllreutter, Allgemeine Staatslehre 
(1933). p. 64; Freisler in Deutsche Justiz (1934). No. 2; E. R. Huber in Tat, 
XXVI (1934), No. 1. But the differences do not affect the foundations of 
the total state, which are the object of our interpretation. To the extent that 
they fall within these foundations, our interpretation applies to them even 
when they are not mentioned explicitly. 
4. Translator’s note: ‘Führer’ means ‘leader’. I have so translated it except when its 
identification with the person of Adolf Hitler makes it no more than a 
proper noun. 
5. Krieck, op. cit., p. 37. 
6. See the discussion of Spengler’s Jahre der Entscheidung in Zeitschrift für 
Sozialforschung, II, No. 3. 
7. Othmar Spann, Gesellschaftslehre (3d ed., 1930), p. 98. 
8. Möller van den Bruck, Das dritte Reich, Special edition (Hamburg: 
Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1933). p. 69. The political theory of 
antiliberalism was created by Carl Schmitt, who was followed by Köllreutter, 
Hans J. Wolff, et al. 
9. Köllreutter, op. cit., p. 21: “Marxism is a spiritual fruit of liberalism….” 
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10. A good collection of all antiliberalist slogans may be found in Krieck, op. cit., 
p. 9. The best portrayal of liberalism from the standpoint of totalitarian 
political theory is to be found in Carl Schmitt’s introduction and appendix 
to the second edition of his Begriffe des Politischen, as well as in his Die 
geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, 2d ed. (1926). 
11. As in Möller van den Bruck’s ‘definition’: “Liberalism is the freedom to 
have no convictions and yet to believe that precisely this is a conviction” 
(op. cit., p. 70). The height of confusion is reached when Krieck brings 
liberalism, capitalism, and Marxism together as “forms of counter-
movement” (op. cit., p. 32). 
12. Leopold von Wiese in Festgabe für Lujo Brentano, I (1925), p. 16: “I repeat my 
assertion that there practically has not yet been any [liberalism] to any 
adequate degree….” Richard Behrendt in Schmollers Jahrbuch, LX, No. 3, p. 
14: “In no period of world history has economic rationality operated in a 
decisive manner for a long period of time. One can and must deny that 
liberalism, even in the nineteenth century, was ever in this sense the ruling 
power.” On German liberalism, see H. Schroth, Welt- und Staatsideen des 
deutschen Liberalismus … (1931), especially pp. 69 and 95ff. 
13. “In private initiative in the area of production, the corporate state sees the 
most valuable and effective instrument for protecting the nation’s interests.” 
“The state intervenes in the economy only where private initiative is lacking 
or insufficient or where the state’s political interests are at stake.” Carta del 
Lavoro, Articles VII and IX, in Niederer, Der Ständestaat des Faschismus (1992), 
p. 179. “Fascism affirms fundamentally the private entrepreneur’s role as 
director of production and as instrument for the augmentation of wealth.” 
W. Koch, ‘Politik und Wirtschaft im Denken der faschistischen Führer’, 
Schmollers Jahrbuch (1933) No. 5, p. 44. For Germany, see especially the 
quotation given by Köllreutter, op. cit., pp. 179-180. 
14. Quoted in the periodical Aufbau, F. Karsen, ed., IV (1931), p. 233. 
15. Ibid., p. 258. 
16. Gide and Rist, Geschichte der volkswirtschaftlichen Lehrmeinungen (1913), p. 402. 
Wilhelm von Humboldt’s statement is characteristic: “The best human 
operations are those which most faithfully imitate the operations of nature.” 
‘Über die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staates’, Klassiker der Politik, VI 
(1922). p. 12. 
17. Classical statements are to be found in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, 
Book III, Chap. I, ‘Of the Natural Progress of Opulence’. On Bastiat, see 
Gide and Rist, op. cit., p. 373. For liberalism nothing “stands on such shaky 
ground as the assertion of the equality of all that bears a human visage” 
(Mises, op. cit., p. 25). Liberalism proceeds from the essential inequality of 
men, which is considered the presupposition of the harmony of the whole. 
See R. Thoma in Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber, II (1923), p. 40. 
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18. On this function of the liberalist concept of nature, see Myrdal, Das politische 
Element in der nationalökonomischen Doktrinbildung (1932), p. 177. The concept 
of nature, he writes, is a “cliché that functions just like every other political 
recommendation.” It is used “when anyone, in some political question, 
wants to assert something without adducing proof of it.” 
19. Möller van den Bruck, op. cit., pp. 200 and 210. 
20. Mussolini in Der Faschismus, trans. by Wagenführ (1933), p. 38. 
21. Hans J. Wolff in Recht und Staat in Geschichte und Gegenward (1933), No. 104, 
pp. 8-9. 
22.  See Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, III, No. 1, pp. 1ff. 
23. Translator’s note: ‘Grund’ means ‘ground’, ‘principle’, ‘reason’, or one of the 
four ‘causes’. 
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